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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to articulate and defend a general notion of 
'perspectives' and some of the ways that they relate to one another, 
in order to help to clarify one of the preliminary conceptual problems 
in cybernetics, namely, the relation between energy propagation 
(signal) and information propagation (message). The literature on 
this topic is meagre, although the literature relevant to it is too 
great to cover comprehensively. The approach closely follows the 
ideas of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend in the philosophy of science. 
It is found that the perspective notion has possible uses other than 
that of signal and message, since the same arguments apply to a wide 
variety of conceptual and human situations. The concepts considered 
include: point of view, field space, overall view, three broad categ- 
ories of perspective difference, compatible and incompatible perspec- 
tives, the effect of values and goals, and mutual sensitivity and 
relevance of perspective spaces. 
There are five chapters: the first introduces the perspective approach 
to the 'problem of meanings' and provides a brief introduction to the 
other four chapters; the second examines two fragments of the philos- 
ophical background; the third offers a relatively informal discussion 
of perspectives and perspective relativity; the fourth suggests an 
example of a terminology of perspectives (true to perspective relat- 
ivity, not the only possible one); and the final chapter summarises 
some immediate results as well as suggesting some possible specialised 
applications, including political models, information retrieval and 
machine intelligence. 
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I 
1.0 Introduction 
The problem of meanings, -ghat they are and how they relate to words, 
to reality and to people, is a traditional exercise for philosophers. 
When we communicate we use language, pictures and gestures, and we are 
tempted to believe that if we understood these transmissions well 
enough, we would thereby understand what communication is. This might 
have been the case if there were a direct correlation between these 
representations, at some level of detail, and what they represent. 
Clearly, however, this is not so; we all know that a sentence 
(for 
instance) whose meaning is perfectly clear to one person can mean 
something quite different to another, and nothing at all to a third. 
Therefore various philosophical approaches have focussed on such 
factors as the truth-conditions of a sentence, the utterance in 
context, the speaker's intention, the recipient's state of knowledge, 
dispositions to behave, emergent phenomena and so on. 
In these days this problem of meanings has become more than a purely 
philosophical exercise because it has practical ramifications in 
information systems engineering, and all the various unsolved 
philosophical approaches seem to have a bearing on this practical 
situation. Originally designed to make numerical calculations, 
computers can now in a real sense be regarded as manipulating symbols, 
as distinct from voltages in their circuitry. In other words, they 
have higher-level languages than machine code. This progress from 
automated abacus to symbol manipulator tempts us to look for a similar 
kind of ju: ap to the level of meanings. If a computer could mean what 
it says, then we can envisage it carrying an amount of detailed 
knowledge far beyond the capacity of a human brain, and in such a way 
that it can recall the appropriate piece of data by 'meaning-matching' 
rather than relying on matching keywords with no possibility of regard 
for their meaning. 
This notion of levels, though, can be misleading. There are many 
different kinds of hierarchy, but none of the familiar ones provide a 
suitable analogy for our problem. It will be suggested, therefore, 
that it would be more useful to try a different tack. 
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1.1 The problem 
The original task facing this research project was worded as follows: 
"A conceptual investigation aimed at integrating physical 
principles governing propagation of signals and those of 
cybernetics which apply to interactions between systems judged 
continuously by some criterion of success. This entails an 
extension of the concept of a signal carrying a message. While 
it is hoped that the applications will be of great generality, 
the project will at first be limited to some cases of human 
communication. " 
The theoretical problem, then, was to find the relation between the 
transmission of a signal and the different aspects of the message it 
carries. The search began for a general theory of communication, 
which includes the semantic content in a message and the sender's 
intentions as well as the mathematical theory. ;f we can understand 
the relationship between meanings and symbol-strings, said our 
premise, then perhaps we shall be able to manipulate meanings as 
easily as we currently handle strings. 
Aside from the practical aspect there is the pervasive hope that some 
light will be shed on certain philosophical problems, in particular 
that of the possibility or otherwise of a conscious machine. Beside 
the problem of the 'relation between' signal and message we also have 
the classic philosophical problems of duality, such as that of the 
'relation between' mind and body or, more specifically, mind and 
brain. 
1.1.1 Approaches to a solution 
In the course of the project there were some changes of direction, 
usually because the subject-matter was too large and the effort was 
concentrated at the wrong end. It appeared that many different but 
obviously related concepts needed to be integrated: consciousness, 
goal-directedness, feedback, entropy, messages, coding, values, 
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significance, stability and so on. There was at that stage a strong 
desire for a system of categories which is small and manageable but 
has a place for all these concepts. The various approaches to solving 
the problem tended to fall into two types: either 
a) to create a massive comprehensive framework and aim at fitting 
the various concepts into it, or 
b) to begin with the individual concepts and aim at adding them 
piecemeal by bridging laws to some existing theoretical 
structure. 
The attempt, for instance, to integrate all the different senses of 
'information' began with looking at Shannon and Weaver's mathematical 
theory of communication. The hope was either to find weaknesses in 
their theory or alternatively to extend it, in the way Weaver hoped 
for, to cover meanings and intentions. This strategy is an example of 
approach b) above, to which we shall return in a moment. 
1 .1 . 1.1 Stewart's Ternality 
D. J. Stewart's theory of Ternality, as yet unpublished, is an example 
of the former approach to the kind of integration we are looking 
for. 
In that theory, the whole of objective reality consists of three 
"domains", called respectively primary, secondary and tertiary. Each 
feature of the world may or may not (Stewart hypothesises that it 
does) have a component in each of the three domains; such features are 
called "terns". There is, he says, a genuine sense of discovery in 
using the theory to look for 'missing' components of terns, in a way 
analogous to using the Periodic Table to look for new elements. 
Work is an example of a tern; primary work is physical labour, 
secondary work is work with information (discrimimable forms), and 
tertiary work is that which involves value judgments, e. g. design. 
The first two domains (which already coexist in physics) are 
exemplified by the distinction and relation between energy propagation 
and information propagation. The tertiary domain is the domain of 
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desires, the domain where it matters which message is sent. One 
hypothesis is that the relation between the primary and secondary 
domains is analogous to that between the secondary and tertiary. 
Our original problem, put in terms of the theory of ternality, could 
be expressed thus: to clarify the relations between propagation in the 
primary domain and that in the secondary domain, and then if any 
progress has been made, to go on to the relation between the secondary 
and tertiary domains. 
Ternality is difficult; and that is not its only problem. Like all 
such systems, it does not draw limits around itself, and therefore 
requires a certain philosophical outlook. In particular, one of its 
motives is an answer to dualism: the idea is to extend physics into a 
third domain (the first two being exemplified by mechanics and thermo- 
dynamics) in order to account for such phenomena as consciousness. 
Whether such a philosophy is 'correct' or not is not at issue; it 
suffices to note that it is controversial (otherwise it would be much 
easier to understand) and ipso facto of limited use, except by its 
creator and any others who are completely at home with it. It is, in 
brief, one perspective among others. 
But the main problem with ternality, where the problem of signal and 
message is concerned, is that however well-articulated the theory is 
the problem still remains, namely that of trying to integrate two (or 
more) well-defined areas into a single theory. Defining the two sides 
of a duality in greater and greater detail does nothing to make their 
mutual integration easier, unless they do in fact overlap or can be 
embedded in a larger theory. This overlapping or embedding is only 
one of several kinds of perspective difference, and the others are 
ignored by this kind of approach. 
This notion of perspective difference emerged while puzzling about 
ternality and about dualities in general. A duality is characterised 
by the fact that the two sides (signal and message, or mind and brain, 
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for example) are at once mutually irrelevant and mutually essential: 
irrelevant in the sense that concepts appropriate to one are inapplic- 
able to the other, and essential in the sense that, in general, one 
cannot exist without the other. The two sides are in the same place, 
but not in the same space. 
That the one might be a substratum, or underpinning, for the other is 
a common line of thought throughout Western philosophy, since the 
dependence seems not to be entirely symmetrical. A signal without a 
message is quite possible, we just call it noise; whereas a message 
without some physical propagation to carry it is ultimately mysteri- 
ous. Similarly, we are comfortable with the notion of an unconscious 
brain, but disembodied consciousness is another matter. Nevertheless, 
the notion of substratum, however couched, continues to defy coherent 
expression. 
Under these conditions, the notion that these dualities might be no 
more (and no less) than cases of the same thing viewed differently 
does have interesting possibilities. If this notion could be made 
precise enough, we could then understand what kind of perspective 
difference we are dealing with and proceed accordingly. If the two 
spaces are incompatible, it makes no sense to try to integrate them. 
Understanding precisely in what respects they are incompatible might 
show us how to manipulate the two spaces most appropriately. This 
might not only help with problems of duality, but also shed light on 
the problem of meanings and prevent fruitless searches for nonexistent 
relations in general. 
Before we launch into a theory of perspectives, let us return to an 
example of the second type of approach to the problem of meanings 
mentioned in the last section. This example is Nauta (1972). We find 
there, in passing, a reference to the perspective notion. After that 
we shall look at some other literature with a view to finding more 
references to this notion. Not surprisingly, it is frequently touched 
upon. What is surprising is that it appears never to have been taken 
quite far enough. 
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1.1.1.2 17auta's analysis of the information concept 
Nauta's The I. Pieaning of Information (? Iauta, 1972) does not introduce a 
new terminology but offers an interdisciplinary study of the "informa- 
tion theme" from the points of view of semiotics and cybernetics. 
Distinctions are drawn, a framework is set _ip, and various 
different 
versions of the information concept are placed in the framework. It 
is an excellent book, surprisingly not often cited. 
Nauta makes (and elaborates) the point that information (in the sense 
of being informed, which is the most problematic sense) is relative to 
the interpreter; thus what is meaningless noise to one person might be 
highly relevant or useful information to another. The point is also 
made, though not laboured, that mass/energy (H/E-) and information 
(i-) are in different perspectives: 
"... one and the same (open) system can be considered as an M/E- 
system and as an i-system; in the latter case the physical state 
of the system is viewed as an interior state in which certain 
purposeful norms and specific forms of intelligence have been 
interiorized. This is just a matter of giving a thing a 
different name when it is seen from a different point of view. 
Ti cybernetics an abstraction is made of the material and 
energetic aspects of a system: only the information and form 
aspects are important. In classic mechanics, on the other hand, 
special attention is paid to the material and energetic aspects. " 
(Nauta, 1972, p. 75) (his italics, my bold type) 
Unfortunately rlauta does not develop this line of thin'cing, but rather 
seems to regard it as an expression of the obvious (which, indeed, it 
is) and leaves it there, going on to More detailed and technical 
discussion of the various distinctions to be drawn. The idea is that 
the different levels of information processing, called respectively 
transmissional (Shannon's mathematical theory), syntactic, semantic 
and pragmatic, are related by embedding; thus syntactics presupposes 
transmission theory, semantics presupposes syntactics and transmission 
theory, and pragmatics presupposes the other three. 
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1.1.2 The perspective notion in recent literature 
Nauta's point about points of view is echoed in Sowa 
(1984), in the 
last chapter of an overview of knowledge-based systems. An aspect of 
human thinking that has yet to be adequately modelled is "conceptual 
relativity": 
"The crucial problem is that the world is a continuum and 
concepts are discrete. For any specific purpose, a discrete 
model can form a workable approximation to a continuum, but it is 
always an approximation that must leave out features that may be 
essential for other purposes. " (Sowa 1984 p"345) 
Sowa then quotes the psychologist E. R. Jaensch, who emphasised in 1930 
a principle of tolerance - that the only way to approach the whole of 
reality is to move around among different categorial structures. 
Earlier still, Kierkegaard (1843, Sowa's reference) pointed out the 
possibility of mutually incompatible world-views which were neverthe- 
less each quite coherent; in Kierkegaard's example one view was esth- 
etic, the other ethical. But the message is even more ancient: Sowa 
also points to Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching and the Zen koans, which 
carried, long before Western philosophy began, the theme of the 
arbitrariness of our conceptual divisions of the world. 
One result of this arbitrariness (we notice) is that many if not most 
arguments (at least about matters of opinion or speculation) are at 
cross-purposes and have no genuine point at issue. The problem is 
not: now do I convince him that I am right? but becomes: how do I 
articulate my side of the discussion (my 'point of view') in such a 
way that he will understand and thereby agree with me? Each side is 
trying, not to force the other to agree, but to help the other to 'see 
things my way'. Some fortunate souls quickly learn that a very good 
way to communicate is first to listen carefully and try to 'put 
oneself in their position'. Then it is found often enough that they 
agreed all along and that the apparent controversy was only the result 
of a quite harmless difference in perspective. 
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Not that all perspective differences are ýiar^ýlesz ; indeed very often a 
great deal of power is at stake, as in polities or medicine. Our 
problem, however, is purely technical and therefore need not involve 
vested interest. 
Langefors (1980) looks at the problem of different views frora a data- 
base engineering standpoint. He criticises the literature on data- 
bases for the way the term 'user view' is generally restricted to mean 
the user's view of the data, as distinct from his view of the world as 
represented by the data. The latter Langefors calls the "infological/ 
conceptual" view, and his paper points out the importance of consider- 
ing the infological aspects in data base design: 
"The perspective of information systems theory and infology 
studies has been that to design the right data and data systems 
one has to begin with the questions about the information or 
knowledge that the data are to represent. This means that the 
information content of the data in the system has to be d3rined 
and described in a way that is independent of how the data are 
handled in the system. " (Langefors, 1980, p. 17) 
Further: 
"We shall see that "user views" are not merely of importance to 
the vray data are to be organised in the store. They are crucial 
to the possibility for the users to interpret the data. Thus, 
not only i: iust the data be arranged and ordered to allow efficient 
processing of the data, according to some view. The data 
themselves will need to be changed iii order to represent the same 
information to users with a different view. " "(Ibid, p. 13) 
It is 'information' -in this sense which is meant by the term message. 
The user view, or "receiving structure" for which the data design has 
to be made is the general background knowledge of what the various 
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elements in the data mean -a pre-existing framework which must be 
known in advance for the user to gain any in°ormation. This general 
background is what we will be calling the 'perspective space'. But: 
"It should be noticed that the insight that the interpretation of 
a record (for instance, a sentence) depends on the world view S 
of the "user" does not imply that the view S must be explicitly 
modelled in a schema, for instance. The only thing that it 
implies is that any record may only convey information to some 
users and, hence, it is important to ensure that the data (the 
record) are designed with proper attention given to the views, S, 
of the intended users. " (Ibid. p. 23) 
Langefors' conclusions are of considerable interest, and are quoted 
here at length. "Community view" refers to a kind of overall view of 
the data, defined by the database administrator, to which all data 
must be adapted, and within which all particular user views are 
assumed to be found, and "external schema" refers to a model, within 
the system, of a particular user view: 
"The infological (or conceptual) aspects of data and information 
- as well as of "user views" - that has been discussed in this 
article imply some fundamental disagreement with the current data 
base theory aspect... of user views, community view and external 
schema. Below four aspects are described: 
"1) If the data to be used by a particular user have been 
modified in order to be consistent with some kind of "community 
view", they may be unintelligible to the users, no matter what 
data selection and rearrangement is brought about by the use of 
the external schema. In other words, it may be . mpossible to 
make some data "shareable". 
"2) The user's view of data depends on his view of the world. To 
such a view one or more sets of data may be adapted. The user 
may then want to use the same data for the solution of distinct 
10 
tasks. Based on the same view of ý'ze data _ie i"nýr talus . rant 
to 
process them in distinct ways and, for t'iat mason, 'ie may want 
to arrange them differently. ^_'hi, d : -: ay call L'or ýaistinct external 
schemas that, however, have to be based on t'le user view. 
The interpretation of some data must aZ,, )a js he based on the 
same-user view - the view for which tha. data have been 
designed. But... the application pro r . nmer... may view 
the data 
according to how they are to be processed - rather than according 
to what they mean. But the data must always , Wean the same while 
distinct inferences are drawn from them in distinct applications. 
"3) The idea of one community view, declared by one conceptual or 
infological schema has to be replaced by a system of conceptual 
(or infological) schemas. One or more of these... subschemas... 
may describe such information as has been possible to establish 
as "community" information. This cannot be decided by the "data 
base administrator". It must be determined through learning and 
negotiation among the relevant users. Some other infological/ 
conceptual subschemas may describe information that can be shared 
by distinct user groups but that requires distinct frames-of- 
reference for distinct user groups. ". 'iris assumes that the users 
have "d atinct but reconcilable" infological Tiests. The Implica- 
tion here is that distinct users will require distýinct data to 
obtain the same information (approximately). This is the case of 
"shareable information" but non-shareable data. Finally there 
will be... subschemas declaring user views that are irreconcilable 
and that, hence, correspond to non-shareable data. 
"4) The hypothesis - rorwarded above - that there will be user 
views that are incompatible, implies that the information systems 
or data bases will contain "islands" )f non-: shareable data. One 
consequence is that it will also be pointless to try to cater for 
formal consistency testing among distinct subsystems. Recognis- 
ing this fact (if it is a fact) will save a lot of useless 
analysis, formalisation, and verification work as well as a lot 
of gathering of testing data. "Total data base integrity" will 
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be meaningless and impossible, while "island-wise" integrity will 
still be important - and easier to achieve. " (Ibid. pp31-32) 
In sum, Langefors is saying that no single community view of data is 
suitable for all users' views of the world; nevertheless different 
user views, even incompatible ones, have to be catered for (though not 
necessarily incorporated in the database in the form of schemas). 
Instead of one community view, there needs to be a system of distinct 
views. These must be grouped according to the shareability of the 
data by negotiation among the relevant users, and not by initial fiat. 
There is the the additional complication that even within a particular 
view, the data might need to be arranged differently for different 
tasks, while still meaning the same. It is, he argues, fruitless to 
attempt to integrate data designed for incompatible views, and better 
to concentrate on the less ambitious task of seeing that data for a 
particular view or set of compatible views is consistent. 
We shall encounter several more diverse references to the perspective 
notion, especially in chapter 2 where the philosophical background of 
this project will be discussed, and in chapter 5 where some examples 
of problems and possible indications of solutions are brought together 
after the perspective concepts have been properly introduced. 
1.1.3 The aim of this thesis 
As we have seen, this relativity of meanings to perspectives which are 
frequently incompatible is a well-recognised fact. The aim of this 
project is therefore not simply to point it out again, but to try to 
show that it need not always be a problem and can in some contexts be 
positively useful in solving existing problems. 
Relativity is not the same as relativism, which is a philosophical 
doctrine, perhaps more often used as an accusation than espoused. In 
the quest for certainty, a philosopher is accused of relativism if his 
views entail that no-one sees the world more correctly than anyone 
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else, that truth has no objective standard and may vary from person to 
person. Usually in practice the relativism is qualified; truth is 
said to be relative to something, so there is ethical, epistemologi- 
cal, cultural and psychological relativism. If the relativity is to 
something we can all point to and understand, then it is, for us, 
nothing more sinister than relatedness. 
Gregory, in Mind in Science, points out in the context of a discussion 
of the development of physics: 
"Einstein, in 1905, took the unprecedented step of accepting 
inconsistencies between observations and accounts from different 
reference frames, and saying that although they are inconsistent 
they are all equally valid. This, it seems, is Einstein's key 
contribution. Its significance is perhaps still not fully 
appreciated in philosophical discussions of epistemology; for we 
still do not seem to be clear about what kinds of inconsistency 
we can live with, and which must be resolved for acceptable 
rational accounts of Matter and Mind. " (Gregory, 1981 , p. 531 
) 
;; ie might add: ... and for accounts of signal and message, entropy and 
meaning, and so on. Perspective relativity might provide a way of 
clearing some of the ground for resolving this problem of which kinds 
of inconsistency we can find acceptable, and even useful. However, 
while it is easy enough to accept relativity as obvious where we are 
dealing with ordinary, everyday perspective shifts, it does seem that 
we all suffer from a sort of intellectual vertigo when we notice that 
it might also allow for perspectives now or forever beyond our ken or 
when certain conceptual and perceptual habits are challenged. This is 
not necessarily undesirable, because habits do provide considerable 
intellectual economy, but it is a point worth remembering because it 
suggests a difficulty where there need not be one. 
The idea of perspective relativity, then, is not a statement which 
competes for truth value with other statements, neither is it a state- 
ment of how things ought to be. Everyday perspective terminology is 
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widely used; wherever one comes across the terms 'perspective', 
'view', 'point of view', 'another angle on it', 'a new standpoint', )r 
any other use of the metaphor of a change of perspective for a new -lay 
of looking at anything, the concept is being recognised more or less 
explicitly. On an even more mundane level, we are constantly changing 
our perspective on the world as we go about our business; every ti; e a 
new problem, however minor, commands our attention we shift to those 
aspects of the world which relate to that problem and ignore all t`-a 
others for the moment. Sowa points to 'conceptual relativity' as a 
difficulty and suggests, with the ancient Buddhists and Taoists, that 
one has to be in the state of perfect enlightenment before one is free 
of this finitude of particular ways of looking. In this project we 
aim to show that there is a clear sense in which this relativity can 
be a positive asset, requiring not spiritual enlightenment but oni: ' 
the spirit of tolerance which Jaensch called for. For a particular 
purpose, it is not only perfectly feasible but a practical necessi 7 
to leave out irrelevant material (as long as it is retained somewhere 
for use when it is needed). If it were otherwise, we would have to 
bring the entire extent of our knowledge to every little problem. 
Recognising that there are limitations to a concept's relatedness -ýO 
other concepts also paradoxically allows us to use it with impunity, 
because we know it need not apply beyond the present context. 
As an illustration of the significance of what we are suggesting, 
consider for example the two traditional approaches to (the nature cf) 
truth, namely the correspondence theories and the coherence theories. 
The bone of contention is this: in virtue of what circumstance are 
some propositions true and others false? Each theory says something 
which rings true, if only on reflection. The correspondence appr,; a h 
begins with the perfectly reasonable hunch that if a proposition is to 
be true, it must express what is the case as a matter of fact in 
real world. Difficulties arise when the theorists try to state exact- 
ly what the nature of this correspondence consists in, what a 'prepos- 
ition' and a 'fact' are, and when they have to take into account : -. ow 
far or under what conditions a fact obtains, for example, 'it is 
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raining', or 'water boils at 100 degrees'. Thou, 'i : ri th all philos- 
ophy, there is the problem of fitting everything i: Zto a theory .. ihich 
is void of contradictions; in this problem the liar paradox figures 
large. Ultimately, even Tarski's elegant "semantic conception of 
truth" leaves correspondence unanalysed. The coherence theorists, 
aware of this difficulty as it existed since Plato, threor out corres- 
pondence altogether, thereby removing the only basis we have of 
ascertaining the truth of empirical statements, which is to look and 
see, and instead said that truth of a proposition consists in its 
fitting into a coherent system with all the other true statements. 
This might be the case in mathematics, but they hold it for all 
statements by the traditional weapon of idealism, the doctrine of 
internal relations. This doctrine states that any relational fact, 
e. g. that x is next to y, is a fact about the natures of x and y; that 
nothing would be what it is if its relations to other things were 
different. Any relations, on this view, are 'internal' to the objects 
related, and are thus denied ultimate reality themselves. It follows 
from this that everything enters into the nature of any given thing, 
so that ultimately only one all-comprehensive entity exists. Since, 
as a special case, the object of perception is related to mind, this 
all-embracing entity is mental, so the argument does. 
This problem of truth, or at least the existence of it, interests us 
on two levels. First, we have an example of two views of something, 
each of which has difficulty accounting for everything they grant it to 
account for; and secondly, the problem of truth itself has a bearing 
on the perspective notion. 
On the first point, the perspective idea suggests that the points that 
either side makes do not have to refute the other side, since they 
deal with quite different aspects of, and hence perspectives on, 
truth. If a judgment contradicts another judgment, within a particu- 
lar perspective, then most of us would agree that at least one of them 
is wrong (coherence); but if two judgments seem to contradict each 
other and yet are both manifestly true, we would conclude that the 
logical relation was wrongly applied (correspondence), perhaps owing 
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to a perspective difference. 
On the second point, we would like the perspective notion to include a 
working hypothesis as to what truth is, which does not Jay us open to 
the charge that we are making the truth of a statement a matter of 
arbitrary choice. We want to say that truth consists not in the form 
of words, even in "a sentence in language L", but somehow in the 
sentence (or other form of representation) in context. Here we can 
use something similar, in spirit at least, to the doctrine of internal 
relations - disconnected from idealism. Any statement can be qualif- 
ied (clarified) to an indefinite degree of precision if a sufficiently 
perverse devil's advocate is present. For example, snow is white: 
what, all snow? even when it's dirty or stained? what about the 
sparkles? it looks pink through my goggles, etc, etc. These are not 
counterexamples to the whiteness of snow, since they do not deny the 
original statement; they merely serve to isolate the particular pers- 
pective sufficiently to allow the possibility of verification. There 
is nothing absolute about snow being white unless the statement is 
specifically excluding all those perspectives on snow. There seems to 
be no empirical statement to which a similar argument does not apply. 
A statement of absolute truth must at least state exactly what it 
means and this entails giving the entire relevant context, which could 
go on indefinitely if the devil's advocate remains unsatisfied. 
In conversation such a devil's advocate is usually regarded as a 
nuisance, deliberately missing the point to appear clever. But prov- 
ided he is less concerned with definitions, and more with possible 
alternative meanings or views, he is a very useful tool for thought in 
separating perspective spaces. Definitions play a minimal part in 
this project, since they occur within particular, more or less formal 
perspective spaces and provide truth, in a sense, artificially. Our 
business is to look at relations between perspectives, and in this 
realm showing, rather than telling, is likely to be paramount. 
If we could find a way to distinguish between different kinds of 
perspective difference, it would then be possible to determine whether 
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or not two particular perspectives can be intt-grat:! d and if not, . -rhy 
riot. Is a part of this, we should be able to find cl ear c ri t--. ria as 
to what is relevant to a particular problem and . ghat may safely be 
omitted, in order not to bring the whole world to bear )n every 
problem. With such a framework, we should be able to see the merits 
of alternative views, without doing violence to the present one. 
What we are aiming at, then, is a way of making an everyday notion - 
namely that we are constantly using different perspecti, res and not 
just one comprehensive world-view - precise enough to be useful in 
mapping meanings, rather than definitions. This has not, to the 
writer's knowledge, been tried before. Because this is a new treat- 
ment of a familiar concept, new terminology will be minimal but there 
will necessarily be some tightening up of the everyday idiom. Never- 
theless, true to the spirit of the last paragraph and remembering the 
devil's advocate, anything that looks like a definition should be 
regarded rather as an indication. Rigour is important, but it is 
relatively easy to diagnose the lack of it; the bigger problem here is 
style because, in a way that is not esoteric or mysterious, Pre must 
needs venture outside the realm of logic to explain what we mean. 
1.2 Perspective Relativity 
The approach to the general problem of meanings which will be proposed 
and defended in this dissertation is, as we have seen, more of the 
nature of a toolkit than a hypothesis, because it is well enough 
recognised and it does not (hopefully) disagree with anyone's particu- 
lar view. ? 'le hope to work towards a way of classifying, or mapping, 
different views without modifying them as they stand. `1e shall call 
this proto-toolkit Perspective Relativity, because that is exactly 
what it is. In the text it is often abbreviated to 'PRA. 
PR begins with the following: 
1) There is always more than one way of looking at something 
2) Any empirical statement can be both true and false, depending on 
how you look at it 
17 
3) Incompatible perspectives do not ipso facto refute one another's 
claim to appropriateness 
4) Any empirical statement is potentially ambiguous, so communication 
requires a shared perspective 
5) Appropriateness of a perspective depends on the purpose in hand, 
rather than the perspective itself. 
These statements are very ordinary, even platitudes on the commonsense 
level. In technical philosophical discussion, however, they are 
generally either ignored, or regarded as trivial, or regarded as 
excruciatingly naive - especially 1) and 2). There is still lively 
debate arising from Kuhn's insight (of which more anon) that the 
progress of science is a history of paradigm shifts rather than a 
smooth accumulation of one coherent body of knowledge. In the absence 
of firm criteria for adopting one paradigm rather than another, it is 
hotly suggested by those who require the One Correct Perspective that 
Kuhn allows no progress in science at all. The mundane platitude that 
there is always another way of looking at anything is thought not to 
apply to those matters which really matter. Suggestion 2) is even 
worse - it is manifestly absurd; but it is only absurd if applied 
within a particular system where ambiguity is eliminated artificially. 
Perspective relativity does not dispute that, it only points out that 
in another system the truth-value can be different. For example, it 
is raining; nonsense, it's not raining, it's pouring!, or alternative- 
ly, it's not raining, just drizzling! We hear C. E. M. Joad's haunting 
refrain: "it all depends on what you mean by... ". Given these consid- 
erations, the syntactic unit that individuates a meaning is not a 
sentence in natural language, much less a word. Sentences only point 
to meanings when the perspective is understood; here we find Cherry's 
(1978) point that communication is essentially sharing. 
Suggestions 3) and 5) deal with appropriateness. It is our sense of 
appropriateness which guides us towards an intended meaning, and if we 
are to begin to understand how to manipulate meanings we must first 
understand how appropriateness relates to them. Like morality, it 
defies coherent explanation; it seems to be a matter of how it feels. 
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In chapters 3 and 4 an attempt will be made to develop these lines of 
thinking and work towards clearing some of the ground for any formal 
theoretical treatment of the problem of meanings which might seem 
appropriate to a particular area. Such a formal treatment will not be 
attempted here; this is an exploratory study of possibilities, with no 
specific application in mind. However, some possible applications 
might be indicated. 
1.2.1 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this chapter will consist of a fairly extended introduc- 
tion to the remaining chapters, in order to provide an overall view of 
the way the thesis is laid out. Since a wide range of apparently 
disparate areas are clearly relevant to our topic, it is desirable at 
this early stage to indicate briefly those areas that we shall be 
looking at, and show how they fit into the overall theme. 
1.2.2 Philosophical background 
PR is not something that is either true or untrue - in that sense, it 
is not a doctrine but a way of looking at ways of looking. PR's very 
neutrality will, however, call for further philosophical discussion, 
which will be the substance of chapter 2. Perspective relativity must 
be shown to be philosophically acceptable, in particular in its rela- 
tion to relativism and realism. At the same time, it must be shown to 
be genuinely useful - that it is not, by its harmlessness, thereby 
totally vacuous. Finally, we should consider why, if it is all of 
these things, has it not been developed before? 
Chapter 2 looks at some related approaches in the history of philos- 
ophy and the philosophy of science. In the first section we shall 
look at the movement in American philosophy in the 1920's and 30's of 
direct realism which Murphy called "objective relativism" and which 
McGilvary developed under the heading "perspective realism". Although 
it is usually taken to imply a 'subjectivist' metaphysics, relativism 
was there argued to be consistent with the notion of an objective 
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reality. The main objective of the first part of Chapter 2 is there- 
fore to try to find out where this movement failed and whether we can 
salvage anything useful from it, given that our purpose is different 
from theirs. 
In the second section of Chapter 2 we shall look at the controversy 
surrounding 'the new image of science' as it has developed from Kuhn's 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962), which considers 
the implications of incompatible perspectives. The concept of a 
paradigm's being inextricable from an observation has been taken to 
lead to the thesis that progress in science is impossible, and that we 
know no more about the world than Aristotle did. Section 2.2 and its 
subsidiaries argue that this fear is unfounded and that multiple 
perspectives, especially mutually incompatible ones, provide a more 
fruitful approach to understanding the world than concentration on a 
single one can. 
1.2.2.1 Murphy and McGilvary 
The principal champion of "objective relativism", and the one who gave 
the movement that name, was A. E. Murphy. In particular, the movement 
was an attempt to account for the fact, puzzling to some philosophers 
of perception, that the same thing looks different from different 
points of view, and yet it is still the same thing. The difficulty is 
to avoid dualism and indirect realism, both of which place something 
in between the perceiver and the object. Murphy pointed to a perva- 
sive assumption, namely that the 'relative' is incompatible with 
objectivity, and suggested that the assumption could legitimately be 
put aside. He found Dewey and Whitehead more intelligible when read 
this way, and especially cited Whitehead's notion of "the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness". If events, rather than objects, are regarded 
as more fundamentally concrete, then one result is that the relativity 
so deplored by those who crave objectivity is 
"... here no other than the fact of relatedness" (Murphy 1927 p58) 
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and thereby loses its sting. 
While Murphy had attempted to clear the ground for a theory of objec- 
tive relativism, it was E. B. McGilvary who made the most complete 
attempt at such a theory, which he called "perspective realism": 
"... perhaps perspective realism... can be provisionally defined as 
a philosophical theory that regards every experience, including 
the experience of a philosophical theory, as the real objective 
world appearing in the perspective of an experiencing organism. " 
(McGilvary, 1956 p6) 
McGilvary is principally concerned to analyse consciousness as the 
converse of appearing, and he thereby blocks the suggestion that we 
can judge whether or not something is really the way it seems. This 
makes illusion and hallucination, the other main problem for direct 
realism, difficult for McGilvary to account for. His theory did not 
allow for the possibility of other analyses of consciousness in other 
perspectives, and that one of these might account for the choice of 
the particular perspective space in which the illusion is viewed. In 
any case we, who have no vested interest in a particular view of 
consciousness, can say that any non-veridical perception arises from 
the wrong choice of perspective space. We know a lot about illusions 
(thanks largely to Gregory), and many of them can be exposed by comp- 
arison with other perspectives. Hallucinations are more extreme, and 
arise within the brain, but still a similar argument may apply; even 
the sufferer can shift perspective to try to verify the apparition, 
and others can look for its cause in the nervous system, at least in 
principle. Gregory argues: 
"Any sense organ can give false information: pressure on the eye 
makes us see light in darkness; electrical stimulation of any 
sensory endings will produce the experience normally given by 
that sense. Similarly, if movement is represented in neural 
pathways, we should expect to experience illusions of movement if 
these pathways are activated or disturbed. " (Gregory, 1977 p103) 
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The other principal objection to McGilvary is his result that all 
perspectives are equally valid, something which at first sight is 
manifestly absurd. In our view, however, it is only absurd if it is a 
statement of a philosophical position, in which case it defeats itself 
by allowing all the positions it explicitly denies. Since McGilvary 
was mostly concerned with a problem in epistemology with a standard 
formulation, he did not extend the theory to accommodate incompatible 
perspectives; indeed, he was trying to fit all perspectives into the 
same space, by adding dimensions (e. g. time, in the case of the dis- 
tant star) if necessary. If his theory had, instead, allowed for 
incompatible but equally coherent perspectives on everything, and were 
viewed as a strategy or policy rather than an all-embracing statement 
of philosophical truth, its original promise might have been restored. 
As it was, Murphy later had a change of heart and became one of its 
most disparaging critics. 
1.2.2.2 Kuhn's paradigms 
Since the demise during the nineteenth century of the speculative 
system-building mode of philosophy in favour of the new "scientific 
philosophy", of which objective relativism was a part, there inevit- 
ably emerged a new orthodoxy - albeit of a different kind. Reichen- 
bach tells us that: 
"Ever since the death of Kant in 1804 science has gone through a 
development, gradual at first and rapidly increasing in tempo, in 
which it abandoned all absolute truths and preconceived ideas. " 
(Reichenbach, 1951, p. 125) 
This new orthodoxy was based on the assumption - revolutionary at the 
time - that all preconceived ideas could be laid to one side and a 
scientific observation could be made with a pure, although specially 
trained, mind. No theory was necessary in viewing Nature, it was just 
a matter of asking questions and setting up experiments which would 
show the answers. But this early confidence in the new empiricism was 
22 
soon tempered, especially by Hume's articulate scepticism about causal 
links and about the inference from the observed to the unobserved - 
the problem of induction. Reichenbach warns of the danger that the 
ancient quest for certainty is a tough habit to break. 
"... even if the problems are seen, the solutions might still be 
sought along those paths which an age-old tradition has glorified 
and which the student of our universities, in the formative years 
of his scientific training, has usually not learned to criti- 
cize. " (Ibid., p. 31 1) 
Scientists themselves, naturally, have always had very little time for 
the pronouncements of philosophers on how they should go about their 
work. They have continued to design experiments and formulate theor- 
ies with results that are undisputedly successful. By the middle of 
this century science had some history, and Thomas Kuhn took the oppor- 
tunity to look back at the development of scientific theories; he 
found what appeared to be a pattern. The pattern was a succession of 
scientific revolutions, or paradigm shifts, punctuating periods of 
data-collection and theory-refinement according to the current para- 
digm. A paradigm is not just a theory but: 
"... theory, methods and standards together, usually in an 
inextricable mixture" (Kuhn, 1962 p. 109) 
and a paradigm shift, being such a wholesale change of view, renders 
all the results of the old one obsolete. 
This gave the quest for certainty a blow that no-one could ignore, for 
it is now not only the unobserved that we cannot know for certain, but 
the observed results as well, since they are so heavily dependent on 
the theory which prompted them. It is inferred, though not by Kuhn, 
that science has not progressed at all, but is on an inescapable 
treadmill. Therefore, true to Reichenbach's warning, Kuhn's ideas are 
still controversial although the spirit of "the new image of science" 
is now common currency. Paradoxically, one critic of Kuhn claims that 
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Kuhn and his followers are themselves victims of the profound habit of 
"deductivism" - that nothing but certainty will do. 
The arguments relating to Kuhn's insight also apply to perspective 
relativity in a similar way, so they call for careful examination in 
chapter 2. Kuhn himself pointed out that the notion of a paradigm was 
his key to reading Aristotle, the point being that it is precisely the 
recognition of a multiplicity of paradigms which makes other views 
available to us. Obsolete, perhaps, in the current view, the super- 
seded results can come to life again if we will only step into their 
perspective space for a little while. 
1.2.3 The intuitive idiom 
The main purpose of chapter 3 is to explore the everyday idiom of 
perspectives, to see how far it has been, and can be, taken as it 
stands, and to bring together considerations necessary for a more 
formal treatment, such as, what we would like it to do for us and what 
are the pitfalls to avoid? 
In the course of this discussion, we find ourselves distinguishing 
three aspects of a perspective which could be of use to us, namely, 
the theoretical (representation), practical and 'being there' aspects 
(see chapter 3 section 3.3). This is, of course, not an attempt at 
an exhaustive list; in this context it would make no sense to ask for 
one. There will always be more aspects to something than anyone can 
name, and the aspects of a perspective are no exception. (Perhaps 
there is a flavour here of Spinoza's notion that of all the infinite 
aspects of God, thought and extension are the only two that are mani- 
fest to us. ) (Spinoza, 1677, or see the Enc. Phil. 1967 'Spinoza'. ) 
Usually it is the Theory aspect, where the perspective is expressed by 
such means as language, diagrams and gesture, that tends to be consid- 
ered primary. Thus Searle tells us: 
"On my view, the world divides the way we divide it, and our main 
24 
way of dividing things up is in language. Our concept of reality 
is a matter of our linguistic categories. " (Searle, in Magee (ed), 
1978) 
Whorf (1956) also stresses the importance of a particular language's 
categories in a view of the world. Because of this, some foreign 
languages are more difficult to learn than others. Nevertheless, they 
can be learned. To say that language precedes and determines the way 
of looking is a little like saying the chicken came before the egg. 
Learning and teaching a language involves showing as well as telling. 
The three aspects are in many ways independent of one another, but in 
other respects they are obviously intimately related, and do constrain 
one another in certain specific ways. 
These three aspects of a particular perspective cannot by themselves 
lead us to a shift to other perspective spaces, and so the problem of 
appropriateness and relevance of a perspective to a situation and a 
problem, or purpose, is central. The present situation on the one 
hand, and the purpose on the other, somehow determine whether a 
particular perspective is appropriate or not. Human beings generally 
switch without thinking about it, where the situation is familiar, but 
on occasions where the new perspective is completely new there is a 
quality of sudden insight, or revolution. The only difference, it 
seems, between these two types of shift is that in the latter the new 
perspective is seen for the first time. If it is useful, it will soon 
become as familiar as any other way of looking. 
We have already noticed that the meaning of a sentence is not individ- 
uated by the sentence itself. Even if all the concepts are clearly 
defined, the sentence can still remain ambiguous to a perverse devil's 
advocate. On the other hand, discussion of the speaker's intentions 
towards the recipient tends to bring in many psychological factors 
which seem extraneous. It is considered here that the meaning of a 
sentence, or any other form of representation of a fragment of the 
world, can in principle be individuated by indicating the particular 
perspective space to which the representation refers and (if relevant) 
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the point of view in the space. That is, any ambiguity in a sentence 
which is otherwise well-formed and clear, is due to ambiguity in the 
perspective to which it refers. Only a recipient who already has 
experience in that perspective space will be able to find the meaning 
in it. 
This process of settling on the perspective space that the speaker has 
in mind - something we do all the time without thinking about it - is 
probably the most difficult aspect of communication to understand well 
enough to simulate in AI systems. It would have to be tackled by some 
kind of search, a process closer to the devil's advocate routine than 
the sympathetic listener. The search, however, is not for concepts 
(or strings of symbols which stand for concepts), but for a space in 
which the concepts make sense. 
The trigger for an appropriateness judgment is generally some problem 
or purpose, the statement of which gives clues to the space. A 
solution to the problem might present itself, but then turn out to be 
unacceptable in other perspectives, as in the case of the cat and the 
fleas. A sure way to rid the cat of fleas is to incinerate the cat. 
The end (result) does not justify the means unless it is acceptable in 
all relevant spaces. An appropriateness judgment for a particular 
purpose therefore has to take into account purposes and interests in 
all the other spaces which are affected. An exhaustive search among 
all relevant perspectives is impossible for a complex problem, because 
there are so many of them. The difference between this combinatorial 
explosion and the string-matching one, however, is that some match can 
be created right away, and the perspective can shift to why, if at 
all, it is unsatisfactory. 
1.3.1 Example: the problem of freewill 
Let us by way of example take a very cursory glance at the philosophi- 
cal problem of freewill. As a first step, obviously it is necessary 
to analyse the concept of freedom. What perspective relativity can 
point out is that there is no reason to imagine that one and only one 
of the many possible analyses is the correct one. 
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For example, let us assume for the sake of argument that freedom is 
either something we all (potentially) have all of the time or some- 
thing none of us have any of the time. In the first camp there are 
the legal perspective, dualism, most religious perspectives and prob- 
ably most practical, everyday perspectives. There is the distinction 
between liberty and licence, and the concepts of responsibility, 
guilt, praise and heroism. In the second camp we have the physical 
and life sciences, behaviouristic psychology, materialistic perspec- 
tives and aspects of some of the more sophisticated paradoxical reli- 
gious perspectives, such as the notion that in perfect freedom there 
is no choice. 
We pick our perspective according to our present situation, and either 
the perspective allows for free choice or it does not. Anyone who 
wishes to say, independently of any particular situation, that there 
is no freewill or that there is freewill, is saying that a whole range 
of perspectives are either incoherent or, at best, inappropriate in 
aZZ situations. His task is then to point out the incoherence, per- 
haps to separate the incompatible spaces which comprise the incoherent 
one, and/or to show why the view is inappropriate even if it is 
coherent. 
Thus where before we had a menu, consisting of a world with freewill 
and a world without any freewill, only one of which was valid, we now 
have a different kind of menu. The various items are all available as 
long as we do not conflate two incompatible perspectives. We don't 
lose anything by seeing that two spaces might be incompatible, because 
incompatibility does not necessarily imply that one of the views must 
be incoherent. 
1.2.4 Perspective concepts 
In Chapter 4 an attempt _s made to bring these notions together in a 
more precise way. A definitive theory is not the aim, or outcome, of 
this work, because different applications will call for different 
treatments and no theory of PR will be the only correct one. It is 
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hoped instead that some of the ground will be cleared so that formal 
treatments, if appropriate, can be more readily found. Concepts such 
as point of view, field space, view and overall view are discussed, 
also different categories of perspective difference, mutual sensitiv- 
ity and relevance, perspective shifts and jumps, and purpose and 
appropriateness are considered. We find that a ?r eat deal can be done 
on the conceptual level without recourse to complex formulations. The 
separation of three distinct categories of perspective difference is 
found to be particularly useful in such deliberations. 
1.2.5 Results 
Our results are of two kinds: first, some of the different ways in 
which perspective concepts interact are indicated, and secondly some 
of the implications of these interactions are discovered. Some 
possible technical applications emerge in the course of the 
discussion, as well as an indication of a solution to the original 
problem, that of the relation between a message and its carrying 
signal. 
On occasions in the discussion we refer to "the user" and "the sys- 
tem". This is because we are envisaging a machine which can use 
perspective relativity and a user who requires information from it. 
The arguments and strategies do, however, apply equally well to 
interactions between two people, perhaps an expert and a layman, or a 
librarian and a library user, or anyone asking advice, professional or 
otherwise, from someone who has knowledge and/or tools which he lacks. 
It even applies to a person's own discussions with himself. Since no 
machine yet has PR, the user and the system referred to are both best 
thought of as people; the user asks a question, :, e system answers it 
with the help of PR. 
The results, summarised in the last chapter, might not be surprising 
but it is hoped that they have been expressed in a more useful way 
here than they have in the past. 
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2.0 Introduction 
Once we look out for perspective terminology and notice how often it 
occurs, it seems to be very ordinary and unproblematic. We all take it 
for granted in the same way that we take parallax for granted. 
Relativism - as distinct from relativity - has, by contrast, evoked a 
whole range of vehement reactions, from relief to unconcealed hatred 
(as in Popper, for instance). 
In Section 2.2 and its subsections, we look at recent philosophy of 
science, where that debate still goes on. In particular we shall 
examine the notion put forward by Kuhn and others that scientific 
observation is paradigm-dependent. Since 'scientific truth' must 
depend on scientific observation, it seems to follow that if there is 
any such thing as the truth it will be forever beyond our ken even if 
our way of seeing is the ultimate, appropriate one, because we have no 
way of knowing that it is. Since progress is thought to be a process 
of closer and closer approximation to the truth, the very assumption 
that there has been any progress in science at all is called into 
(rhetorical) question. This seems to be close to the core of objec- 
tions to anything that smacks of relativism. Such objections seem to 
be more passionate than rational because a great deal is assumed to be 
at stake. This is not to say that opponents of relativism do not 
offer decent argument, but only that perhaps some of them could look 
again at what they stand to lose. 
The problem of the truth of empirical statements, i. e. the problem of 
knowledge, has so many different facets which are interdependent. 
Thers are the problems of truth and meaning, some of which are already 
mentioned in Chapter 1. If these were all solved by a coherent (and 
necessarily open-ended) theory, there is still the problem of how we 
ask Nature for arbitration, and here we need to explore the nature and 
possibility of perception, not neglecting completely the phenomenon of 
consciousness. Physiological mechanisms (which themselves involve 
theories) must be taken into account, as must their frequent failure. 
Metaphysical puzzles, where they arise, must be either solved or shown 
to be harmless for the present purpose. 
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In this connection we find the literature on "sense-data" and "appear- 
ing". The fragment that we shall examine in the next section, before 
we discuss modern philosophy of science, was written without the 
benefit of Kuhn's insight. It concerns the revolt against idealism in 
America in the early decades of this century, in particular the move- 
ment Murphy called "objective relativism" (which he since discarded) 
and McGilvary's "perspective realism". 
2.1 Relativity, relativism and realism 
Realism, in modern philosophy, is the doctrine that material objects 
exist independently of our sense-experience. It is thus opposed to 
idealism, which holds that nothing exists outside our consciousness of 
it, and that the universe is therefore essentially mental. It seems 
incredible to us that idealism was ever espoused, but it was dominant 
until the beginning of the twentieth century and the rise of science. 
There were two broad styles of attempt to escape from idealism and the 
doctrine of internal relations. These were firstly the various forms 
of 'direct' realism, the general view that to perceive an object is to 
be directly aware of the object itself, and secondly the various forms 
of 'indirect' or 'dualist' realism, the view that what we see is 
primarily representations of the objects in the world (e. g. sensa). 
Chisholm (1950) examines the relative merits of use and avoidance of 
"sense-datum terminology", the alternative being the "language of 
appearing". The concept of sense-data, he says, arose from the puzzle 
that in perceiving an object, something can vary (e. g. in size or 
shape) according to the prevalent conditions where the object itself 
is not thought to change. This something is a sense-datum, a sort of 
intermediary between the object and the percipient. Chisholm examines 
the contention that the puzzles which arise from this terminology, 
e. g. that of the status of sense-data, can be escaped simply by using 
a different terminology which has the notion of the object "appearing" 
to the percipient directly, and differently under different condi- 
tions. 
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Chisholm's conclusion is that the language of sense-data is indeed 
unnecessary for expressing what we want to say about perception, but 
that the metaphysical puzzles which arise are at least as problematic 
as those just escaped, and are very similar to those encountered by 
classical dualism. 
The main bugbears for direct realism and the theory of appearing - the 
view that we perceive objects directly, rather than mental representa- 
tions of them - are the problem of accounting for illusion and hallu- 
cination, and the problem of accounting for the different appearances 
of the same object, so that a penny looks round sometimes and ellipti- 
cal at other times, its colour depends on the lighting conditions and 
so on. It is the first of these difficulties, primarily, which has 
led to disenchantment with direct realism and given rise to the dual- 
istic fors. We shall examine some of the theories which tried to 
reply to the second difficulty, in particular those of Murphy and 
'_MIcGilvary, and then look at their failure to deal with the problem of 
illusion. 
2.1.1 A. E. Murphy 
The general thesis of these theories is that an object's intrinsic 
shape, colour and so on are always perceived relative to some point of 
view. "Objective relativism" was a tern coined by '. Turphy to refer to 
this movement, in particular as he found it in Dewey and Whitehead. 
Even though he later discarded the "old faith", his 1927 paper 
(Murphy, 1927) is his best-known work. 
He begins by pointing out a pervasive presupposition, namely, that 
something cannot be both objective and ultimately relative. 
"No better illustration could be found than the very familiar 
struggle between monistic and dualistic realists. The question 
to be determined is that of the objectivity and ultimacy of 
immediately experienced data. The dualist says that they are not 
objective, and his proof rests throughout upon the fact of their 
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relativity. The monist insists that they are objective and hence 
must introduce 'external' relations and try to show that they are 
not ultimately and intrinsically relative. " (Murphy, 1927 
pp"50/51) 
He then goes on to say that although Dewey and Whitehead do not 
develop the point sufficiently, each of them can only be understood if 
that presupposition is put aside. So it must be established that it 
can coherently be put aside. 
"The foundation of the whole affair is an inversion in the rela- 
tion of objects and events. The distinction itself is not new, 
but the use made of it is revolutionary. ... 
"The traditional theory has treated objects as primary, as sub- 
stantives, and events as characters of objects. ... The objective 
reality is such as to be complete in itself and the fact of 
happening, of occurrence in a given situation or context, is 
extrinsic to it. In the sense in which the terms are here used, 
it was an object or set of objects, never an event. The theory 
we are considering transposes this relationship. For it the 
event is substantive and objects are characters of events. Thus 
relatedness, in all its complexity and interconnections, is made 
basic for the objective world. " (Ibid., p. 53) 
The consequences, as Murphy lists them, are these: first, the trans- 
ient aspect of events means that time makes a difference to them which 
it cannot, by definition, make to objects. Time is thus 'promoted' in 
physical speculations. Secondly, existence is no longer mysterious; 
where existence is not essential to the nature of objects when they 
are taken as fundamental, the occurrence of events is precisely what 
gives them their uniqueness. 
"Events depend upon relations, but they are not relations, and 
this fact is essential. " (Ibid., p. 56) 
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Thirdly, the concrete reality of an event is simply the union of the 
other two aspects: 
"An object is always just itself and nothing else. An event is 
always more and less than itself in this sense; less in so far as 
it is incomplete and owes its being to the situation of which it 
is a part, more because it exists, it plays its part in what goes 
on, and existence is no part of an object 'in itself. ' This 
mixture of finality and dependence, of immediacy and transcend- 
ence, is the most pervasive fact about the world as pictured by 
objective relativism. " (Ibid., p. 57) 
It is this metaphysical primacy of events, as distinct from objects in 
space, which Murphy regards as essential. At once relativity becomes 
easy to handle: 
"The fact of relativity is here no other than the fact of 
relatedness" (Murphy 1927 p. 58) 
It is not simply that events are opposed to objects and the choice of 
the former is iaore fruitful; this would be to make the same mistake of 
"bifurcation" as those theories which tried to do the opposite. It is 
rather that, taking events as existent in their own right, objects 
immediately find a place in the scheme: 
"An object is a character, a universal, a meaning, and the 
function of such objects is altogether central. " (Ibid., p. 58) 
In other words, objects characterise events; they function as adjec- 
tives and thereby provide the nature of what goes on: 
"Where an event is existent in its own right but owes its nature 
to its relations, an object has its own intrinsic nature but its 
existence is extrinsic; it : nay or may not occur. Both Whitehead 
and Dewey claim that the main errors of traditional philosophy 
have arisen from an attempt to ignore this fact. Whitehead has 
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coined the very happy term 'misplaced concreteness' for this 
mistake. " (Ibid., p. 59) 
Some more should be said about Whitehead's notion of misplaced conc- 
reteness. In Science and the Modern World he traces the prevalent 
habits of thought as they change to accommodate the beginning of the 
scientific temperament. There were two different trains: on the one 
hand, the use of rationality to discover general principles, and on 
the other hand, the use of induction and minute attention to detail to 
find the order in nature which we instinctively believe is there. The 
latter was a revolt against the former, and the resulting cross- 
purposes led to the breaking away of science from philosophy: the 
scientists had their "naive faith" and did not feel the need to just- 
ify it. 
"There persists-the fixed scientific cosmology which pre- 
supposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter, 
or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configura- 
tions. In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, 
purposeless. It just does what it does do, following a 
fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not 
spring from the nature of its being. It is this assumption 
that I call 'scientific materialism'. " (Whitehead 1926 p. 30) 
The problem of the justification of induction and Hume's criticism of 
the possibility of science went blandly unheeded. This scientific 
materialism reduces the whole of nature to "merely matter in motion", 
and leaves no room for what came to be called "secondary qualities" 
such as colour, taste and smell. The result is that the qualities 
which make life interesting are all products of the human mind; Nature 
itself is dull and meaningless. 
"The enormous success of the scientific abstractions, yielding on 
the one hand matter with its simple location in space and time, 
on the other hand mind, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not 
interfering, has foisted on to philosophy the task of accepting 
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them as the most concrete rendering of fact. " (Ibid., p. 73) 
Hence philosophy has found itself juggling with these abstractions, 
mind and matter-in-motion, as if they were concrete; it seems trapped 
in an oscillation among dualism and two forms of monism. And all 
because the abstract has been mistaken for the concrete. Concreteness 
belongs not to objects in space whose nature, but not existence, is 
intrinsic to their being but, so the argument goes, to events only. 
The nature of an event depends entirely on external relations but its 
occurrence is intrinsic to its being. (For ourselves, looking at this 
argument, it seems that we are being taught a more precise meaning of 
the word 'concrete', since we might have been forgiven for regarding 
the concreteness of something as consisting precisely in its intrinsic 
nature and not, as we are now told, only in its intrinsic existence, 
for which objects in space do not qualify. Perhaps this is precisely 
the bad habit to which Whitehead refers and if so, it is not surpris- 
ing that it is still not easily broken. ) 
To return to Murphy's article: taken on its own terms, he ; 3ays, this 
new theory is a model of coherence and has only been rejected because 
of the old inability to allow what exists to be ultirnat? ly relative. 
Once the old presupposition is denied, the new theory can be acdar- 
stood on its own terns and immediately looks promising. 
Murphy himself did not take the matter further in that article, but 
just claimed to have cleared the ground for further work to be done. 
Later, however, he changed his mind and published a critique of the 
objective relativism movement. Since by all accounts t'ie most . are- 
fully worked out theory was that by McGilvary, we shall turn to hi. -. 1 
before returning to iTurphy's change of outlook which criticises the 
theory in detail. 
2.1.2 E. B. McGilvary 
McGilvary attempted (with some help from a Hegelian background) to 
combine the truth in both sides of the monism-dualism debate, and the 
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result was his "perspective realism". His 1939 Carus lectures are 
reprinted, after considerable revision, in McGilvary (1956). His 
introductory remarks, much condensed here, seem to promise something 
very like our PR: 
"Every philosophy is the universe as it appears in the perspec- 
tive of a philosopher. ... The perspective realist makes no claim 
that he can speak for the universe as it is for itself. ... He 
sees in part, he knows in part, he prophesies in part; and that 
which is perfect never comes, except as a goal that lies afar off 
before him. ... Absolutes, whether logical or ontological, 
he has 
none ... 
"In one sense it is nothing new. It is almost as old as philos- 
ophy itself. We are all familiar with the dictum of Protagoras 
that "man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, 
that they are; of the things that are not, that they are not. " 
... in the philosophical tradition that goes back at least as far 
as Plato the acceptance of Protagoras's "Man the Measure" has 
been regarded as the great philosophical betrayal. ... Without 
some certainty, without something that is known as absolutely 
true, it was dogmatically assumed that there could be no advance 
to knowledge of anything else. There must be "first principles" 
which are "self-evident" and therefore unquestionable, and they 
remain such, world without end. ... Through the centuries 
this 
position found powerful support in the geometry then current ... 
What had not been questioned was taken as unquestionable. ... it 
is not surprising that philosophy, too, in her earlier days, 
while aspiring to be queen of the sciences, should have had 
equally indubitable first principles, the very first of the 
first. ... 
"But-the nineteenth century brought with it a radical change in 
the foundations of mathematics. There are in mathematics no 
longer any "axioms" of universal sweep. They have been replaced 
by "postulates". Instead of starting from self-evident premises 
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geometry now starts from "assumptions", and many different ass- 
umptions are eligible. ... Philosophers are be,, inning to follow 
again the lead of science. The mood of absolutism is evaporat- 
ing, leaving relativism as a deposit in many quarters. And 
relativism rorks from postulates and not from principle: enjoying 
the sanction of self-evidence. This relativism differs from that 
attacked by the earlier tradition of absolutism. It is riot a 
relativism which results in general scepticism. That scepticism 
there is is one of caution and not of despair. ... 
"But what is perspective realism? ... so far as this can be 
done, 
perhaps perspective realism-can be provisionally defined as a 
philosophical theory that regards every experience, including the 
experience of a philosophical theory, as the real objective world 
appearing in the perspective of an experiencing organism. 
We have all perhaps had the experience of wondering what a man - 
and not necessarily a philosopher - is talking about. His words 
don't make sense. But hoping that we shall arrive at an under- 
standing, we continue to listen. After a longer or shorter time 
it all "clicks". ... A new philosophy is like a new suit of 
clothes; it must be tried on before one can learn whether it 
fits, and it must be worn in order to find out whether it wears 
well. 
"Perspective realism offers itself for this trying on and this 
wearing; but ... it does not offer itself as something brand-new. 
Very few recent philosophers have neglected the use of perspec- 
tives in their make-up. ... Thus perspective realism is not 
introducing a new concept into philosophical discussion. All 
that it claims to do is to make it central in the array of 
philosophical concepts ... it is different from that current in 
many present-day philosophers. It restores to the word "perspec- 
tive" the meaning it has in popular thought. " 
(McGilvary, 1956, ppl-8) 
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Unfortunately, the promise is incompletely fulfilled, not because of a 
flaw in McGilvary's argument, but because his main emphasis is on an 
elucidation of the nature of consciousness; perspective relatedness is 
a useful background for his thesis that consciousness is the organism 
perceiving. 
His own postulates, stated and discussed throughout the lectures, 
total nine. The first three postulates are: 
1) "In our sense-experience there is presented to us in part the 
real world in which we all in common live and move and have our 
being"; 
2) "Every particular in the world is a member of a context of 
particulars and is what it is only because of its context; and 
every character any member has it has only by virtue of its 
relations to other members of that context. " 
3) "In the world of nature any 'thing' at any time is, and is 
nothing but, the totality of the relational characters, experi- 
enced or not experienced, that the 'thing' has at that time in 
whatever relations it has at the time to other 'things'. (Ibid. 
) 
This looks incredibly clumsy, like a tortured attempt to negotiate a 
path between the theory of internal relations and the theory of exter- 
nal relations, with an acute awareness of the difficulties of each. 
Thus 'thing' must go in inverted commas, and the theory of internal 
relations must be confined to 'particulars'. McGilvary is particular- 
ly concerned to elucidate consciousness as a (nondynamic and "epiphys- 
ical") relation between an organism and a thing perceived: 
"What differentiates more than anything else my perspective 
realism is the view of consciousness as an epiphysicaZ relation 
whose occurrence depends upon nerve activity. Just as in sense 
and sense perception and memory physical objects and events 
appear to us in perspective, so do they appear to us also in 
intellectual perspectives and moral perspectives and esthetic 
perspectives. In none of these cases does the physical object 
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appear to us as it is by itself, for... t; hiere ar= t li is by 
themselves; they are all things in relation an3 - :e characters... 
vary... according to the different relations of they are 
terms. ... Now a perspectivist, to be t1ioroughgoir should 
recognize that his perspectivism is itself relative, not 
absolute. " (HcGilvary 1956 p. 193-4) 
This relativity, which allows even opposing views to be correct when 
seen in their own perspective, is one of , Zurphy's later targets. B. zt 
McGilvary points out that it all depends on not coafusLcg one persrec- 
tive with another, and this is the answer that PR would like to give. 
We shall examine Murphy's argument in the next section. 
On the subject of the now extinct star we nevertheless . gee 
in the sky, 
McGilvary suggests that there are temporal perspectives as well as 
spatial, and that the time interval is foreshortened to zero. This 
seems as good an answer as any. On the subject of the : spot in the 
bottom of a cup of water (a case of 'things are not always what they 
seem'), McGilvary's reply is that the position of the scot (the direc- 
tion of it) is correctly seen in that particular perspective relation 
whether there is water in the cup or not. This is more difficult, and 
Murphy pours scorn on it. 
McGilvary wanted to make "consciousness" the converse of "appearing" 
and it was his desire to explain consciousness in a certain , -ray which 
probably most inhibited his perspectivism. Perspective relativity, as 
we shall see, does not depend on a certain view of mind, even when we 
consider illusions and hallucinations (which it seems :: cGilvary does 
not, except to cite examples of cortical stimulation to lend weight to 
his theory of consciousness). 
2.1.3 i{urphy's about-turn 
Later even Murphy changed his rind and in an extract from a work 
written in 1940, reprinted as chapter 6 of ýL'iurphy ; 1963), he offers an 
"antidote" to the earlier view. Since this later article was not 
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specifically written for that purpose, it gives the intiression of 
mentioning objective relativism only in passing and is -lore a dis- 
course on perception. The inversion of the object/event relationsip 
is only touched upon as an "important contribution" to the epistemol- 
ogical debate. 
That paper is, for our purposes, a real treasure because it points to 
all the standard difficulties which we wish to avoid. It is here that 
we find a discussion of the problems associated with the relativity to 
context of the truth of statements - our problem of the different 
colours of snow. 
The original problem that objective relativism tried to solve was to 
avoid dualistic realism, the dichotomy between appearance and reality, 
and the solution was to point out that there is no reason why reality 
should not be relative to a viewpoint and that what is perceived is 
really the object, if only in part. For statements of this doctrine, 
Murphy quotes from Cohen (1931) p. 166: 
"... two statements which, taken abstractly, are contradictory way 
both be true of concrete existence provided that they can be 
assigned to separate domains or aspects. A plurality of aspects 
is an essential trait of things in existence. Determinate exist- 
ence thus continues free from self-contradiction because there is 
a distinction between the domains in which these opposing state- 
ments are each separately true. " (in Murphy 1963 p. 68) 
and from Lewis (1929) p. 185: 
"... there are certain properties of the object, an independent 
reality, which can only be described in terms of some observer, 
or some frame of motion. But specify this relationship and t:. e 
true description is thereby fixed. What is it that determines 
this? It cannot be the relative motion already specified. It is 
fixed by the objective real character of the thing. " (in Murphy 
1963 p"69) 
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This, coupled with Whitehead's new outlook on the concreteness of 
events, looked promising. The only detailed theory to be worked cit 
from this point is McGilvary's. Murphy applies some counterexamples 
to McGilvary's argument: that of the distant star which, though seen 
now, might no longer even exist; that of the railway lines which, 
though they appear to converge, must be parallel if they are to func- 
tion; and that of the colour of an apple which is different in differ- 
ent lighting conditions. The question that is put is: is what is 
perceived really what is out there?, and the discussion seems to 
concern the sense of 'really'. Murphy points out that 
"... we do actually make a distinction, within the field of per- 
ceptual observation, between what things look to be and trhat in 
fact they are. " (Murphy 1940 p. 72) 
He goes on to say: 
"When NcGilvary says that an apple really is whatever in any 
perspective it is found to be, he may not actually be rejecting 
this distinction, but simply using the term 'really' in a diff- 
erent sense. In that case the railroad tracks are really con . "ar- 
gent in McGilvary's sense, and also not 'really' so L_n :: ie ori- 
inary perceptual usage. " (loc. cit) 
The argument, then, is that the theory itself is ruabiguoLzs, and t:. ere- 
fore lends itself at once either to attack or to speculative ilab3_a- 
tion. On the subject of the spot in the cup which appears i_Z a 
different place if the cup contains water, Murphy 3-ay"3: 
"Perhaps the answer is that "correctness" and "incorrectness" are 
terms properly applied riot to sensations as physically produced 
but to the estimates we make, given such sensations, of the real 
properties of things observed. But this cannot be i"ZcGilvary's 
answer, for it would involve a relation between "subject" and 
"object" other than that of "consciousness" or "appearing", on 
which he has staked his case for perspectivism. What he does 
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instead is to continue his effort to get the appearance as sensed 
into the physical world as a "perspective" character of the 
objects that constitute the world. " (Ibid. p88) 
It seems very difficult to escape from dualism, and this is where 
McGilvary falls down. As R. J. Hirst writes: 
"Such perspective-realist statements as "The table is round from 
here" sound forced, for the natural word to use is "looks, " not 
"is, " and it is possible to express this kind of direct realism 
in terms of looking or appearing. Physical objects simply are 
such that they appear different from different positions, and we 
see them as they appear from a viewpoint or in certain condi- 
tions. Thus, we may see the round table looking elliptical from 
here, but even so it is still the table that we see. Thus far 
the theory is trite and does little more than state the situation 
in a way which dualists could accept and then claim to analyze. 
To be distinctive, it must, as its essential characteristic, sep- 
arate directness and incorrigibility.... 
"... (Some might object that the theory cannot admit that 
perceiving is ever erroneous. Perspective realism treats all 
properties as relative and all perspectives as equal - the table 
is round from here, elliptical from there, but not round in 
itself; similarly all appearances should be treated as equally 
valid. Nevertheless, it seems more plausible to treat some 
appearances as privileged; in some conditions we see the real 
shape, the round object appearing as it is - that is, round. It 
may be considered a weakness of the perspective theory that it 
does not take into account the fact that objects do seem to have 
real (measured) shapes and volumes absolutely, not relative to a 
viewpoint. )" (Enc. Phil. 'Realism', p. 78) 
It seems to be assumed that the relativist cannot allow any particular 
perspective to have pre-eminence, and his world must therefore become 
a chaotic mish-mash of appearances. Murphy is particularly scathing 
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1 '1 about ''ICGi lv3. ry's claim that even Opposing V''L:? WS -Ir? 0'1u1 111 7-1-ti 
their own yýrspective, and that this is actually an odvnota1; e -)f his 
theory. '311-t thh _s does not entail that "everyone ' :: equally c )tree t' 
all it claims i `. hat there are always other poi.: lts "ýf r::, a ad as 
long as the limitations of a perspective are cecognised at it. n aden- 
tion, there might be something to learn from it. 
We nay also argue that it is quite consistent with McGilvary's theory 
that some perspectives, e. g. the ordinary perceptual usage, can have 
some pre-eminence. The perspective theory i. 3 only pointing out that 
in certain limited perspectives the railway lines are convergent. 
Ordinary perceptual usage happens to assume a perspective in which the 
lines are physical objects in three dimensions. In that, the ordin- 
ary, perspective, the lines not only are 'really' parallel 'out they 
actually look parallel. It requires a shift from the ordinary persp- 
ective to see theta as convergent, and the term 'looks' or 'appears' in 
that context is a natural signpost to that perspective. In such a 
perspective (e. g. that of the artist) they are not just convergent, 
but converge at a definite angle in a definite direction which can be 
measured. They could not carry a train if it were not so. I similar 
argument applies to the green apple - if it were riot green in plain 
sunlight, it wonld riot appear the colours Lt does in other conditions 
or perspectives. This being the case, it looks green when t: ie camera 
or artist says it is greyish-clue. 
Seen this way, the ambiguity to which Murphy refers seems less of a 
problem. A privileged perspective is privileged not because it some- 
how shows the reality of the object more clearly than other views, but 
because it is more appropriate to the particular purpose of looking; 
that is, we look for the usefulness rather than the Cod's-eye view. 
If the real, : measured shape of something is required then indeed 
certain perspectives will be of more use than others; one view might 
show the overall shape, another might show the ruler reading with a 
minimum of parallax, and so on. To ask for 'the truth' about some- 
thing is futile only because the question is not specific enough; to 
ask for 'the truth: is that table really round? ' immediately provides 
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something to look for. All perspectives are equal, but some are more 
conducive to effective measurement, for example, than others. This is 
no mystery. 
On the matter of directness and incorrigibility, the perspective 
theory says that ;, That we see directly is the object as it is in that 
perspective, and we can say further that if there is error it is in 
mistaking one context for another, as Murphy himself nearly suggested 
when he mentioned "the estimates we make, given sensations, of the 
real properties of things observed". 
But all this has done is to make the theory independent of the monism- 
dualism debate. , Te can answer the charge that it would entail dualism 
by saying that judgment between different perspectives must itself 
depend on another perspective which encompasses the relevant factors. 
It does not depend on there being a metaphysical "subject" to be a 
"judge" - that turns out to be a quite separate question. 
Finally, what about hallucination and illusion? : -Iurphy asks, in a 
third article reprinted in the same volume: 
"Are we to say that the drunkard sees pink rats correctly, and 
that what he sees are real, though epiphysical, constituents of 
the natural world around us? And if we do say this, then what, 
in this sense, would not be a correct disclosure of the world to 
consciousness except perhaps an "appearance" that resulted from a 
violation of the laws of nature? 
"IMIcGilvary does not consider this question. " (Murphy, 1959, p39) 
The pink rats that the drunkard sees before him are not objects in the 
world, so the argument goes, and so perspective realism must founder. 
McGilvary is not a great deal of help, although he considers a related 
phenomenon - that of experiences resulting from electrical stimulation 
of the cortex - because he is concerned to explain consciousness as 
'epiphysical' and this raises more problems than it solves. 
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But we can talk about context, purpose and even illusion wit`iout a 
particular philosophy of mind, provided ,, re are careful not to make 
unwarranted extrapolations from one perspective t, ) another. The per- 
spective of the drunkard is, like that of everyone else, shifting all 
the time and he would as likely as not regard the rats as evidence 
that he has had too many. The images exist; no one denies that, and 
physiology can account for them at least in principle. We would 
consider it odd if all drunkards saw rats in the same places doing the 
same things. Similarly I can see something, and turn out in another 
perspective to be mistaken as to what it was I saw; I can even be 
deliberately mistaken e. g. when looking for fairyland in the clouds. 
Confirmation (in the everyday sense) depends as much on other perspec- 
tives as it does on duplicating the original, as in repeatable scien- 
tific experiments. What matters is not that our sensory apparatus is 
capable of playing tricks on us - this is unavoidable, even essential 
- but that we should be open to the possibility of uaing other persp- 
ectives to gauge how cautious we need to be. ,, that we perceive might 
not be incorrigible, but it can be true enough for the present pur- 
pose. We still perceive the thing, but t'he truth may be unattainable 
because of various kinds of physical and theoretical obstacles to 
clear perception. Thus far the theory is trite, says 'first.; it does 
not in itself separate the true from the untrue. 
This is the first step in our argument, that the spirit of perspective 
relativity is acceptable to all. The next step is to show that never- 
theless something useful can be made of it. headiness to move about 
among different views is the most promising uay to get close to clear 
perception of the siorld. This policy is advocated in the movement, 
which critics call "irrationalist", in the philosophy of scLence which 
will be examined in the nett section. 
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2.2 Progress in the new philosophy of science 
Perspective relativity is closely related to the work of the pioneers 
of 'the new image of science' with its central concept of theory- 
dependence of observation. Therefore this chapter should include a 
brief survey of the main theses of N. R. Hanson, T. S. Kuhn and P. K. 
Feyerabend, and of some of their critics. We can then relate our 
results to PR. 
A related but different concept, that of underdetermination, is also 
relevant. This is the 'Quine-Duhem' thesis, that "Any statement can 
be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system" (Quine, 1953 p"43). The "come what may" 
refers to observations which might seem to falsify the statement. 
These two concepts form part of the movement which Stove (1982) has 
criticised as "irrationalist". Stove's criticism is levelled at four 
authors, namely Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend. The argument 
will be considered in Section 2.2.3.1. 
There is also a growing literature on the 'sociology of scientific 
knowledge' which has been inspired by these ideas. Perspective term- 
inology is used a great deal in this literature, and it seems odd 
that, even though it is used so much, it does not seem to be taken 
seriously. (Stove offers an explanation for this pervasive levity. ) 
For example, Lukes comes very close, in his survey of various forms of 
relativism: 
"... perceptual relativism, provided it is not given an 'idealist' 
formulation, is simply the (doubtless fertile) hypothesis that 
how we recognize and interpret what we see will be relative to 
(divergent) languages or conceptual or theoretical frameworks. " 
(Lukes (1982) p. 267) 
While a perspective is not the same as a framework or a language, the 
notion that there is something there, "doubtless fertile", is never- 
theless passed over. Later in the same article (indeed, right at the 
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end of the book) he discusses various forms of what he calls "perspec- 
tivism", but because he confines his attention to the social sciences, 
he only appears to consider the people under study to have different 
perspectives. The scientist's problem then is that of finding "per- 
spective-neutral" data with which to judge them. The idea that the 
social scientist's own observations are perspective-relative is not 
considered. Lukes has come very close to us, then veered away with 
remarks that have no relevance at all to our purpose in this project. 
Yet again, it seems that PR has escaped notice because it is too 
simple! 
2.2.1 Theory-ladenness and underdetermination 
It was Hanson who, apparently, first coined the term "theory-laden". 
He applied it to the activity of seeing, and to terms, especially 
"causal talk". Hanson was among the first to bridge the gar (Stove 
would say foster the confusion) between the history and the philosophy 
of science. His approach was to look at theories of philosopny of 
science through the lens of microphysics rather than vice versa: 
"Let us examine not how observation, facts and data are built up 
into genera systems of physical explanation, but `iow t'iese 
systems are built into our observations, and our appreciation of 
facts and data. Only this will make intelligible the d-sagree- 
ments about the interpretation of terms and symbols wit 11 in 
quantum theory. " (Hanson, 1958, p3) 
In the same spirit, he argues that law sentences, such as the Law of 
Inertia, can be put to a variety of uses and that philosophers who try 
to give one answer to such a question as: "what is the logical status 
of law-sentences? " are addressing themselves to a question rather like 
"what is the use of rope? " (Ibid., p98). A law-statement may be used 
as a definition, or as an a priori statement, a heuristic principle, 
an empirical hypothesis, a rule of inference or whatever. Its status 
depends on the actual place it has in the concept-system of the physi- 
cist using it on a particular occasion. 
48 
Hanson's main emphasis is on the observation itself and not to the 
same extent on the language in which it is reported - although of 
course this is of central importance. He discusses seeing, and its 
relation to 'seeing as' and 'seeing that'. While seeing is not to be 
identified with seeing as, consideration of the latter brings certain 
features of observation into sharp relief, and 'seeing that' even more 
so. To have a retinal image is one thing; to observe an X-ray tube on 
the table involves much more - it involves knowledge of some kind, 
about X-ray tubes and about what will happen if certain things are 
done to X-ray tubes. Something counts as an observation only if it is 
appreciated in the light of some knowledge - usually causal knowledge. 
So the more an observation involves causal knowledge, the more theory- 
laden it is. If colour-patches, sound frequency distributions and the 
like are all that is noted, then no causal relationships are involved 
and no explanation is assumed. ("There are as many causes of x as 
there are explanations of x. " Ibid., P54) That it does not really 
count as an observation is reflected in the fact that it is reported 
in a ("sense-datum") language which is not the language in which the 
enquiry is conducted - that of the theory. Theory, or knowledge, is a 
"pattern of threads-there in the cloth" (Ibid., p22) - the organisa- 
tion of the conceptual apparatus which "allows physicists to observe 
new data as physicists, and not as cameras" (loc. cit. ). 
The idea of underdetermination is attributed to Duhem and has been 
promoted by Einstein and Quine, among others. It says that any theory 
can be put forward to explain any set of data, if radical enough 
adjustments are made elsewhere in the overall system of beliefs. The 
argument is briefly as follows: no single theory can be extricated 
from its collateral assumptions, so it cannot be refuted. If a 
theory's predictions do not materialise, we can only say that the 
theory and the assumptions are not both correct. We could always keep 
the theory if we made adjustments in the assumptions, and conversely, 
there are always alternative theories which are consistent with the 
evidence. While the logic of Duhem's original argument was refuted by 
Grunbaum (Grunbaum, 1960), the idea remains plausible because of the 
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enormous problem of ambiguity. 
These two ideas, underdetermination and theory-ladenness, are often 
cited as arguments for the study of a sociology of science. This is 
fine, as long as the sociologists remember that they, too, are scien- 
tists. But Stove (1982) argues that the way these notions are used by 
the "irrationalists" Kuhn, Feyerabend et at has had the effect of 
reducing the philosophy of science to a sociological study, thereby 
devaluing the scientific endeavour completely -a sort of reductio ad 
absurdum. This charge of irrationalism must therefore be met, and 
will be examined in Section 2.2.3.1. 
2.2.2 The concept of a paradigm 
Relativism is a thesis which Popper has called "fashionable" (Popper, 
1965 p"56). His remark is addressed to Kuhn. Two aspects of Kuhn's 
work are of particular interest to perspective relativity: one is his 
answer to the charge of relativism, the other is the argument that 
there is a sense in which scientists working according to a different 
paradigm are actually "responding to a different world" (Kuhn, 1970 
p. 111). We shall return to the relativism issue shortly, but first 
examine the concept of a paradigm and the different worlds. 
A paradigm is a set of commitments more fundamental than a theory: 
"In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods 
and standards [governing permissible problems, concepts and 
explanations] together, usually in an inextricable mixture. " 
(Kuhn, 1962 p. 109) 
The idea of a paradigm is original to Kuhn. In the Preface to his 
(1977) he tells us that the insight arose from a deep puzzlement in 
reading Aristotle's discussions of motion in the Physica: 
'Even at the apparently descriptive level, the Aristotelians had 
known little of mechanics; much of what they had had to say about 
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it was simply wrong. No such tradition could have provided a 
foundation for the work of Galileo and his contemporaries. ... 
When dealing with subjects other than physics, Aristotle had been 
an acute and naturalistic observer. In such fields as biology or 
political behaviour, his interpretations of phenomena had often 
been, in addition, both penetrating and deep. How could his 
characteristic talents have failed him so when applied to motion? 
How could he have said about it so many apparently absurd things? 
And, above all, why had his views been taken so seriously for so 
long a time by so many of his successors? ... was it conceivable 
that his errors had been so blatant? ... I all at once perceived 
the connected rudiments of an alternate way of reading the texts 
... Aristotle's subject was change-of-quality in general, incl- 
uding both the fall of a stone and the growth of a child to 
adulthood ... the subject that was to become mechanics was at 
best a still-not-quite-isolable special case. More consequential 
was my recognition that the permanent ingredients of Aristotle's 
universe... were not material bodies but rather the qualities 
which, when imposed on some portion of omnipresent neutral 
matter, constituted an individual material body or substance. ... 
In a universe where qualities were primary, motion was necessar- 
ily a change-of-state rather than a state. ... Lessons learned 
while reading Aristotle have also informed my readings of men 
like Boyle and Newton, Lavoisier and Dalton, or Boltzmann and 
Planck. Briefly stated, those lessons are two. First, there are 
many ways to read a text, and the ones most accessible to a 
modern are often inappropriate when applied to the past. Second, 
that plasticity of texts does not place all ways of reading on a 
par, for some of them (ultimately, one hopes, only one) possess a 
plausibility and coherence absent from others. " 
(Kuhn, 1977 pp xi-xii) 
So the original concept of a paradigm was a device to facilitate 
sympathetic reading of material which was otherwise either very hard 
to understand or blatantly wrong. This notion, that a paradigm is a 
key to communication, has been largely neglected in favour of the 
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notion that it is a barrier which excludes all but those in the know, 
and precludes any possibility of finding the truth about anything. 
2.2.2.1 Masterman's analysis 
One of the best analyses of the paradigm concept, and one of which 
Kuhn himself approves, is Masterman's article (Masterman, 1970). All 
the different uses of "paradigm" in Kuhn's (1962) are listed, and the 
result is a division into three categories, as follows: the first 
sense is that of a metaphysical world-view, and this is the way most 
philosophers who have criticised the concept have seen it; the second 
sense is that of a concrete scientific achievement and the set of 
scientific habits to which the achievement gives rise; the third sense 
is that of an artefact or construct -a toolkit or a "crude analogy". 
The first is metaphysical, the second sociological, and it iä the 
third, the most concrete sense, which Masterman regards as the most 
fundamental. 
The argument for this stems from Kuhn's view that normal science is 
essentially the solving of puzzles. Something raust provide a struc- 
ture for formulating puzzles and showing what form a solution would 
take. The first two senses of "paradigm" reflect the abstract (meta- 
physical) and concrete (sociological or practical) aspects of normal 
science once the paradigm has taken root, but 
"the real problem-is to describe philosophically the original 
trick, or device, on which the sociological paradigm (i. e. the 
set of habits) is itself founded. " (Nasterman, 1970 p. 70) 
The most fundamental aspect of a paradigm is the way it got started in 
the first place and, she argues, the original device is an artefact 
"for only with an artefact can you solve puzzles" (loc. cit, her 
italics). 
A paradigm comes into being when an artefact (e. g. a picture of some- 
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thing) is suddenly seen to provide a way of looking at something else, 
which as yet has no theory to explain it. Masterman argues that the 
artefact thereby becomes a crude analogy - an analogy because in times 
of crisis the paradigm behaves exactly like an analogy which has been 
pressed too far, and crude because if it were not so, i. e. if it were 
precisely statable in terms of a mathematical model, it would be 
comparable with other paradigms. It is the crudeness - the original 
concrete artefact - which is characteristic of Kuhn's notion of a 
paradigm as distinct from the theory which eventually turns the prob- 
lem into a puzzle. 
Three kinds of crude analogy are isolated: pictures (e. g. the Genetic 
Code lent concreteness by picturing it as a language), models (e. g. a 
model of a macromolecule constructed - or constructable - out of wire 
and plastic), and metaphor ("an analogy-drawing sequence of word-uses 
in natural language"). Masterman says that this is an exhaustive 
list. 
2.2.2.2 Different worlds 
The origin of a new paradigm, then, is a concrete analogy constructed 
using the tools provided by picturing, modelling or linguistic 
(poetic? ) techniques. This helps us to understand the other two senses 
of "paradigm", and to see what Kuhn might mean by "different worlds". 
From the analogy comes a range of metaphysical assumptions on the one 
hand, and a set of practical habits on the other. The cruder or more 
concrete the initial analogy, the more likely it will be that the 
assumptions and habits will be incomparable, or "incommensurable", 
with those stemming from another paradigm (see Ibid., p. 80). It is in 
this sense that the worlds inhabited by scientists working according 
to different paradigms are different. It is the analogy and not the 
'world out there' which lends concrete interpretation to the mathemat- 
ics and thus provides a way of seeing whatever it is being used to 
represent. The analogy is itself, while it lasts, the world the 
scientist observes. 
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2.2.3 Relativism versus progress? 
Since Hanson and Kuhn, it is now common currency (and hence, perhaps, 
"fashionable") to recognise that in order to understand what scient- 
ists talk about it is necessary to be 'in the know' in more than just 
the sense of having become acquainted with the established facts in 
their subject-matter. Students are trained to see the subject-matter 
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in the. way that their teachers see it - only thus can they understand 
the puzzles to be solved. It follows that, if there is an alternative 
way of seeing the subject-matter (Duhem), the alternative might not be 
seen from the established viewpoint, and when it is seen the choice 
between the two ways of looking must depend on considerations other 
than what is observed in either of them. 
Popper's response to Kuhn is to reject the thesis that it is imposs- 
ible to scrutinise a paradigm while it is being used: 
"I do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in the 
framework of our theories; our expectations; our past exper- 
iences; our language. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian 
sense: if we try, we can break out of our framework at any time. 
Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in a framework, but it 
will be a better and roomier one; and we can at any moment break 
out of it again. 
"The central point is that a critical discussion and a 
comparison of the various frameworks is always possible. " 
(Popper, 1965 p. 56) 
Even so, this argument admits that paradigms can be scrutinised only 
in hindsight - from "a better and roomier one". It is not clear what 
is meant by "roomier", except as a continuation of the analogy 
of the prison. The roomier a prison becomes, the less like a prison 
it is. 
Kuhn replies (Kuhn, 1970) that all the usual criteria for choice 
between competing theories (such as accuracy of prediction, number of 
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problems solved, simplicity, scope etc. ) are still just as relevant as 
they always were, but they can only be guidelines. They are commonly 
held values, and do not constitute rules which provide a calculus for 
choice of theory. Therefore in actual practice a great deal of 
persuasion and appeal to intuition may be required to convince working 
scientists that the new paradigm is worth the switch. (Feyerabend 
emphasises this point. ) This, however, does not mean that there is no 
progress in science - there is no danger of returning to phlogiston 
and anyone told of the phlogiston theory today would realise that it 
is not a new theory but an old and superseded one. 
Kuhn is not, therefore, defending "irrationality", but only pointing 
out that the existing criteria, or values, of theory-choice leave room 
for differences of judgment which are still within the bounds of 
rationality, and moreover, that we do not possess a more definitive 
way of choosing between theories. Popper's statement that paradigms 
can always be compared and critically discussed is not denied - Kuhn 
just removes its significance. The only way to find out more is to 
look at the scientific process, instead of taking it for granted or, 
worse, postulating methodologies from an armchair. (For an illuminat- 
ing study of how scientists actually go about their business, see 
Ravetz, 1971. ) 
So the only area in which Kuhn might admit to being a relativist - and 
"if the position be relativism, I cannot see that the relativist 
loses anything needed to account for the nature and development 
of the sciences" (Kuhn, 1962 p. 207) 
- is the problem of approximation to 'the truth'. As Kuhn has pointed 
out, this is a smaller problem than it seemed before. What is needed 
is a clearer notion of 'progress' on the one hand, and 'truth' on the 
other. Science progresses in the sense that it is an irreversible 
process, and in the sense that each paradigm is better than its prede- 
cessor according to a wide-ranging set of (admittedly vague but) 
useful criteria of theory-choice. If these criteria were regarded as 
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pointers to 'the truth' by definition, there would be no problem - and 
as we have seen, this is quite close to Popper in a certain mood. Yet 
Popper is not content; he believes in absolute truth "in Tarski's 
sense" - in the sense, presumably, in which snow is really white. The 
problem that Kuhn points to here (Kuhn, 1970 p265) is that if this 
conception is applied to the choice between two competing paradigms, 
it assumes that the two sides agree precisely on what it is that they 
are talking about and that they both understand the sentence in ques- 
tion in the same way. This, Kuhn has taught us, is by no means to be 
assumed. 
We should remember the point made earlier that any statement claiming 
to be absolute must include its entire relevant context. Even the 
ultimate roomy paradigm must be made explicit. 
2.2.3.1 Stove's criticism of "irrationalism" 
David Stove criticises this whole movement in a closely argued book 
(Stove, 1982) to which we must give some answer. He traces the rot 
back to Hume's famous conclusion that there is no reason, from any 
source, observational or a priori, to believe any contingent statement 
about the unobserved. Stove disagrees with Hume's conclusion, and 
finds the gap in the argument at the point where Hume makes the 
inference from the incurable fallibility of what is now called induc- 
tion to the utter unreasonableness of it. Stove argues that, given 
the indubitable conclusion that no argument from the observed to the 
unobserved can be valid, it does not follow that the observed provides 
no reason at all to believe something about the unobserved. Hume's 
hidden premise, Stove tells us, is deductivism - the view that only an 
absolutely conclusive argument will provide any reason to believe a 
proposition about the unobserved. In other words, only the best will 
do. 
It is this deductivism, Stove says, which is the root of the trouble 
because Popper, Kuhn and the others have taken it on board. Where 
Carnap, Hempel and others have bowed to the inevitable and turned 
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their attention to working on a non-deductive theory of probability, 
confirmation and explanation, "our authors" have ignored or ridiculed 
such attempts as chasing second best. They are therefore reduced to 
trying to deal with the consequence of their perfectionism, namely, 
that there can be no scientific knowledge and no scientific progress. 
The result of this state of affairs - this deductivism coupled with 
scepticism about the observed - is considerable confusion. Stove 
accuses the authors of using literary tricks (in particular what he 
calls "sabotage of logical expressions", whereby such terms as 
'confirms' and 'falsifies' cannot be used directly and so are embedded 
in epistemic statements about scientists) to foster the confusion 
between the history and the philosophy of science. This, coupled with 
hostility towards the work of Carnap and Hempel on non-deductive 
logic, has resulted in a kind of levity, a lack of seriousness on the 
part of our authors and an "amazing" lack of rigour. Stove argues 
that there are two reasons for this, one, that a perfectionist does 
not distinguish between a greater and a lesser imperfection and so is 
careless in his dealings with either, and two, that the deductivist 
thesis is itself frivolous and enfant-terrible. As far as frivolity 
is concerned, the only exception of the four authors considered is 
Kuhn, who, Stove says, is truly in earnest and really believes that 
there has been no progress in science in the last four centuries. 
We have already seen that Kuhn believes nothing of the sort if he, of 
all the four, can be said to mean what he says. The point about 
deductivism is, however, important. We have seen it in Popper, in his 
argument with Kuhn about relativism; Popper's own solution, as Stove 
points out, is to postulate methodologies to turn a non-deductive 
argument into a deductive one. The comment that Popper, of all 
writers, is an "enfant-terrible" is surprising, but Stove does cite 
some remarkably sloppy passages in Popper which, he suggests, indicate 
that the writer does not really take seriously the things he is 
saying. The suggestion that Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend are also 
deductivists at bottom is also surprising at first, but it does 
explain why they take no interest in confirmation theory and probabil- 
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ity, preferring to study the historical development and overthrow of 
actual scientific theories, and the relation between such theories 
(as 
opposed to those of logic) and observation. 
But to say that deductivism itself is frivolous (but, like the priest- 
hood, indelible) when applied to science is only a part of the matter. 
Nowhere does Stove criticise the idea of a paradigm, which is much 
more than Popper's postulated methodologies. That paradigms exist, 
and that they change, is obvious in the historical perspective that 
these authors outline. That paradigms turn problems into puzzles 
which can be solved, and are solved, is quite acceptable to Stove, 
even though the motivation for such a device is precisely to offer a 
means for deductive inferences in science. What he finds unacceptable 
is that these solutions lose all of their value when a new paradigm 
supersedes the old. 
Indeed, Kuhn and Feyerabend are ambiguous on this point. To reject 
the cumulative view of science can be taken to entail a rejection of 
any but the current view, with the added awareness that this view is 
also subject to revision. It does not follow, however. All that is 
being rejected is the idea that new theories are more or less simple 
extensions of the old, and that therefore all scientific observations 
are on a par. We can see, from the historical perspective, and with 
the benefit of Kuhn's lessons from reading Aristotle, that that is not 
so. All that follows from the rejection of the cumulative view is 
that the context must be taken into account in any report of any 
observation. The ancient observations are no less important; only 
they must be understood to include the intellectual climate in which 
they were made. Kuhn found a way, not to explain why Aristotle was 
wrong about mechanics, but to explain to what extent he was correct. 
The result was a more, not less, sympathetic reading of him. 
As for the charge of levity, the principal and most blatant offender 
is Feyerabend, to whom we shall now turn. 
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2.2.4 The flippant spirit 
In Against Method, Feyerabend gives a graphic account of certain 
aspects of the history of science, in particular the work of Galileo, 
to illustrate his own approach to the philosophy of science. We are 
shown that the only fruitful approach to the development of science is 
the spirit of "anarchism" - that is, to try as far as possible to get 
outside the existing paradigm. The principle that "anything goes", 
far from destroying progress, is the only principle that does not 
inhibit it. The argument is even put forward explicitly as a defence 
of "irrationality", with the following balancing statement: 
"There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to 
give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to 
defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else. I do not 
think that we are living in such a time today. " (Feyerabend 1975 
p. 22) 
Though he uses the term 'anarchism', Feyerabend is at pains to point 
out that this is meant in the spirit of 
"a flippant Dadaist and not ... a serious anarchist' 
(Ibid., p. 21 
footnote). 
A sense of flippancy is essential to the scientific enterprise - as 
soon as it is taken too seriously (e. g. as a search for the truth) it 
begins to die. He is arguing that there is nothing inherent in 
science which makes it superior in all respects to any other way of 
looking at the world, and since the best way to examine a framework is 
to create - or import from elsewhere -a quite different one which 
clashes with it, the scientific enterprise could well benefit from 
far-fetched, even mythical, ways of seeing. 
This could all look very like an attempt to take Kuhn's position to an 
absurd extreme. It may be that that depends as much on one's sense of 
fun as anything else, but that does no harm. Anything which helps us 
to get a sense of proportion is worth carrying, but it must be held as 
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lightly in the hand as anything else. Feyerabend's levity is serious, 
almost urgent in its intensity, a point which makes Stove laugh. But 
it must be remembered that Feyerabend's book was originally intended 
as a sort of devil's advocate, to be published with a reply by Lakatos 
who tragically did not live to complete it. It was therefore written 
in anticipation of a competent rejoinder, and that is why it is 
phrased in such strong terms. 
With this new sense of proportion, we can see that Feyerabend is 
neither extreme nor absurd. True, there is a great deal of historical 
example, as we are subjected to yet another perspective on the Copern- 
ican revolution. Feyerabend does, however, take more seriously the 
actual practice of science, as distinct from its methodological ideal, 
than the others. 
"... some of the most important formal properties of a theory are 
found by contrast, and not by analysis. A scientist who wishes 
to maximize the empirical content of the views he holds and who 
wants to understand them as clearly as he possibly can must 
therefore introduce other views; that is, he must adopt a 
pluralistic methodology. He must compare ideas with other ideas 
rather than with 'experience' and he must try to i: aprove rather 
than discard the views that have failed in the competition. 
Proceeding in this way he will retain the theories of man and the 
cosmos that are found in Genesis... he will elaborate them and use 
them to measure the success of evolution and other 'modern' 
views. He may then discover that the theory of evolution is not 
as good as is generally assumed and that it must be supplemented, 
or entirely replaced, by an improved version of Genesis. Knowl- 
edge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories 
that converges towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual app- 
roach to the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of 
mutually incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable, ) altern- 
atives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth that is 
part of the collection forcing the others into greater articula- 
tion and all of them contributing, via the process of compet- 
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ition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever 
settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive 
account. " (Feyeraband, 1975 p. 30) 
Feyerabend tells us to read him any way we like, and so we shall take 
the "process of competition" to be light-hearted (though not light- 
minded), in the sense that there are no losers. As we shall see in 
the succeeding chapters, incompatibility of two perspectives does not 
necessarily imply that one of them is quite wrong. What it does mean 
is that they cannot both be viewed at the same time, and many quite 
innocent perspective differences have this property. Again, Stove's 
fear that ancient ways of looking are totally destroyed by new parad- 
igms is unfounded. Feyerabend, as well as Kuhn, is asking us to look 
at them again, not to reject them as the initial rise of science was 
wont to do. 
2.2.5 A summary 
Thanks to Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend, the philosophy of science lends 
itself very well to the terminology of perspectives, and indeed these 
writers and others use the terms 'perspective' and 'point of view' 
quite freely. If we were now to try to explain the contributions of 
these writers to the philosophy of science using perspective termin- 
ology (analogy, perhaps, at this stage), we would see the following 
advantages: first, it will be easier; secondly, ambiguity (such as 
that which has arisen from the idea of a 'paradigm') will be more 
readily avoided or at least detected and diagnosed; thirdly, the 
terminology itself can be scrutinised, both for its assumptions and 
its appropriateness; and fourthly, it has all the advantages of 
'crudeness' - it is not mathematics, no single perspective need be 
overworked, and it is intuitively useful and clear. 
To summarise: Hanson first drew our philosophical attention to the 
idea that what is observed depends on the perspective of the observa- 
tion. Kepler and Tycho Brahe each see a different thing in the east 
at dawn to the extent that their perspectives on the sun are 
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different. It is not a matter of seeing the same thing and then 
interpreting it differently - the 'interpretation' is an integral part 
of the perspective ("the pattern of threads is there in the cloth"). 
Kuhn elucidated this idea by explaining that the perspective incorp- 
orates basic assumptions, habits of practice and of thought, a 
metaphysical world-view and whatever concreteness the field of view 
has. Perspectives improve upon their predecessors in usefulness, 
simplicity, scope and so on. Normal science is conducted in the 
current established perspective, which students have to be taught to 
enter, and which remains unquestioned until another perspective seems 
more useful, simpler, wider in scope etc. The switch cannot come 
about by explanation, discussion and persuasion alone -a perspective 
is of such a nature that it must also be shown, by invitation to enter 
and 'see for yourself'. The experience in this respect resembles a 
religious conversion. The succession of scientific perspectives con- 
stitutes progress no less than the articulation of a single perspec- 
tive does. 
Feyerabend went further and told us that the only principle of scien- 
tific methodology which does not inhibit progress is "anything goes", 
and that it is necessary to run several perspectives, even mutually 
incompatible ones, at once in order to articulate any of them as fully 
as possible. 
Thus an outlook (i. e. relativity) which is often very helpful in other 
fields such as everyday life, art and even religion and morality is 
now being applied to science, including natural science. At once, it 
seems to matter to us. For a perspective is a subjective sort of 
thing and if there is no objectivity even in science, then we have 
'nowhere to lay our head'. There is no point, it may be thought, in 
pursuing the scientific enterprise in any field if everything we are 
going to observe is determined almost entirely in advance by the 
perspective adopted by the observer. 
Therefore Popper calls Kuhn's thesis "dangerous", and insists that 
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scrutiny of the perspective is by no means impossible since we can at 
any time break out of it into a better and roomier one. (By imp1ica- 
tion, the roomiest perspective of all is the truth - but by his own 
argument this cannot be scrutinised, since there is no roomier pers- 
pective in which to view it. ) Feyerabend takes the opposite view - 
that there are incommensurable perspectives, that this is an important 
aid to progress which should be fostered, and that no perspective is 
better than any other except relative to the purpose in hand. If the 
current perspective does not serve the purpose, it may well be worth 
looking in the most unlikely places for one which does. It is not 
necessary to have a destination (e. g. the truth) in mind. 
The difference between Popper's and Feyerabend's viewpoints, as cited 
here, represents a difference in strategy, and our notion of perspec- 
tive relativity will aim to indicate to what extent, and in what 
respect, they are both appropriate. Relativity need not be dangerous, 
and absolutism need not be bigoted, though of course they can be so. 
'Objectivism' and 'subjectivism' (in any sense) are also both equally 
appropriate, and both equally inappropriate. The slogan is: It all 
depends on the perspective. 
This is not being non-committal. PR is not an escape from the prob- 
lem, a blanket statement that the perspective you choose doesn't 
matter; on the contrary, it points up the need for some kind of method 
or device for stepping between different perspective spaces to help to 
detect what is relevant and appropriate and what is not. 
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3.0 Introduction 
The theoretical formulation of Perspective Relativity that will be 
outlined in Chapter 4 is probably one of many that would suit the 
purpose and is therefore more an example of what can be done with the 
idea than an attempt at the final word on the subject. In the present 
chapter we must first discuss the everyday, general notion of a pers- 
pective and of perspective relativity in an informal way in order to 
see how far it can take us as it stands without a formal terminology. 
At the same time we can assemble problems and points that must be 
accounted for or included in any useful theory of PR. 
3.1 Ambiguity and needless controversy 
The original idea arose from the observation that most arguments on 
matters of any generality have no genuine point at issue. As we saw 
in Chapter 1, such controversies are a result of ambiguity in the bone 
of contention. In ordinary perspective terminology, a statement can 
be ambiguous if more than one perspective has a place for it. A 
linguistic utterance can indicate any perspective which is not explic- 
itly excluded by it, or implicitly excluded by context. Any such 
utterance may therefore be said to partition any set of perspectives 
into three classes: those perspectives in which it is true, those in 
which it is false, and those in which it is irrelevant or meaning- 
less. Here are some examples: 
One example, already mentioned, is Tarski's famous sentence "snow is 
white". It is true enough, for all the ordinary reasons. It is also 
false; snow is often pink or orange in a sunset, blue in shadow, 
greyish-brown on the road, and so on (as any camera will show). 
Finally, it is irrelevant; snow is transparent, or lattices of mol- 
ecules, or atoms, or wave-packets, or tiny distortions in space-time 
in any of those perspectives it makes no sense to say what colour it 
is. To ask whether "snow is white" is a true, false or meaningless 
representation of a fact in the real world is to ask a silly question, 
like saying "How long is a piece of string? ". 
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Another example might be 'a nuclear blast is a beautiful sight'. 
Value judgments are, in an important respect, relative to perspective 
- or, at least, to the purpose (to which topic we shall of course 
return). Any absoluteness, for those who require it, would reside in 
the choice of the appropriate perspective and not in the utterance by 
itself. 'Stealing is wrong', for example, assumes a perspective in 
which ownership is respectable. Exactly what kind of difference a 
value judgment makes to a perspective will be explored later on. 
Relativity applies equally to specific, here-and-now utterances, such 
as: 'you'll find my mug on the table over there'. There are all 
sorts of possible alternative perspectives, apart from the one which 
includes physical objects in space: e. g. the aesthetic effect against 
the rest of the decor, or the light and shade effects (e. g. for 
painting the scene), or the currently understood physical forces that 
stop mugs falling through tables, or an example for the contemplation 
of an anti-gravity or teleport machine. In some of these perspec- 
tives, 'the mug is on the table' does not make sense, and the phys- 
icist or inventor shifts perspective with a jolt when some kind soul 
takes it away to make him coffee. There might also be some perspec- 
tives in which the sentence under discussion is false, as distinct 
from meaningless; someone might want to say that the mug is not 
strictly on the table, but on a coaster which is in turn on the table. 
This might be important e. g. on a polished surface. 
This is not the same as saying that the mug, in the original perspec- 
tive, might not be on the table. A perspective is not a possible 
world. It is also not the same as saying that it is all a matter of 
how the terms are defined; the perspective is prior to the meanings of 
the words, in the sense that the perspective must be understood before 
the words make any sense. Diagrams and gestures, which do not carry 
truth-values, often do the job (of pointing to a particular perspec- 
tive) better than words. 
In actual practice, of course, no-one would dream of asking 'what 
exactly do you mean by that? '. For all the perspective relativity, 
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our homely utterance is unproblematic, for two reasons. 
The first reason is that a perspective which includes physical objects 
such as mugs and tables and coffee occupying places in space and time 
is one with which we are all familiar and which we inhabit a great 
deal of the time. 
The second reason is that, once the perspective is established, the 
actual mug and table indicated are easily identified by looking 'over 
there'. This brings us to genuine controversy, where the bone of 
contention is clearly understood by both sides. 
3.2 Genuine controversy 
A perspective is like a conceptual scheme or categorial framework, 
with one important difference: namely, the explicit significance of 
the point of view. A perspective, like any framework, paradigm, 
language-game, set of opinions etc., is essentially a slicing-up of 
the world -a set of distinctions and dimensions upon which ontologic- 
ally accepted elements find their place. A fact, therefore, is not 
something that can be established unless the appropriate distinctions 
are agreed upon. Once this is done, a suitable point of view can then 
be sought from which to see how the world looks in that perspective. 
Only when the perspectives are matched in all relevant respects can 
there be a genuine point at issue on a matter of fact (such as: is 
there a tree in the quad or not? is there such a thing as 'vital 
energy'? can a computer think? and so on). If the perspectives do 
not match, then the discussion is at cross-purposes and communication, 
at least on the topic(s) under discussion, is not taking place. If, 
on the other hand, they are matched, then Nature can be asked to 
provide arbitration provided that; a) there is access to a suitable 
point of view, and b) the relativity to the perspective is seen to be 
an integral part of the answer (if it matters). Here we have the 
beginnings of a strategy for resolving such problems. 
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3.3 Three aspects of a perspective 
In the discussion so far perspectives seem natiir311y to divide into 
three distinct aspects which we can call Theory, Practice and Experi- 
ence (Being There) respectively. Theory is the articulation of the 
perspective, which is necessary for communicating it by representa- 
tions and for making sense of what we see; Practice is the practical 
aspect, where we move towards a suitable point of view, or interact 
with the world as seen in the perspective; Experience is just to be 
at the point of view and thereby experience the , -rorld in the chosen 
perspective. 
The scientific endeavour, especially that part of it which Kuhn calls 
"normal science", seems to reflect these three aspects quite clearly. 
The Theoretical aspect involves the articulation of the paradigm, the 
formulation of questions, the design of experiments in the light of 
the chosen paradigm and the interpretation of actual and possible 
results. The Practical aspect of the enterprise involves the building 
or other procurement of suitable apparatus and tools, and the manip- 
ulation of these to arrive at an appropriate point of view. Once he 
has manoeuvred himself to a point of view in a certain paradigm, the 
scientist can then look and see how the world is in that perspective - 
Being There. 
The three aspects are quite distinct, and the problems associated with 
the scientific endeavour find themselves partitioned accordingly. The 
fact that the aspects are intimately related in any particular pers- 
pective does, however, often blur the issue of which aspect a particu- 
lar problem belongs to. 
For example, the three major classes of theory of truth - correspond- 
ence, coherence and pragmatic - might be considered to address them- 
selves to different aspects of perspectives. The coherence theory, it 
seems, addresses itself to Theory; the various attempts at a corresp- 
ondence theory are addressed to Being There and Theory; and the prag- 
matic theories lay emphasis on practical possibilities. As in almost 
all philosophical disputes, they are all equally right, up to a point. 
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They all point out important elements lacking in the others. The 
difference is one of emphasis, and not necessarily of substance. 
Wittgenstein's change of emphasis from the Tractatus (TLP) to the more 
friendly Philosophical Investigations (PI) is another case in point: 
"A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a 
picture of reality" (TLP, 4.06) 
"Think of the different points of view from which one can 
classify tools or chess-men. " (PI, para. 17) 
The logical considerations in the TLP are still as valuable as ever, 
and perhaps it could be said that they still apply within coherent 
perspectives. The PI points over and over again to the fact that 
there are many possible perspectives, some of which are mutually 
incompatible owing to such factors as fuzzy borderlines and the ways 
language is used. Thus where the TLP is devoted to developing the 
Theory aspect on the whole world, the PI considers also the practical 
aspect of the perspective and finds that a multiplicity of views can 
be generated by an utterance. 
3.3.1 Changes in the world - the Practical aspect 
Change in the world is not a matter of an alteration in the structure 
of the perspective - that would be a perspective shift (though not 
necessarily a revolution). Observed change, the dynamic quality of 
the world in view, might be simply enough represented by adding the 
time dimension to the perspective space if it was not already there. 
Time-lapse and slo;, r-motion photography are examples of techniques for 
bringing slow and very fast changes into view. 
Particular perspectives view particular classes of change, and a 
change of one sort in one perspective might be something quite differ- 
ent in another. Furthermore, change of any sort in one perspective 
might be stasis in another; it is this kind of invariance which makes 
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cybernetics so compelling. Very often the continual movemert is 
irrelevant as long as certain pertinent factors remain constant. 
This dynamic quality, the state of constant flux, was a bone of cont- 
ention in pre-Socratic Greece between Heraclitus, who held that change 
is the essence of matter, and Parmenides, who held that change is 
logically impossible. Gregory writes: 
"The ancient controversy... between the positions of Parmenides and 
Heraclitus - between unchanging and changing as the basis of 
physical reality - is alive now in present theories of matter. 
It is the controversy between indestructible unchanging atoms and 
changing fields. Is physical reality indestructible units, or is 
it evsr-flowing flux? to put this another way: what is the 
status of matter? In thinking about form and matter, what 
Heraclitus and Parmenides questioned remains central. " ; Gregory, 
1981 P-114) 
Gregory adds that Parmenides' grounds for his argument, well illust- 
rated by the famous paradoxes of his disciple Zeno, no longer hold 
water since (in particular) Russell's theory of logical constrictions. 
Gregory, in this discussion, points to the way that Parmenides' phil- 
osophical theory had the power to filter out and disallow something 
that is obvious to all of us - namely, that changes do occur. PR 
would point out that this filtering action of an articulated perspec- 
tive need not disallow the other views but challenges them to be 
articulated as well, so that the perspective relations can be explored. 
Cybernetics is a clear example of an attempt to articulate perspec- 
tives which filter out irrelevant change and concentrate on, say, 
keeping certain essential variables within limits. In these perspec- 
tives the only changes which are seen at all are those which relate to 
the purpose in hand and are seen as discrepancies to be corrected. 
Of interest in this connection is the concept in automata theory of 
the 'world automaton'. The idea is that a learning automaton can 
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build up a picture of the world as a second automaton, the world 
automaton, whose outputs (or states) are its inputs and whose inputs 
are its outputs (see, for example, Aleksander and Burnett (1983), 
ch. 7). 
We may regard the practical aspect of a perspective as carrying an 
associated toolkit with it, which enables the point of view (which 
might be at the eye, or the tip of a finger or the end of a probe) to 
be moved, and practical tasks to be carried out, in that perspective 
space. As a simple example, consider a computer game in which, among 
other things, to fire a missile you press the 'M' key. In learning 
the game, the focus is on the key and when to press it, but once the 
game is mastered the tool is the missile and the action is firing it. 
Pressing the 'M' key is in a perspective long ago abandoned. In this 
way different perspectives will have different means. They will 
overlap according to the way perspectives overlap, and some tools 
might be almost universal (e. g. hands, or their analogues). Some 
tools, on the other hand, might be available to only a few (e. g. 
experts or politicians) in which case the ordinary individual might 
only have persuasion in his toolkit in a particular perspective. 
One possible view on making changes is to regard it as creation, 
destruction and rearrangement of elements as seen in the relevant 
perspective(s). Creation and destruction are themselves rearrange- 
ment; creation of something is assembly of its parts or removal of 
unwanted parts, and destruction of something is a more or less gentle 
dismantling of it. On this view, making changes consists of using the 
perspective's toolkit to rearrange elements, with appropriate atten- 
tion to detail and often with unforeseen consequences in other pers- 
pectives. In another perspective, for example, that particular rela- 
tionship between parts and whole -light not exist, or be quite differ- 
ent. Creation in one perspective might be destruction or more or less 
meaningless rearrangement in another. 
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3.3.2 Theory and Experience 
The other two aspects, Theory and Experience, have to be considered 
together in order better to separate them, because of their relation 
to interpretation and representation. 
Theory gives experience a labelled grid, a set of distinctions and 
dimensions. The grid incorporates its own set of logical rules con- 
straining manipulation of whatever finds itself in the grid's space. 
Theory can then formulate what is the case and what is to be done 
about it. The ; rid and its uses are taught, and are therefore to a 
great extent commonly shared -a prerequisite for communication. 
It is often thought that theory is a framework for interpreting exp- 
erience. At the beginning of his book, Hanson (1958) stresses that 
this is a misnomer. "Seeing as", he says, is not the same thing as 
"interpreting as". Kepler and Tycho do not simply see the same thing 
in the east at dawn and interpret it differently; they actually see 
different things because their conceptual organisation is different. 
Gregory disagrees: 
"Hanson, it seems to me, gives no good reason for separating 
interpreting from seeing. It is clear that the processes of 
seeing (including object recognition by computers, developed 
since Russ Hanson was writing) involve many processes which could 
well be described as 'interpreting' - though we are not aware of 
these or any processes of perception. " (Gregory, 1981 p. 388) 
As usual, they are both right. These discussions seem to centre round 
ambiguous figures like the duck/rabbit or Necker cube and the question 
is: do we need to interpret the data before we can see it one way or 
the other, or do we just see it differently in the first place? 
Hanson recognises that interpretation is not a matter of placing a 
theory on otherwise neutral data, but of finding a perspective in 
which the data makes sense. He separated interpretation from seeing 
in order just to make this point. Gregory wishes to say that percep- 
tions are like hypotheses of science, in that they are based on exist- 
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ing knowledge and rules of inference, but this looks very close indeed 
to Hanson's main point that observation is theory-laden. 
If nothing else, we see from these arguments that the notion of 
'interpretation' as we wish to use it in PR had better be clearly 
elucidated. It seems to be agreed that interpretation is not some 
kind of matching of theory to data once the perspective is settled 
upon, but rather a process of perspective choice. Much of the con- 
fusion probably arises from the converse of interpretation, namely 
representation. Representation, for us, will be simply concrete 
attempts at communication, and not some process in the mind or brain 
which somehow relates sense-data to knowledge. Representation is the 
means of pointing out a perspective space or saying what is going on 
in that space, and interpretation is what the recipient does to under- 
stand the message, namely to look where the message is pointing and 
thereby extract its meaning. If Nature is regarded as sending mes- 
sages, this is best regarded as an analogy which should be used care- 
fully. 
3.3.2.1 Meaning 
In the literature on cybernetics and AI there is frequent mention of 
"internal representations" of the world. These take the form of 
conceptual graphs (networks of linked concepts with rules for manipu- 
lation) and other syntactic templates which are compared with inputs 
and processed accordingly. Syntactic rules for manipulating sentences 
and techniques for matching patterns to templates can do no more than 
relate strings to other strings, albeit with impressive results. 
Meaning does not enter into it at all, if to 'understand' a concept is 
merely to put it in the right place in a hierarchy of types according 
to syntactic clues in the input definition. Searle (1980) is credited 
for pointing this out, but he was by no means the first. 
For example Mackay (1969) points to a distinction, arising from phil- 
osophical and scientific work in this field, between structural and 
functional criteria of meaning - between the logical composition of a 
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message on the one hand, and what it does to the recipient on the 
other. Wittgenstein is one philosopher who embraced the former app- 
roach in the Tractatus and then shifted to the other approach in his 
later works while vigorously repudiating his previous position. 
Mackay points out, rightly, that the two approaches need not contra- 
dict each other. 
The latter approach, the question of what a message does to the recip- 
ient, has proved more difficult to represent in usable form. Mackay 
suggests that meaning can be explained by the change it produces in 
the "state of conditional readiness for behaviour" in the recipient. 
This is close to Gilbert Ryle's notion of "dispositions to act" in a 
certain way (Ryle, 1949). The motive is to account for the behaviour- 
istic observation that the same 'stimulus' means different things to 
different people, but without using a subjective terminology. 
The state of readiness involves internal mechanisms as well as action 
and reaction, and encompasses the notion of readiness to perceive the 
world in a certain way. The discussion makes use of such concepts as 
the recipient's "internal representation of the world" and the "deg- 
rees of freedom" of such a representation. 
In PR terms, we must understand these concepts practically. To say 
that an internal representation is a state of readiness to behave 
carries the suggestion that we live by a process analogous to string 
matching. The insight without that suggestion might read more like 
this: the internal representation of (an aspect of) the world is what 
you would say if someone asked you about it. At different times and 
in different situations you might give quite different honest answers 
to the same question, even if the situation is quite independent of 
the question. Often we can give an instant answer to a question we 
have never thought about before. Considerations such as this do seem 
to rule out internal, latent utterances just waiting for the right 
stimulus. The representation (the answer) is made up on the spot. 
In certain forms of thinkin, we do find ourselves unable to under- 0 
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stand something unless we can put it into words (or perhaps some other 
kind of representation), and so once something is understood there is 
also something to say about it. When we trigger someone's favourite 
hobby horse we do feel that we have evoked a disposition to behave. 
Answers to questions which are frequently asked, such as 'what do you 
do? ', or teaching contexts, soon settle down to a pattern. But being 
ready with an answer before the question is asked is a very small part 
of our mental life, and in many areas it is the hallmark of a closed 
mind. Yet this is the model of thinking on which traditional AI is 
based, and the problems encountered are not those of meaning so much 
as the combinatorial explosion - the enormous range of syntactic 
templates which have to be included in a useful system of this kind. 
To understand meaning, we would be better to consider the apparently 
spontaneous utterances, rather than these prepared speeches, because 
meaning must play a part in the former, and need not in the latter 
(hence the term "parrot-fashion"). It is the difference between 
discovering something and being told - for example, everybody knows 
that a rose carries thorns, and if asked about it would immediately 
say yes, of course. But the first encounter with a sharp thorn when 
removing overgrown weeds from the vicinity of a rose bush brings a 
quite new kind of knowledge, which is still expressed in the same way. 
It is as if one never knew it before. It is not a matter of a new 
"disposition to behave" in an evasive fashion towards thorns - that is 
a red herring, although a persuasive one because of the introduction 
of the notion of purpose. It is, for our purposes, simply a matter of 
having at last been at the point of view in the indicated perspective, 
instead of living on hearsay. Only then can the meaning be extracted 
from the statement and related to experience. So much of our knowl- 
edge is based on hearsay, and we can often go a long way just repeat- 
ing and exchanging representations; but relating these representations 
to experience requires having been there, or somewhere relevantly 
similar. 
Meaning, therefore, is not so much what the message does to the recip- 
ient but mgre a case of the reverse: what the recipient does with the 
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message, and what experiences he relates it to. Since the only way of 
ascertaining this is by eliciting further messages, it might have 
seemed that we are stuck here. We can do more, however, because 
unlike a message (which is ambiguous between perspective spaces), an 
experience is individuated by a perspective space and a point of view. 
A message which states these explicitly will wear its meaning on its 
sleeve and show precisely how to get there. 
3.3.2.2 Relevance 
In any given situation there are countless perspectives which are 
quite irrelevant to the purpose in hand. In ordinary situations we 
seldom even consider these, as we habitually settle on a perspective 
which we know is appropriate and relevant. This is one of the proc- 
esses which the AI community has had great difficulty simulating, 
because it is still shrouded in mystery. 
Sowa (1984) has given part of the answer, saying that we need a theory 
of conceptual relativity which takes account of the continuous as well 
as the discrete: 
"People make black and white distinctions when the world consists 
of a continuum of shadings. For many aspects of the world, a 
discrete set of concepts is adequate... . Yet such distinctions 
break down when pushed to extremes. " (Sowa, 1984, p"344) 
Sowa goes on to give examples of such breakdowns: the distinction 
between the body and the rest of the world is one, where doubt may 
arise as to the status of hair and nails (being non-living), hair dye 
and makeup, tooth fillings, tattoos and even clothes. In brief, all 
distinctions when applied to the world are vague in certain contexts 
and this, says Sowa, is a major problem in designing databases and 
natural language processors. 
Perspective relativity can help to extend Sowa's answer. It is agreed 
that for many aspects of the world a discrete set of concepts is 
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adequate, but the same discrete set of concepts will not be adequate 
for all aspects of the world. A multiplicity of perspectives, with a 
set of rules for assessing their applicability and for moving among 
them would, if it could be implemented, dissolve nany of these inst- 
ances of vague distinctions. This would not be entirely a matter of 
different definitions of the same concept in the different perspec- 
tives in which it is found, although this might be a part of the 
implementation; it is, more centrally, a matter of inclusion or 
omission of distinctions according to their relevance. 
In the example of the distinction between a person's body and its 
surroundings, such alternative distinctions might include: 
a) anything that a normal, healthy body always carries with it vs. 
anything else, which would allow hair and nails but not tooth fill- 
ings, kidney stones or cancers; 
b) anything that is a factor in the space that a person occupies vs. 
anything that is not, which allows fingernails, hair, clothes, brief- 
cases etc. but not hair dye or tooth fillings; or 
c) anything that is not easily removable vs. anything which is, which 
allows tooth fillings, permanent hair dye, artificial hips and cancers 
but not clothes, makeup, 'fun' hair dye or dentures. 
With any of these, there will still be borderline cases, but the fact 
that these are not hard-and-fast definitions is part of the point we 
are trying to make. There is a place for definitions, and this is not 
it. This is a matter of looking at the world and juggling with 
perceived borderlines (according to already-learned distinctions) and 
eliminating all the irrelevant ones until all and only those which are 
relevant are included. 
The outcome of such an elimination process might still include more 
than one perspective, because relevant-seeming distinctions might 
cross one another as they did in the example above, precluding integ- 
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ration into one perspective space. Then, depending on the original 
problem, the system might offer a menu and request further clarifca- 
tion, or alternatively choose the first one and proceed. 
With such strategies as these, PR could provide additional tools for 
setting up and updating a database. For example, two common problems 
encountered in information storage and retrieval are the problem of 
'out of sight, out of mind' and the problem of 'what you put in and 
what you leave out' of a particular category (see Sharp, 1965, for an 
elucidation of this traditional problem). Obviously the items that do 
fit neatly under existing headings are best left alone, as they will 
be retrieved easily enough when needed. The problem occurs when 
string matching by keywords, on which information retrieval systems 
work, is inadequate. A useful system might help to ensure that a new 
item will be placed where it will be seen when it is needed, but 
preferably not at other times. Such items are best related to situa- 
tions, or rather, to perspective spaces, rather than to keyword head- 
ings. 
There are two approaches to finding a perspective space, which corres- 
pond roughly to Mackay's selective information and descriptive inform- 
ation respectively. Selective information is 
"... that which enables us to make a selection frors a set of 
possibilities or to narrow the range of possibilities about which 
we are ignorant. " (Mackay, 1969, p. 11) 
Descriptive information, by contrast, is what we look for when 
"... our problem is not to select but to build a picture. ... 
Our first problem here is to transform our experience into a 
symbolic picture or description of what we believe to be the 
case. Our picture... depends for its every feature on our actual 
observations. Each element in the picture there ore formally 
represents and has its origin in one corresponding elementary 
feature of the experience pictured. " (Mackay, 1909, ppl2-13) 
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These two senses of 'information' give rise to two ways of delineating 
a perspective: 'elimination' and 'construction'. The elimination 
approach starts with a large store of possible perspectives, and every 
new element in the problem as it is put to the system eliminates a 
portion of them as irrelevant. The construction approach, by con- 
trast, builds up a perspective space on the clues provided by the 
problem as put. Both are necessary and important; elimination alone 
does not provide for new perspectives to be added to the store as 
appropriate, and construction alone will be constantly re-inventing 
wheels and not allow full advantage to be taken of the large store of 
Knowledge which must play such a crucial role in AI systems. 
The relevance of a perspective space to a situation obviously depends 
on what is required from it, i. e. whatever purpose is being brought to 
it. We shall be considering purposes in section 3.4; first let us 
summarise the relationships among the three aspects we have disting- 
uished. The discussion will also introduce perspective jumps, which 
are discontinuous shifts between distinct perspective spaces, and are 
intimately related to purposes. At this point we do not need to 
consider how they occur, but only when they occur in terms of what is 
happening in theory, experience and practice. 
3.3.3 Aspect relationships and constraints 
Fig 3.1 overleaf is a diagram summarising the relationships among the 
three aspects. The aspects are represented by three circles, spaced 
around a fourth which represents perspective jumps. The arrows (a) to 
(f) towards and away from the jump represent transitions out of and 
into a particular perspective space. The curved arrows between the 
three aspects represent constraints and limitations, not transitions 
or any kind of sequence since in any particular perspective at any 
particular moment all the aspects are involved. 
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Fig 3.1 
While relatively independent, in the sense that certain features of 
each aspect are peculiar to that aspect, still the limits of one can 
put constraints on the others. Since there would seem to be what 
might, after Ryle, be called a "category difference" (Ryle, 1949) 
between any two of the aspects, it might at first sight appear that it 
is a category mistake to regard one aspect as constraining another. 
But thanks to Hanson, Kuhn and others we are quite familiar with the 
notion that theory constrains practice and experience, and that prac- 
tical difficulties constrain acceptable theoretical formulations. 
Finally, experience provides the possibility of falsification of the 
theory, and demonstrates the appropriateness or inappropriateness of 
an articulation of a paradigm as applied to that particular piece of 
the world. 
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The constraints are summarised as follows: 
Theory is limited in its understanding of processes and in 
practical possibilities by Practice, and also by the scope of the 
monitoring provided by Being There; 
Practice depends on Theory for the space in which the movement 
occurs, and for planning, and depends on Being There for feedback 
and directionality; 
Being There also is limited for the nature and scope of its space 
by Theory (including the discriminations it allows for), and for 
the toolkit and point of view mobility by the practical aspect. 
If any of these limitations of the present perspective make the goal 
unattainable, then a perspective shift is called for. In the diagram, 
the arrows towards the 'jump' reflect this as follows: 
(a)Theory: finds the goal theoretically impossible, or cannot 
formulate the problem precisely enough, or finds the goal 
in conflict with other goals (e. g. too dangerous); 
(b)Practice: finds the goal impracticable for any reason, e. g. 
insuperable obstacles, paralysis etc.; 
(c)Being there: finds the view obscure, or obscured, or finds 
emotional obstacles (e. g. boredom, fear) or suffers 
sensory malfunction, etc. 
The arrows away from the 'jump' towards the other three reflect a 
shift into a perspective considered, stumbled upon or seen to be 
appropriate to the passing show (to borrow a phrase from Quine). 
Attention may be drawn by a phenomenon in experience, or by a 
representation in Theory. In either case the other aspects are also 
involved as soon as the shift is made. The practical aspect also 
provides an entrance to a new perspective, for example through prac- 
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tice of a skill. Referring back to the diagram, then, the ways into a 
new perspective are: 
(d) a representation of some kind, e. g. a description, statement, 
drawing etc. enters the field (learning), or 
a question is asked (teaching), or 
instructions are received for reasons which are understood in 
the new perspective; 
(e) compulsory action (e. g. being pushed), or 
practice in a skill or technique, physical or mental; 
(f) something, either unusual or urgent, is suddenly noticed 
(the urgency etc is part of the experience), or 
something quite incomprehensible in any hitherto known 
perspective is nonetheless noticed, often with a sense of 
revelation. 
We must be careful when trying to distinguish among the three aspects 
since, for example, Practice in one perspective might be Being there 
in another perspective: an action towards a goal might be someone 
else's entertainment. Similarly, a Theoretical representation of one 
perspective might be lines on paper, sound waves or whatever, in 
another's Experience. We cannot look at a portion of the world and 
say: this is Theory, that is Practical, etc. We must also be clear as 
to the distinction between the perspective we are in and the perspec- 
tive we are talking about. 
3.4 Perspective shifts, values and purposes 
Having identified the perspective, we then look for the goal, if there 
is one. Let us therefore move at this point to consideration of 
purpose, and its intimate relation to changes in perspective. The goal 
is a state of experience, and is by implication different from the 
present state of experience (or the projected future state). We have 
assumed that Experience is essentially passive, that is, it is the 
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outcome of a certain way of setting up Theory and Practice and doesn't 
do anything in the physical world of itself. It is just the way 
things are (seen, remembered, imagined) in the perspective. ; Again, 
it is important to stress that this strategy is not the only one. If 
it is found, somehow, that a perspective's being experienced does ipso 
facto change the world, then the strategy can be altered accordingly. 
Psychology experiments, where the subject is not told what is going 
on, are a possible case in point. The limit to observation in Heisen- 
berg's Indeterminacy principle is another. But in these cases, great 
care must be taken that we are looking in the right space. ) We have 
seen, however, that Experience does put constraints on Theory and 
Practice where we generally have the feeling that things are done. 
A goal, then, is basically in the Experience aspect; nevertheless it 
is the representation of it which provides the basis for a search for 
solutions, and the toolkit which provides the means. 
Some 'goals' can be translated into rules, such as Kant's categorical 
imperative or the various rules of thumb used by designers and archi- 
tects. These rules provide tools for those who don't have the knack 
of doing it right without them. They are actually incorporated in the 
perspective space as dimensions of desirability, since the terms in 
which the state of affairs in the perspective space are described are 
the same terms used to indicate which of the possible states of aff- 
airs are the more desirable in that perspective. 
Purposes which can be treated in this way we can call "values", after 
common usage. Like the other distinctions and dimensions in the 
space, they affect the way of looking at the world as it is. A space 
with different values is not the same space. 
Intentions, by contrast, do not lend themselves to this treatment. 
They may arise from, or be circumscribed by, values in the spaces 
their implementation might affect, but they are not built-in to the 
spaces in the way that values are. Generally, "purpose" refers to 
intentions, or problems, rather than values. Purposes are desired 
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results, rather than merely comments. 
Purposes are therefore intimately bound up with the appropriateness 
judgment, and with shifts in perspective. 
We can identify several different types of perspective shift. The 
simplest type would be a movement of the point of view, for instance 
standing on a chair to see over a wall. The perspective is settled 
upon; the only problem is the practical one of a wall obstructing the 
view. This shift does not involve a jump between two different pers- 
pective spaces. 
If no chair had been readily available, a jump to a new perspective 
with the purpose of finding something to stand on might be the next 
step. If nothing suitable can be found, the project might be aban- 
doned in favour of some other goal, e. g. continuing on one's way. 
Alternatively, something else might catch the attention -a rare 
butterfly, or an approaching car. Then again, a more dramatic persp- 
ective shift might occur, as in successful "lateral thinking" (de 
Bono, 1967), whereby some quite different solution to the problem is 
suddenly seen. Here, old ground is looked at in a new way (we also 
say: in a new light). De Bono offers methods for cultivating and 
encouraging such shifts in one's business and social life, and his 
suggestions include generation of alternative ways of looking and 
suspension of judgment so as not to dismiss an idea prematurely. 
Some perspective jumps make the old perspective obsolete. Kuhn's 
'revolutions' are jumps of this kind, but the concept encompasses more 
than those perspective spaces which occur in science. Revolutions in 
science do not happen every day, but ordinary insights, which often 
have the same quality of discontinuity and can supersede old ways of 
looking, are quite frequent. 
All these types of shift happen all the time in everyday life, and the 
purpose and toolkit are clearly intimately involved in motivating 
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them. Sometimes a shift is prompted by an unsolved puzzle within a 
perspective, sometimes it comes about by the new one calling in some 
way - perhaps a question is asked, or something is noticed. Generally 
the new perspective is judged more appropriate than the old one in 
some way or another - otherwise there would be no point in adopting 
it. 
3.4.1 Appropriateness and perspective jumps 
Good and bad, high and low, comfortable and painful, are relative to 
particular perspectives. Appropriateness to the present situation, 
however, is a different matter. Appropriateness is relative, but it 
is relative to something more immediate and dynamic than a particular 
envisaged goal. The goal itself might be inappropriate. Appropriate- 
ness seems to relate to the state of the world as it is in itself, so 
to speak. 
This is a generalisation of the problem of theory-choice which has led 
to so much misunderstanding of Kuhn. Because the choice of perspec- 
tive must come from outside the perspectives themselves, there can be 
no hard criteria unless there is an all-embracing 'absolute' perspec- 
tive from which to judge the others. One of the most persistent 
quests in philosophy is to look for the most basic and comprehensive 
perspective, or meta-perspective, with a view to seeing the whole 
world within it. An example might be the Taoist Yin-Yang theory. But 
such a rarified God's-eye view is seldom of much use, because it is 
bound to be ambiguous when applied to detailed problems (e. g. moral 
dilemmas, or sorting foods into yin and yang). With specific prob- 
lems, an all-embracing perspective is so much excess baggage. 
This is not to say that perspectives on perspectives are of no use in 
an appropriateness judgment. It may be that values in such meta- 
perspectives, with their associated rules, can provide something like 
a calculus for the judgment. Such values, in the case of paradigm 
choice in science, might include simplicity, scope, predictive value 
and relevance. In more practical areas, whether it be an ordinary 
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switch of attention, the adoption of a new paradigm in science, a new 
way of looking at an old practical problem, or the best place to look 
for, or store, something in a database, the values might include 
efficiency, convenience and so on. Compatibility with values in other 
affected perspective spaces is also fundamental to perspective choice. 
Another question to consider is whether in any given situation there 
is just one appropriate perspective. Hunches point both ways: from 
time to time we all have the experience that something is 'exactly 
right'; on the other hand we often see the same problem solved in 
different ways, all equally effective. This is another example of a 
case where the strategy can go either way according to taste (i. e. 
other PR theories might choose differently). 
One consideration, following Feyerabend, is that there are numerous 
advantages in a strategy of exploring as many different perspectives 
as possible, with an air of flippancy. It is the closest approxima- 
tion to an absolute perspective, and the best way to look at the world 
without missing the obvious; it not only helps us to understand other 
people, but also actually helps us to understand the world. The idea 
that we cannot communicate unless we have a single universal perspec- 
tive does not follow from the notion that perspectives must be matched 
for communication to take place - on the contrary, it is more effec- 
tive to learn how to see the world in more different perspectives. A 
lighter touch is suggested, bringing with it a sense of economy and 
efficiency. 
In any case, if there were only one appropriate perspective (that of a 
saint or sage, for example) we could never arrive at it by rules and 
searches because there might always be alternative meta-perspectives, 
possibly arbitrated by a still higher one, leading to an infinite 
search - to say nothing of the enormous scope on the original level. 
So we shall consider appropriateness to be a matter of degree: 'if 
it'll do, it'll have to do'. 
We have seen that, at least in everyday life, shifts are the rule 
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rather than the exception; but theory, practice and being there do 
not alone provide us with a clear way to jump between two quite 
distinct perspective spaces. They do provide ways into their own 
perspective, but not ways out of a current unsatisfactory one. 
In order to judge one perspective to be more appropriate than another, 
one at least must be able to see them both (though not necessarily 
both at once). Argument in favour of a certain perspective jump is 
not enough to bring it about. However well I understand an argument 
or description of an outlook, I cannot make the shift on the basis of 
that alone, even if I wanted to. I must be shown (being there) what 
it is like, and I must take any necessary practical steps before any 
jump can take place. In short, I must be ready for the shift with 
regard to all three aspects. In the case of a revolution a consider- 
able amount of groundwork may be necessary first (possibly in the 
unconscious, for perspectives whose ontologies have that notion). 
A very useful project, therefore, would be to elucidate the groundwork 
necessary for a jump to an unfamiliar perspective. The new perspec- 
tive might have to develop gradually, by stages or insights. Good 
educators are probably the best qualified to comment on this. 
In the case of already familiar situations, the groundwork was done 
long ago. The difference between a jump to a familiar perspective 
space and a jump to an unfamiliar one is only that in the latter case 
the jump is being made for the first time. Most discontinuous pers- 
pective jumps are between familiar but incompatible perspectives - 
incompatible only in the sense that they cannot both be viewed at the 
same time. There is a large store of perspective spaces already 
available to a person (Gregory terms this "Potential Intelligence"), 
and it is from these that a perspective is normally chosen in a given 
situation. The Experience aspect, so far the most mysterious, plays 
as crucial a part in this choice as the other two. 
If there is a way to make the judgment by searching or matching, it 
will have to come from a meta-perspective; otherwise there is nothing 
87 
but noise to match with. The appropriateness judgment seems quite 
spontaneous to us most of the time; to make a set of rules for it must 
be a matter of perspective on perspectives, where appropriateness can 
be a value. In setting up such a system, however, this value is 
likely to be arbitrary, since other meta-perspectives might see it 
differently. 
3.4.2 Further remarks on purposes 
In cases where there is no ideal involved, a representation in Theory 
is a plain description of what is going on in the perspective as in, 
for example, (ideal) scientific and police reports. Usually we find 
some value judgment either explicit or implicit in expressions of 
Theory. (An immediate example is the suggestion that an ideal report 
should have no ideals built-in to its particular perspective space). 
Where there is a relatively clear purpose, there will be a definite 
difference between the present (or, alternatively, envisaged future) 
state of affairs and the envisaged goal. Where a clear purpose is 
being pursued, there is no call for a perspective jump; by that stage 
the perspective space has been settled upon. If, however, while the 
goal is being pursued it turns out to be impossible either theoretic- 
ally or practically, or not so desirable after all, then a perspective 
jump is called for. 
If in the course of pursuing a goal there is an interruption which 
brings about a perspective shift, there might be two goals in two 
different perspectives which somehow have to be compared for priority. 
The dilemma would be resolved either by finding a perspective which 
allows achievement of both goals or an acceptable compromise, or by 
abandoning one goal in favour of the other, or by äbandoning both if a 
jump produces a perspective in which they both seem silly. A shift to 
a meta-perspective may or may not be of use. 
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3.4.3 Vague and negative purposes 
So far we have mainly considered clear, positive purposes. Many 
goals, however, are only vaguely understood, or negative (where any 
relevant change will do), or both. 
A clear, negative goal (expressible usually as 'x is too y' - for 
example, 'I am too cold') would be achieved either by any movement on 
the relevant dimension in the current perspective (in the example any 
currently practicable steps to warm up), or by shifting to another 
perspective where things don't seem quite so bad (in the example, 
perhaps regarding it as an exercise in hardiness). In both strategies 
the purpose is easily converted to a positive one, because it is clear 
and the relevant dimension is therefore isolated. 
A vaguely understood goal may be negative or positive. At that stage, 
there is only an area of disquiet in the perspective, with no clear 
formulation or visualisation of it. If it is negative, the goal is 
escape but it is not yet clear from what. If it is positive, the goal 
is some change, but it is not yet clear to what. In both cases, the 
perspective requires further clarification before an efficient course 
of action can be sought. A negative, vague purpose, such as 'I am 
unhappy', is best clarified first before converting to positive; what 
is required is to find out what one is unhappy about, whether it is 
job prospects, home life or whatever. 
3.5 Communication 
We now have the beginnings of a view of communication which, true to 
the nature of the subject, is easy to understand. Cherry (1978) 
stresses that communication is essentially sharing, and points out 
that certain things, such as emotions and the sense of "being" cannot 
be shared. Cherry's idea of sharing seems to be based on the observa- 
tion that a message is not lost to the sender. Coupled with this is a 
valuable discussion of the social nature of language and its analogy 
with morals. 
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In considering perspective relativity, however, when we say that a 
perspective must be shared for communication to take place, we are 
taking Cherry's point a stage further. Communicators share not only a 
common language and customs, but must also share a way of seeing the 
relevant world. The failure of attempts by philosophers to put this 
way of seeing in a comprehensive framework which relates it to 
language seems to suggest that this 'way of seeing' incorporates a 
multiplicity of perspectives. 
In fact the multiplicity of perspectives is so enormous that most 
communication between two people is only partial. Not only must all 
the relevant distinctions be understood but also, as we saw in the 
example of the rose, they must be appreciated in the same way. An 
extreme view would be to say that perfect communication is impossible 
because no two people share the same experiences and even if they did, 
since experience is essentially private they would have no way to 
ascertain that they did. 
We have seen that a particular experience is not individuated by a 
sentence, even if the definitions of the words are made plain, but 
that it can be individuated by a perspective space and a point of 
view. It will not do simply to give spatial co-ordinates and a direc- 
tion, because this does not give the whole perspective space; what is 
needed is a clear way of pointing to all the distinctions and dimen- 
sions which go to make up the space in question. 
In order to work with this idea, we need a sufficiently precise and at 
the same time comprehensive notion of what a perspective is. The 
perspective on perspectives outlined so far (by no means the only 
possible one) includes the practical and experiential aspects as well 
as the theoretical space. 
The analysis of these three aspects of a perspective can make it 
easier to talk about conscious activity (and unconscious activity) 
without making any commitment as to what consciousness 'actually' is, 
what truth is, what feelings are and so on, in the real world. Be- 
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cause of this tolerance the theory of perspective relativity is not 
intended to be a philosophical position - it was here that McGilvary's 
perspective realism came to grief - but it does provide us with an 
approach to problems like the one with which this project began, 
namely, that of finding a useful way of manipulating meanings where 
syntactic rules are not enough. 
Perspective shifts, of all kinds, are the rule rather than the excep- 
tion and depend on the purpose brought to the situation and on the 
values inherent in the perspectives concerned. Other notions, such 
as appropriateness (of a perspective to a situation) and relevance (of 
a perspective to a purpose), are intimately bound up with shifts and 
purposes. 
These and other related concepts require further clarification, which 
will be attempted in chapter 4. Then in chapter 5 we shall look at 
some possible areas of application. 
91 
CHAPTER FOUR : PERSPECTIVE RELATIVITY 
Contents: Page 
4.0 Introduction ................................................ 93 
4.1 Point of view, field of view ................................ 
93 
4.2 Field space, view, overall view ............................. 95 
4.3 Combination ................................................. 97 
4.4 Perspective differences, coherence, incompatibility......... 98 
4.5 Shifts ..................................................... 102 
4.6 The world .................................................. 102 
4.7 Assumptions ................................................ 103 
4.8 Mutual sensitivity and relevance ........................... 105 
4.9 Values, purpose, appropriateness ........................... 106 
92 
4.0 Introduction 
In the last chapter we considered the versatility of perspectives as a 
conceptual tool, and the relationships among certain aspects of a 
perspective. Useful concepts in perspective relativity, some of which 
we have already touched upon, include: differences and combinations of 
perspectives, mutual relevance, co-operation of two or more perspec- 
tives, incompatible perspectives, the effect of values and goals, and 
the possibility or impossibility of an 'impartial' perspective (God's- 
eye view). These matters can be more easily discussed if we have a 
clearer terminology with which to work, because while the concepts are 
relatively simple their interaction can become very convoluted. In 
this chapter, therefore, we shall be looking at a possible example of 
such a terminology. This chapter is physically shorter than the 
others, but arguably the most important. Because of the way the 
concepts are introduced, the format is slightly different; the num- 
bered subdivisions do not have separate headings, and where a concept 
appears for the first time it is printed in boldface. 
# 
4.1 A perspective is determined by two elements, namely, a point of 
view (POV) and a field of view. 
4.1.1 The POV is an abstraction; it is a point in a space, not an 
object (though it might be occupied by an object, e. g. an eye or a 
probe), and it has no qualities of its own. 
4.1 .1 .1 When we speak of 'the point of view of science' or 'the point 
of view of Londoners', for instance, we generally mean the field and 
not the POV. The POV is just what draughtsmen call the station point; 
it has no qualities or attributes other than its position in relation 
to the field. 
4.1.2 The field of view is whatever is before the POV in that perspec- 
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tive - whatever is being looked at. 
4.1.2.1 The position of the POV does not alone determine which field 
is in view; for example, the field in a drawing of a still life could 
be the marks on the paper, or the objects depicted, or the space in 
which the objects are situated, or certain facts about the objects, 
such as their relations to one another and to the POV. We can shift 
from one to another of these perspectives without moving a muscle. We 
can even pick up a complex value-laden message from the artist, if we 
are in the perspective he had in mind. Anything that could conceiv- 
ably be looked at from any POV is a field of view. 
4.1.2.2 We must keep in mind that the field is not the representation 
of the field - although it might happen to be a representation of 
another field. 
4.1.2.3 A field can be expressed, in the Theory aspect, in any of the 
different ways that people communicate with one another using shared 
signs and symbols. Theory is not restricted to written and spoken 
language, whether natural, formal or specialised, but also includes 
diagrams, artistic creations in any medium, facial expression and 
gesture. Each perspective is conducive to some such form of expres- 
sion in the Theory aspect, even though the message might only be 
available to those already familiar with the perspective. 
4.1.2.4 We have referred elsewhere to Theory as putting Experience on 
a labelled grid. The form of the grid is quite variable. We could 
choose one form to express all fields, provided we remember that we 
imposed rather than discovered that constraint. For example, we could 
choose to regard all fields as made up of 'holons', after Koestler 
(Koestler, 1978), with emphasis on wholehood and parthood; or we 
could choose that all fields are composed of elements with boundaries, 
attributes and relations to one another. This kind of choice is a 
matter of convenience of handling. 
4.1.2.5 Given that there are alternative ways of expressing the same 
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field, we must beware of the distinction between perspectives on 
perspectives and perspectives on the world. A different perspective 
on a particular view might involve a different mode of representation, 
but it is still the same view. By contrast, a switch to a different 
perspective space, even if the person, or probe, does not move at all, 
is a switch to a different view which may or may not involve a differ- 
ent form of representation. 
4.1.2.5.1 For example, marks on paper might be represented by patches 
of light and dark, or by boundaries between light and dark patches, 
but they are still marks on paper; the difference is one of perspec- 
tive on the perspective. If the marks are seen as depicting objects, 
however, the space, and the view, have changed to that of the objects 
and the switch is one of perspective on the world. 
4.1.2.6 Having separated perspectives on perspectives from perspec- 
tives on the world, there is one more item of structure to point out. 
We have said that the perspective space is a set of distinctions and 
dimensions upon which ontologically accepted elements find their 
place. What is the difference between distinctions and dimensions? 
At the early stages of the project they were regarded as practically 
the same thing, but it turns out to be useful to separate them. 
Dimensions are divided into units, and can be the axes of graphs, 
whereas distinctions are yes/no affairs. Distinctions are nonetheless 
part of the space; a perspective space with the same dimensions as 
another but with different distinctions, especially distinctions which 
cross those of the other, is a different space offering different 
views. Rank orderings, like hardness, could be treated as distinc- 
tions or as dimensions according to the purpose. So could colour, for 
example, being an ordered spectrum from red to violet, or mixtures of 
primary colours, or a menu of just a few. 
4.2 First let us consider how the POV relates to the field The 
question is: is it more useful to regard the POV as a point in the 
field's space, or as a point on a dimension orthogonal to it? 
95 
4.2.1 Consider the experience of looking at one's surroundings in the 
perspective of, say, three-dimensional physical objects in space. The 
POV is somewhere in that same space, and has the same kind of relation 
to the objects as they have to one another. 
Now consider the same situation, but in the perspective of, say, 
colour patches in the visual field which is two-dimensionsal. Here 
the POV cannot be in the field space. What is the difference between 
these two perspectives, whereby in one the field encompasses the POV 
and in the other the field not only does not but cannot encompass the 
POV? 
4.2.1.1 We must bear in mind that a POV cannot look at itself (al- 
though another POV might look at it) and so if the POV is located in 
the field it must itself be a 'blind spot'. This might be awkward, as 
the POV would have to alter the space around it in some way. 
It seems preferable to regard the POV as something which is perfectly 
simple and which does not, by being occupied, alter the field's space 
in any way. Therefore we would like to say that the POV is not a 
point in the field, yet in the world of everyday objects it obviously 
is in the field's space. How do we solve this dilemma? 
4.2.2 We can solve it by making a distinction between on the one hand 
the view, and on the other hand the field space, or perspective space. 
4.2.2.1 Then we can say that the POV for each view is located in the 
field space which encompasses or embeds that view and others, but is 
not and cannot be located within its own view. The field space there- 
fore has one dimension more than the views have. 
4.2.2.2 This field space is also a view, from a POV which is a point 
in a still higher-dimensional field space. Thus there are perspec- 
tives on perspectives. Conversely, we can say that any point P in an 
n-dimensional space is a potential POV for any (n-1)-dimensional 
fragment of that space which does not include P itself. 
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4.2.2.2.1 The physical objects around us, then, can look three-dimen- 
sional because imagination and memory of other views enables those 
views to cooperate with the present one. All the individual views on 
the objects are two-dimensional, 'camera' views (although it takes an 
effort to see them as such possibly because of genetic factors). 
4.2.2.2.2 The 'mind's eye' is able to see physical objects at various 
distances and orientations because of cooperation among different 
(imagined) views on them. The mind's eye is also a POV, but it does 
not correspond to any particular view on the objects. Its view (the 
overall view) is the field space of the camera views, and the POV of 
this view is therefore outside that field space (a clue to the mind- 
body problem? ). We could define the overall view of a space as the 
views from all the points in that space combined. 
4.3 To combine two perspectives, (i. e. in order to view both at once) 
we must find a space which embeds both their field spaces. 
4.3.1 If they are already the same, or one already embeds the other, 
this is easy. 
4.3.2 If they overlap - that is, they have at least one dimension in 
common - then we can (at least in theory) hook them together; if the 
resulting space contains distinctions which cross one another, all but 
one in each knot can be dropped. 
4.3.3 If they do not overlap, we can look for a space which overlaps 
both - again, eliminating crossed distinctions. 
4.3.4 If it should prove impossible either to find a common space or 
find a common distinction, then the two perspectives will remain 
forever separate and "incommensurable". 
The possibility of combining perspectives thus depends on perspective 
differences. 
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4.4 We can split perspective differences into three categories: 
A) different POV, same field space 
B) different field space, same POV 
C) different POV, different field space 
4.4.1 The first of these categories is potentially the most congenial, 
since two POVs on the same field space can serve to enrich each 
other's overall view i. e. makes possible a wider perspective which 
encompasses both, and in which the view is their field space. Let us 
illustrate this category by fig 4.1 a: 
fig 4.1 aI_I Category A 
where the circle represents the field space and the dots the POVs. 
One example might be binocular vision, where two very similar 2-D 
views result in a sense of depth. Another example is friendship, 
where an area of expertise or interest is shared. The different POVS 
make available different facts which can immediately be communicated 
to the other because of the common perspective space. The spirit of 
the interaction is one of cooperation. 
4.4.1.1 Having said this, we often refer to quite acrimonious argument 
as a difference in point of view. The facts, it might be said, are 
agreed upon; the difference is in the values placed upon the facts. 
For example, suppose it is agreed that the level of unemployment is 
too high and that something must be done about it. The statistics 
are agreed upon, and so (let us assume) is the awareness of the 
individual human misery it causes. Yet the government and the opposi- 
tion are never seen to cooperate to solve the problem. New facts 
brought to light by one side do nothing to enrich the other side's 
view. The facts are already shared. 
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In such a case it is not the perspective space that is shared, because 
the agreed facts have different implications for the two sides. What 
is at issue is the other factors considered relevant and important in 
considering the agreed problem. Therefore the two sides have 
different extensions to the space in which the problem is stated, over 
and above the distinctions and dimensions they have in common. 
4.4.2 This political problem is an example of the second category of 
perspective difference, where the POV is shared but the views are in 
different field spaces. 
4.4.2.1 This amounts to saying that the same piece of the world is 
different in the two perspectives. 
4.4.2.2 This second category of perspective difference may be illus- 
trated by the diagrams in fig 4.1b: 
fig 4.1b Category B 
To have the same POV, the field spaces must overlap or 'hook together' 
on at least one dimension; the most obvious example would be spatial 
position, but we must remember that many perspectives do not include 
those dimensions. (If the field spaces have no dimension in common, 
then there is no sense in which the POV can be the same in both. ) The 
common POV must be within the intersection of the field spaces (that 
is, the space consisting of the dimensions they both have in common). 
4.4.2.3 Another example of category B is learning and teaching, where 
the perspective space to which the pupil has access is still develop- 
ing towards that of the teacher. The spirit is one of persuasion, to 
enlarge the other's field space. In the political example above, the 
persuasion is two-way. 
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4.4.3 Now, what of category C, where the POVs and the field spaces are 
both different? There are three different ways this could be: 
Ci) the field spaces overlap, 
and both POVs are within 
the intersection; 
Cii) the field spaces overlap, 
but one or both POVs is not 
in the intersection; 
Ciii) the field spaces do not 
overlap at all. 
ýo 
ýýo iý 
fig 4.1c Category C 
4.4.3.1 Case Ci) reduces to category A in the intersection of the two 
field spaces (i. e. same field, different POVs), so provided that that 
limitation is understood, cooperation can flourish. Similarly, with 
judicious operation of the toolkit (i. e. movement of the POV within 
the field space) in one or both perspectives, Cii) can be converted 
to category A. Alternatively, Ci) and Cii) can be converted to 
category B by moving the POVs to coincide in the overlap, and communi- 
cation in the spirit of persuasion can begin. 
4.4.3.3 Not so with Ciii), the extreme case of category C. There is 
no facility within the perspectives themselves to bridge the gap 
between them. Communication is impossible, since nothing is shared, 
and so to go from one to the other requires a perspective jump. 
There is no room even for antagonism between the two perspectives. 
This is the situation Whorf points to when he discusses the different 
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classifications apparently to be found in the Hopi tongue as compared 
with those that we take for granted (Whorf, 1956). It occurs, usually 
on a much smaller scale, when people talk at cross-purposes. Again, 
the duck/rabbit drawing is an example of this category, since the one 
excludes the other. Similarly, the duck and the rabbit both exclude 
the marks on the paper. Such pairs of perspectives are incompatible 
or "incommensurable", and they are to be found everywhere. 
4.4.4 We can define coherence of a perspective as follows: a coherent 
perspective is one which is not made up of one or more incompatible 
perspectives. Where two incompatible perspectives are confused, the 
result is a perspective which is incoherent. 
4.4.4.1 Two perspectives are compatible if one can be added to the 
other without the need for a perspective jump. In other words, they 
are compatible except where the difference is of category Ciii. 
4.4-4.1 .1 For example, colour can be laid on top of shape, but the 
Mona Lisa's eyes and hair are in a different space, a space 'inside' 
(or 'behind') the picture wherever it goes, and whenever it is reprod- 
uced. This reflects Ryle's notion of a "category mistake" (Ryle, 
1949). The spaces are mutually exclusive (a category Ciii perspective 
difference) with the added problem that they are not seen to be dif- 
ferent, and so it seems as though the POV is shared. 
Thus some philosophers feel that the Mona Lisa's smile must be found 
in, or defined in terms of, a configuration of light and dark patches. 
Similarly, when puzzling about the nature of communication we feel 
that the message must be contained in the signal in some way, that the 
sender's intention is to be found in the message, and so on. 
If whatever you are looking for is not immediately apparent, then a 
perspective shift is called for, however clear the present perspective 
happens to be. 
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4.5 Given these different forms of perspective difference, perspective 
shifts can be classified similarly. 
4.5.1 The simplest shift is just movement of the POV in the perspec- 
tive space, e. g. to get a better view. This corresponds to a Category 
A perspective difference, where the perspectives are just two differ- 
ent views in the same space. The two perspectives are obviously 
compatible and in practice actually enhance each other. 
4.5.2 A shift between a category B pair of perspectives, where the POV 
is the same in both, will be a matter of addition or subtraction of 
dimensions and distinctions. A new distinction might be pointed out, 
and added to the view, or a dimension might be dropped because of 
irrelevance. The facts themselves are unaltered; it is a matter of 
which facts are considered relevant. 
4.5.3 Category Ci and Cii are variations on categories A and B. Again 
the perspective shifts corresponding to them could be broken down into 
a relatively smooth slide from one to the other: adding a dimension 
here, removing one there, sliding the POV over there, and so on. 
4.5.4 Shifts between incompatible perspectives, by contrast, cannot be 
analysed in this fashion. There is a definite quality of discontin- 
uity in the shift. 
4.6 What of the world? We tend not to see what we don't expect to 
see. This does not entail that reality is 'merely' subjective, like 
the tree in the quad. There are, we may assume, countless perspec- 
tives which have never been and never will be actually experienced. 
4.6.1 In this sense the world consists of perspectives - not of 
photons and quarks, or animals, vegetables and minerals, but of all 
possible distinctions which make up ways of looking. 
4.6.1.1 In another sense the world is made up of animal, vegetable and 
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mineral, or of the natural and the artificial, or of atoms, or what- 
ever you will. These are all equally fundamental ontologies, each in 
its own perspective (or set of perspectives). 
4.6.1.2 If a coherent perspective space contains a distinction, then 
it should be safe to say that the difference corresponding to that 
distinction exists in the world. If a distinction appears only as a 
result of a confusion of two incompatible perspectives then it may be 
that there is no such difference in the world, only in the way of 
looking. Our original problem, that of the relation between signal 
and message, might find its answer here: that they cannot cohabit the 
same space. 
4.6.2 Provided the space is not mistaken for another, a coherent 
perspective is not mistaken about what is in view. We have also 
reason to assume, as Sowa pointed out, that there are incompatible 
perspectives which are nonetheless coherent within themselves. It 
follows that there is no single perspective space which includes all 
aspects of the world. 
4.6.2.1 The structure of a field space will, if it is overworked, 
eventually produce generalisations which go beyond the scope of the 
original view. This is what happens when a paradigm in science is 
found to be increasingly unsatisfactory as the analogy is pushed too 
far. We saw in Chapter 2 that it is the crudest, most limited analogy 
which makes the most effective scientific paradigm. Just as any 
mistake about what is in view is in the choice of space, the limits to 
a particular space are in its scope of appropriateness. 
4.7 Since any view depends on a particular perspective space, it must 
incorporate assumptions, which may or may not bo explicitly under- 
stood. 
4.7.1 If we can relate these assumptions to the perspective space we 
can use the relation both ways. That is, we can use explicit assump- 
1 03 
tions to delineate the space, and we can use the space to point to 
implicit assumptions. In the first case, the user can tell the system 
which space to look at, and in the second, the system can help the 
user to clarify any ambiguities. Implicit assumptions are the sort of 
statement which a person might not formulate for himself but which, 
once formulated for him, he can at once recognise - as in 'I couldn't 
have put it better myself'. 
4.7.2 Not all assumptions are about the perspective space. Hypoth- 
eses, for instance, are usually not about the space but about what 
goes on there. Hypotheses, comments and factual statements do not 
contribute directly to the space delineation, but aspects of the space 
can be inferred from the concepts expressed in such statements. 
4.7.2.1 A concept might find a place in several quite incompatible 
perspective spaces, so the mere mention of a concept is not enough. 
We said in Chapter 1 that any statement partitions perspectives into 
three classes: those in which the statement is true, those in which it 
is false and those in which it does not make any sense or is irrel- 
evant. This partitioning could give rise to a useful technique, since 
all but the first class can then be immediately eliminated at each 
successive statement or comment until a manageable number remains. 
4.7.3 There is no such thing as perspective-neutral data. A fact 
(or a 
representation in the Theory aspect which purports to be of a fact) 
carries its perspective space with it, implicitly. 
4.7.3.1 It follows that to make a message perfectly explicit, the entire 
relevant perspective space must be specified. 
The intention behind a message is to indicate a certain view and then 
to say (or ask or suggest or demand or whatever) something about it. 
(The psychology of the matter is not our concern, only the perspective 
considerations. ) 
4.7.3.1.1 In ordinary discourse it is usually unnecessary to be expli- 
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cit about the space since it is understood from the context, but where 
an ambiguity is detected the discussion always turns to distinctions 
of some kind. (This is why it takes so long to find out what someone 
else means by "God". ) 
4.7.3.1.2 Even defining terms is a way of pointing to a space - except 
where it is just substituting an expression for another expression, 
for the sake of brevity or verbosity. 
4.7.3.1.3 To specify a field space in a certain context it might be 
necessary only to point out examples of elements (e. g. mugs and tele- 
phones, or colours and textures etc. ). It might, alternatively, be 
necessary to set up schools to train people to see a field. It 
depends on the range of perspectives already available to the people 
concerned. 
4.8 Two perspective spaces can be incompatible and yet still mutually 
sensitive, in the sense that a change in the world might be seen in 
both spaces. This means that in planning something it might be neces- 
sary to take several different spaces into account. 
4.8.1 Translating a change from one space into an incompatible one is 
a futile endeavour without the benefit of looking and seeing, or some 
analogue of that, because of the incompatibility. 
4.8.1.1 A representation which makes sense in both spaces will serve 
as such an analogue. The same Mona Lisa is available to the pixel 
counter and to the viewer who enjoys the enigmatic smile. 
4.8.1.2 Conversely, if a representation in one space does make sense 
when seen in another, then the two spaces will be mutually sensitive. 
4.8.1.2.1 Since there is, we may assume, only one world, all perspec- 
tives on the world which make sense are mutually sensitive. 
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4.8.2 Mutual relevance is mutual sensitivity where it matters. This 
is something to be discovered in the individual case, according to the 
particular purpose in hand and values in other perspectives. 
4.9 Values, such as aesthetics, morals and interests, are inherent 
in their perspective spaces. They are functions of the distinctions 
and dimensions which make up the space, and by virtue of them the 
state of affairs in the space is more or less desirable. An identical 
space, but with different values on it, is not the same space and 
might actually be incompatible. 
4.9.1 For example, rich and poor might agree completely on the facts 
about how wealth is distributed, but clearly they see and appreciate 
those facts quite differently. 
4.9.1.1 This ties in with commonsense thinking about facts and values. 
A dispute about facts can be resolved by matching the spaces and 
looking at the view; a dispute about values is a dispute about the 
appropriateness of the space. 
4.9.2 Values give rise to purposes when there is an intention to 
make changes in the state of affairs so as better to conform to the 
ideal. Purposes therefore reflect values, but are independent of them 
in the sense that a purpose might conflict with a value in another 
(incompatible but sensitive) space, whereas if values conflict the 
space is incoherent. 
4.9.2.1 That is, a purpose can be represented in spaces other than 
that in which its corresponding value gave rise to it. It may happen 
that the goal thus translated turns out to be quite unacceptable in 
the new space. This translation is therefore often a necessary part 
of policy decisions. 
4.9.2.2 The values inherent in the perspective being communicated may 
not coincide with those reflected by the speaker's purpose in communi- 
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cating it. Nevertheless, the speaker's purpose still reflects values 
in some perspective, the one he is currently adopting (perhaps secret- 
ly) . 
4.9.3 Appropriateness is a matter of perspective choice. Given a 
problem, some perspectives in which it can be formulated (and which 
are relevantly sensitive to it) are less appropriate than others, 
either because their toolkits are less effective, or because they add 
(or, alternatively, ignore) other quite different problems than the 
one in hand. 
4.9.3.1 Checking a space for appropriateness therefore involves look- 
ing at other spaces and comparing them according to values in the 
meta-perspective. 
4.9.3.1.1 Since there is no limit, in principle, to the number of 
meta-levels of perspectives, the values which determine appropriate- 
ness are bound to be ultimately arbitrary. 
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5.0 Introduction 
Having brought together a variety of concepts relating to perspective 
relativity, in this final chapter we can indicate some possible areas 
of application of these ideas. 
In the first instance, PR is a plea for tolerance of other views' 
existence as a prerequisite for better communication between people, 
especially where there is a real or apparent conflict of interests. 
If it were no more than this, though, it would almost certainly fall 
on deaf ears because bigotry sets its own limits on the field beyond 
which the bigot has, often deliberately, prevented himself from 
seeing. No amount of argument can help, because anything outside the 
limit is, literally, meaningless. The psychologists might have more 
to say here, for example that the root of a closed mind is fear, but 
the mechanism of bigotry itself is a fact about perspectives. 
We have found that PR has yielded not only negative results such as 
this, but has several positive results as well. Perspective differ- 
ences are not always obstacles to communication and even where they 
are, PR can indicate ways to deal with them. In some cases an expli- 
cit consideration of the perspective idea will be necessary, but since 
(to be realistic) in a genuine argument it will be very rare for both 
sides to sit down and discuss perspective spaces, it will be generally 
only used by one side. In other cases, e. g. libraries or expert 
systems, some form of perspective relativity could be built in to the 
system to enable users to make themselves better understood. 
Aside from the practical problem of making oneself understood for a 
particular purpose, PR can be of use in philosophical problems which 
lie in the background of our personal and technical lives. It allows 
for flexibility of definitions, such that different distinctions can 
be used for different purposes. Sowa's example, cited above, of the 
distinction between a person's body and its surroundings is a case in 
point. Ethical considerations of life and death are affected by this. 
Finally the problems of duality, with which this project began, can be 
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clarified by considering them as incompatible but mutually relevant 
perspectives on the world. 
Let us take some problems in each of these areas and consider them in 
terms of perspective concepts. 
5.1 Politics 
The concept of politics is wide-ranging and covers anything from 
running a nation to establishing or maintaining a pecking order in a 
small group. This in itself opens up different perspectives on 
politics itself; that national politics is 'no different' from the 
politics of the classroom except that the toys they are fighting over 
are bigger and more dangerous is a perspective some people sometimes 
adopt. As a statement, it is true in some perspectives and false in 
others, and therefore potentially controversial; as an indication of a 
perspective, however, it is neither true nor false but can only be 
valuable, dangerous, tasteless or something of that sort. 
All kinds of personal and professional relationships are affected by 
perspective considerations; a doctor may have difficulty persuading a 
patient that he knows what he is doing, or a designer of anything has 
to be sure he knows what the user requires, and so on. 
5.1.1 Political models 
Different perspectives on political structures can give rise to dif- 
ferent models of how they work. Allison (1971) gives three analyses 
of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, when it seemed that the 
United States and the Soviet Union were at the verge of a nuclear 
confrontation. The Soviet Union placed strategic missiles on Cuba, 
the United States responded by a naval blockade, and the Soviet 
missiles were subsequently withdrawn. Analysts are still puzzled as 
to why these decisions were taken. 
In Allison's first model, the government is seen as a rational actor 
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who makes strategic calculations according to a well-defined situa- 
tion; in the second model it is seen as an organisation with standard 
procedures and routines responding to particular features of the 
situation; finally in the third model it is seen as a power game among 
individuals. Here is an extract from his concluding summary: 
"To explain the blockade, the Model I analyst examines the U. S. 
strategic calculus: the problem posed by the Soviet missiles, 
relevant American values, and U. S. capabilities. Explanation 
means placing the blockade in a pattern of purposive response to 
the strategic problem. For a Model II man, this "solution" 
emerges as the by-product of basic organizational processes. The 
analyst emphasizes organizational constraint in choice and organ- 
izational routines in implementation. Organizational processes 
produced an awareness of the problem on October 14 (rather than 
two weeks earlier or later); organizational routines defined the 
alternatives; organizational procedures implemented the blockade. 
These features overshadow the "decisions" of the unified group of 
leaders within these constraints. ... The Model III analyst 
accents the action of players in the relevant games that produced 
pieces of the collage that is the blockade. Bargaining among 
players who shared power but saw separate problems yielded dis- 
covery of the missiles on a certain date in a special context, a 
definition of the problem which demanded strong action, a coali- 
tion of Presidential intimates set on averting holocaust, failure 
to probe the military estimate, and consequently a blockade. In 
the absence of a number of particular characteristics of players 
and games, the action would not have been the same. " (Allison, 
1971, p250-1) 
Further on, he comments: 
while at one level three models produce different explana- 
tions of the same happening, at a second level the models produce 
different explanations of quite different occurrences. And in- 
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deed, this is my argument. " (Ibid., p251) 
Each model highlights quite different features as relevant to the 
question, why did this happen? It is not a matter of the three models 
competing for the correct answer; there will only be competition if 
two answers together give rise to a contradiction. In this case, we 
can imagine models II and III being put together by considering power 
games within organisational constraints, so each explanation enriches 
the other. Model I in this example is the odd one out; it requires 
much less detailed information as to what happened, and only needs an 
explanation that will fit the outcome. The space is incompatible with 
the other models, since the mechanisms and machinations of the people 
and organisations involved do nothing to add to or subtract from the 
view of the nation as a single rational decision maker. Even so, the 
second and third models can be sensitive to the first, in that it 
provides a simplified overall view which may affect the operation of 
the details. 
5.1.2 Negotiation 
The effect of values and goals on a perspective space is well illust- 
rated in Fisher and Ury, (1981). While in the format of a 'how-to' 
book, Getting to Yes is a result of serious work carried out by the 
Harvard Negotiation Project to explore the principles of successful 
negotiation at any level. Two of the many sensible points they make 
are the following: 
1) that it is essential to show the other side that you fully 
understand the problem from their point of view, 
and 
2) that the negotiator should aim to turn the'situation into a 
partnership where both sides attack the problem, not each other. 
On the first point, it is obviously likely that if you ignore the 
other side's case they will be encouraged to ignore yours, leaving the 
situation to slide into a battle of wills. The more interesting 
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aspect of listening properly to the other side, though, is that their 
interests in their perspective might be quite different from their 
interests as seen in yours. The authors stress that this does not 
mean that you have to adopt their perspective; on the contrary, you 
can use your understanding in several different ways, e. g. pointing 
out other consequences, or simply fostering a sense that mutual co- 
operation against a mutual problem is feasible. 
On the second point, the aim is to find a perspective space in which 
both parties feel comfortable. This may involve bringing in a third 
party to arbitrate, or deciding on an objective standard which is 
independent of the will of either side but which both can regard as 
fair. On the other hand, it may call for creative invention of new 
"options for mutual gain". This involves, among other things, the 
identification of shared interests - states of affairs which are 
desirable for both sides - and finding items in the bone of contention 
which are valued much more highly by one side than the other, so that 
the gain to one is a small loss to the other. 
In perspective terms, negotiation generally begins as a case of a 
Category B perspective difference, where the spaces overlap and cert- 
ain facts are agreed upon, so the POV can be regarded as shared to 
that extent. Then the usual model, as Fisher and Ury point out, is a 
tug-of-war along one dimension - for example, a landlord and tenant 
want to pull the level of the rent opposite ways, according to their 
respective financial interest. In our terms, it is along this dimen- 
sion only that the POV is not shared, and each party attempts, by fair 
means or foul, to persuade the other to come over to his position. 
This is again in line with common usage, where a dispute is referred 
to as a difference in point of view, or a difference in negotiating 
position. 
It is this model of negotiation which Fisher and Ury repudiate, be- 
cause it is a battle of wills with no attempt at co-operation. The 
goal in negotiation, for them, is to reach a solution which is genu- 
inely acceptable to both sides. The subtitle to the book is "Negotia- 
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ting agreement without giving in". This involves looking for options 
which do meet with the other side's interests as well as one's own - 
that is, the other side's problem is not just his problem. The focus 
of discussion shifts from positions along a dimension to a wider range 
of interests. We could say they are talking about values, but more 
importantly the tactic is to explain one's own extension to the space, 
outside the intersection, and ask the other party to explain his. 
This can open up the possibility of a much wider range of possible 
solutions than points along a single dimension. 
Co-operation, as we have seen, involves a difference in POV but a 
shared space. The larger the space, the better; bringing in a wider 
space on both sides is likely to make it easier to reach a suitable 
degree of co-operation than cutting out as many dimensions as possible 
on the grounds that they are prima facie irrelevant. 
5.2 Signals and messages 
Let us now turn to the problem with which this project began, that of 
the 'relation between' signal and message, with a view to finding a 
way of manipulating meanings in a way analogous to symbol manipula- 
tion. Obviously the problem is vague, otherwise we would know at once 
where to look for the answer. We know a fair amount about why it is 
vague, because of the large number of attempts to answer it. Shannon, 
for example, has given us a clear elucidation of the perspective space 
where we find signals transmitted along channels, and a number of 
useful engineering discoveries have resulted from it. 
Shannon's theory includes notions such as coding, redundancy and the 
statistical notion of entropy, and one is tempted to imagine that 
these concepts apply also to messages, by analogy. 
Shannon's diagram of a communication system (from Shannon and Weaver, 
1949) is reproduced overleaf: 
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sage 
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Noise source 
Received 
signal Message 
Weaver, in his Introduction to the book, envisages adding the semantic 
element of communication directly to this diagram: 
"One can imagine, as an addition to the diagram, another box 
labeled "Semantic Receiver" interposed between the engineering 
receiver (which changes signals to messages) and the destination. 
This semantic receiver subjects the message to a second decoding, 
the demand on this one being that it must match the statistical 
semantic characteristics of the message to the statistical 
semantic capacities of the totality of receivers, or of that 
subset of receivers which constitute the audience one wishes to 
affect" (Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p26) 
If an example of a signal is a string of dots and dashes, say, then an 
example of a message is a string of letters and numbers. The statis- 
tical characteristics of the signal depend on the relative probabili- 
ties of different possible signals and yield a quantity which Shannon 
eventually called "entropy". Shannon is quoted as saying: 
"My greatest concern was what to call it. I thought of calling 
it 'information', but the word was overly used, so I decided to 
call it 'uncertainty'. When I discussed it with John von Neu- 
mann, he had a better idea. Von Neumann told me, 'You should 
call it entropy, for two reasons. In the first place your 
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uncertainty function has been used in statistical mechanics under 
that name, so it already has a name. In the second place, and 
more important, no one knows what entropy really is, so in a 
debate you will always have the advantage. "' (Tribus and 
McIrvine, 1971 ) 
The notion of entropy, especially when given a minus sign (negative 
entropy) and put forward as a general measure of orderliness, captures 
the imagination. Schrodinger explains entropy for the layman thus: 
"At the absolute zero point of temperature... the entropy of any 
substance is zero. When you bring the substance into any other 
state by slow, reversible little steps... the entropy increases by 
an amount which is computed by dividing every little portion of 
heat you had to supply in that procedure by the absolute temper- 
ature at which it was supplied - and by summing up all these 
small contributions. ... the unit in which entropy is measured is 
cal/°C... 
Much more important for us here is the bearing on the stat- 
istical concept of order and disorder, a connection that was rev- 
ealed by the investigations of Boltzmann and Gibbs in statistical 
physics. This too is an exact quantitative connection, and is 
express (sic) by 
entropy =k log D, 
where k is the so-called Boltzmann constant ([dimension] cal/'C), 
and Da quantitative measure of the atomistic disorder of the 
body in question. " (Schrodinger, 1944/1967) 
Schrodinger goes on to suggest that organisms maintain their high 
level of thermodynamic orderliness (measured by the reciprocal of the 
quantity D, which gives the expression for entropy its negative sign) 
by turning highly ordered substances into relatively degraded ones. 
This is a valuable perspective on life, but it needs chemistry and 
116 
biology to explain why some highly complex substances are poisonous. 
The analogy when pushed this far loses its grip and becomes an 
unsolvable puzzle instead. 
Mackay discusses the mathematical notion of entropy in terms of his 
concept of "selective information" (measured in bits), but he comments 
that: 
"The entropy or selective information-content of a selection 
should not be facilely identified with the physical entropy of 
thermodynamics. The two are equivalent only in the particular 
case where the ensemble from which the selection is made is a 
physical one defined for a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. " 
(Mackay, 1969, p174) 
The statistical characteristics - and hence the entropy - of a message 
are found by looking at the relative frequencies of different letters 
or words in natural language. On the level of meanings, such factors 
as what the source is more or less likely to want to say would have to 
be taken into account; this is easy enough to illustrate where there 
is a definite number of possible messages (for example, 'yes' and 
'no'), but to talk about the 'semantic capacities' of audiences is no 
more than an extension, perhaps fanciful, of the analogy between 
signals and symbols. 
The nearest we get to a message in Shannon's perspective is a string 
of symbols which is one of a definite number of possibilities. The 
higher the number of possible messages, or the more equal their res- 
pective probabilities, the higher the entropy (uncertainty) of the 
source and the higher the amount of information gained when the mes- 
sage is received. This is a long way from the (albeit muddled) pers- 
pective of the original question, where the idea of a message had 
something to do with meaning. Weaver says that these statistical 
considerations are essential to an understanding of effective communi- 
cation, even though they have nothing to do with meaning. Then at the 
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end of his article, he says: 
"One has the vague feeling that information and meaning may prove 
to be something like a pair of canonically conjugate variables in 
quantum theory, they being subject to some joint restriction that 
condemns a person to the sacrifice of the one as he insists on 
having much of the other. 
"Or perhaps meaning may be shown to be analogous to one of the 
quantities on which the entropy of a thermodynamic ensemble 
depends. The appearance of entropy in the theory ... is surely 
most interesting and significant. " 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p28) 
The analogy has led to a 'twenty questions', or multiple-choice, 
paradigm for meaning which completely disregards perspective relativ- 
ity. Indeed, PR might be used to put forward a speculative theory 
whereby we can calculate the entropy of a source by enumerating all 
the spaces that source uses and all the things that source might want 
to say in a particular context in each of the spaces, listening to the 
source for a while and counting the relative frequencies. We probably 
do this subliminally with people we know well, as a result of which 
they become more 'predictable'. As a model for meanings with a view 
to incorporating them into a general theory of communication, however, 
it is inadequate for several reasons. First of all, even though it 
brings PR into the theoretical formulation, the perspective on mean- 
ings it suggests is too narrow. Secondly, people's entropies as 
viewed in this way change from moment to moment, and not only because 
of changes in context. Thirdly, Shannon's other concepts, such as 
coding and redundancy, are inappropriate when applied to a theory of 
meanings. While we do speak of 'deciphering' what a person is saying, 
and could well call empty talk 'redundant', it would be a mistake to 
be seduced into thinking that these figures of speech are very fer- 
tile. They provide one limited perspective on one aspect of meanings, 
and may give the impression that, after all, the perspective space of 
the signal and that of the message are compatible. 
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So the next step is to try to clarify our perspective on messages. 
Using our user-system analogy for the questioner and the finder of an 
answer (here the same person), the system only has the user's input to 
go on, and so must now ask the user for clarification of his perspect- 
ive on messages, since there are many possibilities. Examples of 
messages will not help, since they are also examples of signals. To 
narrow down the range, the system could use information as to what, in 
the user's perspective, messages are not, so the question formula 
suggested is: 
Messages as distinct from what? 
Whatever answers the user gives can then be put on one side, as 
irrelevant perspectives on messages; for example: symbol strings, word 
strings (e. g. a telephone message as taken down by an intermediary), 
and any representation of a state of affairs in any perspective space. 
A message is all of these, in other contexts, but not in this one. A 
message is also the effect it has on the recipient, but in such cases 
often the message received is not the one sent, as when the sender (or 
the recipient) is being subtle. Again, this is not quite the perspec- 
tive we are looking for. 
The closest we have come so far is the perspective which sees a 
message as a representation of some state of affairs in the world. 
Why did the user reject this? The answer in this case is that the 
notion of representation is as ambiguous as that of message; however, 
this perspective is the only one which includes what is being repres- 
ented and is objective without being behaviourist. 
The effect on the recipient, on the other hand, was rejected because a 
message, as the user conceives it, is something which the sender and 
recipient can both look at in the same way; whatever else goes on 
between them is incidental. 
(It must be pointed out again that we are not looking for a defini- 
tion, and thereby rejecting perspectives because of counterexamples. 
Perspectives are rejected because they don't feel right. Only the 
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user can judge this; the system can only pick up the pieces. ) 
One last resort for the system, when all its perspectives on messages 
are exhausted, is to look through all the distinctions in its reper- 
toire until it arrives at a set which is manageably small. (E. g. is a 
message observable or not? ). Fortunately in this case the system does 
have something to work on: the message as something potentially public 
to anyone who can view its perspective, and the message as something 
being represented - as distinct from the representation itself. In 
the case of a line drawing, for instance, the message is the world 
shown in the picture, not the picture itself; the perspective space of 
the message is that of the objects or relationships depicted. We are, 
in fact, in a perspective close to Langefors', quoted in Chapter 1, on 
messages. The reason for arriving at it in such a roundabout fashion 
is only to illustrate the kind of negotiation that is often required. 
Let us look at some perspectives on signals and messages, now that we 
have an idea of what we mean by 'message'. The sender's perspective 
and the recipient's perspective are the important ones for meaning; 
the others (those of the telephone engineer, the psychologist, the 
linguist and so on) only come in when something goes wrong with the 
toolkit. The channel, the language, the reading and writing skills 
and so on are all, from the communicators' points of view, taken for 
granted as part of their respective toolkits. 
a) In one perspective on communication there are two people communica- 
ting away, without a thought for the means. The conversation need not 
be grammatical - it need not be in language even; very often the less 
is being said, the more is being communicated (as Weaver suggested) 
although this is by no means always the case since some communication 
calls for a lot of talking - e. g. telling a friend about a recent 
trip. 
To say that the perspective space of the message is background is 
slightly misleading; the perspective space must be an integral part of 
the message, however little syntax is devoted to it. The notion that 
1 20 
what is already known need not be said applies equally to the indica- 
tion of the space (setting the scene) and to the information about 
what is going on there. 
b) In another perspective there might be a difficulty in communication 
which results from a perspective difference between the two people. 
If communication breakdown at the level of (or in the perspective of) 
perspective difference can be understood better, then perhaps syntax 
and semantics will be more forgiving. We saw the different categories 
of perspective difference in section 4.4., and the kinds of effect 
they have. 
Category A, where the POVs are different but the space is the same for 
both people, is the ideal case for communication. (If the POV and the 
space are both the same, then the conversation is probably polite and 
formal with no exchange of information. ) It is Categories B and C 
which call for conversion. 
First we must ascertain that the problem is really in this space and 
not that of difficulty of expression. This is harder than it seems, 
because it is easy to assume that the other person is fully satisfied 
with the way he is expressing himself. If he is satisfied, and you 
still do not understand what he means or find yourself disagreeing 
with him (discussions about God are a notorious example), then there 
is probably a perspective difference. If the POV is the same it is 
Category B, with the spirit of persuasion. Otherwise it is Category 
C, which may or may not be convertible. 
c) In a third perspective, the perspectives are the same but diffic- 
ulty might arise in the expression, i. e. in the Theory aspect. This 
is the problem we encounter when we know what we want to say, but 
don't know how to express it. This is a matter of convention, and the 
most effective cure is practice, which may or may not need to begin 
with mastery of the syntax, as in learning to read. At present, 
machines tend to begin by learning to read, whereas children begin by 
interacting with the world. Syntax is therefore of primary interest 
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for designing the former, whereas spelling and punctuation errors - 
and even misuse of words - are in humans often considered merely a 
nuisance. 
d) A fourth perspective involves the practical problems of getting the 
expression across the intervening medium, e. g. Morse code, semaphore, 
speaking loud enough and so on: Shannon's perspective. 
Any number of these types of difficulty might occur at any one time, 
but each must be solved according to its own perspective's toolkit. 
They are interdependent only in the sense that they are all necessary 
for effective communication, each in its own perspective space. In 
other words, the spaces are mutually relevant, in the sense mentioned 
in Chapter 4- that they are mutually sensitive in a way that matters, 
and therefore constrain one another. Each perspective does not just 
presuppose that all the perspectives 'below' it are functioning prop- 
erly; it presupposes those 'above' it as well. This is in contrast to 
Nauta's suggestion that transmissional, syntactic, semantic and prag- 
matic semiotics are related by one-way embedding. 
Therefore the engineering problem of giving a machine the capacity to 
mean what it says will involve taking into account the mutual sensit- 
ivity of these different perspectives, but will not require the integ- 
ration of all the aspects into a single space. Instead, what is 
needed is a way of incorporating perspectives, and meta-perspectives, 
into the system by any means which happen to work. If pattern recog- 
nition 'ultimately' involves pixel-matching, this does not entail that 
it is 'nothing but' that, but only that the system functions as a 
pattern recogniser in the user's perspective space. If a system does 
include a PR function, it may still have to do it by matching repres- 
entations, but that says nothing fundamental about PR, only about 
current technology. 
Philosophical reductionism, of any sort, becomes highly misleading. 
The argument between those who wish to reduce everything to one funda- 
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mental ontology, such as physics, and those who maintain that 'the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts' (a seductive notion for 
beginners in cybernetics), is a needless (and fruitless) controversy. 
If the perspectives were examined, we might find something like the 
following: 
Reductionist: the subject-matter of physics is all there is. If you 
look at the world through the 'lens' of physics, within the limits to 
observation which are well enough understood, you will see what the 
world is made of and how it works. There are no other components, 
such as information, or Mind. Therefore, in principle, everything can 
be ultimately explained in terms of physics. 
Opponent: the reductionist is obviously wrong - you can put the physi- 
cal components of the world together any way you like, but there is no 
possibility of explaining our mental lives in those terms. It would 
be bad enough trying to follow biological processes in terms of phys- 
ics, and many essential factors would be lost in the attempt. There- 
fore, the sum of the parts is not all there is to the whole, even if 
there is no 'mental substance', or 'information substance'. 
We can see that their perspective spaces are different. One looks at 
the physical world, sees no life or information or Mind, and concludes 
that these things are not fundamental. The other looks at life, or 
systems, or whatever, and concludes that the physical world is not all 
there is. 'Emergent' properties are postulated, to try to maintain 
the insights of both views. 
If we abandon the attempt to combine the two perspectives, and merely 
note their mutual sensitivity, we can satisfy both sides of this 
particular portion of the controversy. The reductionist can maintain 
his view that physical entities are all there is without having to 
show that other views can be explained in those terms, since the other 
views do not contradict him. His opponent can afford to abandon his 
disquiet by seeing that the parts and the whole, where they seem to 
differ in character, are seen in different and incompatible spaces. 
1 23 
To say that the one is greater than the other carries inappropriate 
implications, in particular that a heap of parts and a functioning 
whole can be coherently compared at all. 
To explore mutual sensitivity, one method might be to make a change in 
the relevant fragment of the world as seen in one perspective, and 
then switch to the other perspective to see what, if anything, hap- 
pened there. In this way we can at last look for relations between 
incompatible spaces with less danger of incoherence. It is probably a 
mistake to speak of one change 'causing' the other, though, because 
that carries the suggestion of a nonexistent bridge. Causal links, if 
any, are quite independent in the two spaces in so far as they are 
incompatible. This may seem paradoxical, but it is less confusing 
than the alternative. (If applied to the mind-body problem, for inst- 
ance, the result is that it makes no sense to ask whether mental 
events cause physical events and vice versa. ) 
Quantifiable links between incompatible perspectives, such as that of 
signals and that of meanings, are often of a statistical nature. 
Indeed, the various notions of the entropy of a source of information, 
according to whether the perspective looks at the stream of alpha- 
numeric characters or the repertoire of things the source might want 
to say about the world, provide a good example of this. It may be 
that all statistical results could be seen as indications of mutual 
sensitivity between incompatible perspectives. 
We have seen two broad ways in which perspective relativity applies to 
the problem of meanings. In the first place, meanings only make sense 
in a perspective incompatible with the transmissions of their repres- 
entations and so will not be found there, however closely we try to 
examine those transmissions. Secondly, meanings themselves are sub- 
ject to perspective relativity, in that if a message is to convey a 
meaning the perspective in question has to be included, perhaps imp- 
licitly, before the meaning can be understood. 
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5.3 Different user views 
How do we make even one perspective available to a system which as yet 
does not have it? This is a large problem, which is beyond the scope 
of this project to solve; we can only make a few suggestions as to the 
direction the work might take. 
Given a problem, we need somehow to build up a perspective space from 
the way concepts are used in the problem statement. This is in place 
of 'defining one's terms' and of course does a better job. Defining 
concepts in terms of other concepts is a good way to arrive at a 
semantic network, but we have seen that the truth value of sentences 
(and hence of conceptual graphs) is perspective-relative. Where there 
are potentially incompatible perspective spaces involved, the system 
must be able to keep them apart. 
5.3.1 Brief overview of AI knowledge representation techniques 
A useful summary of research in Artificial Intelligence is to be found 
in Barr & Feigenbaum (1981), of which Chapter 3 in volume 1 covers 
knowledge representation techniques. This section is a summary of 
that summary, followed by some comments as to where perspective 
relativity might be implemented. 
Four kinds of knowledge that need to be represented in AI systems are 
listed: knowledge of Objects, classes of objects and descriptions of 
(facts about) objects; knowledge of Events, including sequences of 
events and cause-effect relations; knowledge of Performance - how to 
put together sentences etc.; and Meta-knowledge, e. g. knowledge of how 
well or reliably something is known. 
Use of this knowledge involves three stages: a) acquiring more 
knowledge, b) retrieving facts relevant to the problem at hand, and c) 
reasoning about these facts in search of a solution. 
Acquisition and retrieval are related in that knowledge acquired must 
be fitted into the knowledge base in such a way that it can be 
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retrieved when needed. Classification of new data structures, 
provision for interaction between different structures (sometimes 
causing interference with the existing ones) and representing them in 
a way which is natural to humans are all being considered. ":, inking 
and lumping" are two kinds of techniques - if one data structure 
entails another they may be explicitly linked, and if several data 
structures are likely to be used together they are lumped together 
into a larger structure. 
Reasoning, from existing knowledge to the answer to the problem, takes 
various forms in people - by analogy, by generalisation and 
abstraction, and meta-level reasoning, e. g. 'if I knew it, I'd know 
that I know it because it's not something I'd forget, so I don't know 
it'. Formal and procedural reasoning - syntactic manipulation using 
rules of inference and simulation by running procedural models - are 
the more successful modes of machine reasoning. There is, as yet, no 
psychological theory of knowledge representation, and the research 
tends to aim for efficiency rather than accurate reflection of how 
humans do it. 
The scope and grain size of a representation depends on the intended 
application, and some things are more easily or naturally represented 
than others. Part of the art of AI research is getting a feeling for 
what it means to be "represented more easily". 
The problem of indeterminacy - that two sentences with quite different 
structures can mean the same - tends to be tackled by choosing certain 
"semantic primitives" and canonical representations, such that two 
structures that mean the same thing reduce to the same network of 
primitives. One form of attempt to do this is to incorporate 'frames' 
(see Minsky, 1974) and 'scripts' into the program. A script is a 
typical scenario, for example that of ordering a meal in a restaurant. 
Each element, the waiter, the menu, the prices, the food, the bill 
etc. has its place in the script. A frame is a conceptual graph with 
'slots' into which certain kinds of element may be entered, and others 
excluded. These techniques serve also to eliminate certain kinds of 
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meaningless statement, but they do so by explicit preprogramming, and 
not by feedback from the world. 
Modularity is a desirable feature, whereby data structures can be 
added, deleted or modified without disturbing the rest of the database 
too much. Otherwise, all the interactions in the system have to be 
understood in order to modify the system, which with large databases 
can be impossibly difficult. Unfortunately for current techniques, 
much human knowledge is inherently nonmodular, and even the meanings 
of data structures depend on context. Some formalisms are more 
modular than others, but in many contexts these formalisms are 
inappropriate. 
We can see from this thumbnail sketch, without going into any more 
detail, that AI research has still not been able to tackle the funda- 
mental problem of manipulating meanings themselves - the best attempts 
still use ever cleverer tricks of manipulating syntactic structures 
and using procedures to make the system seem to know what it is doing. 
Any mistakes it makes are patched up by new ad hoc rules. It is 
impressive, but as the systems grow they must become more and more 
clumsy and difficult to keep on an even keel. 
Let us focus on the matter of modularity. In perspective terms, any 
new fact will modify any view in which it makes sense. Because of 
this, the modules in the system must either be all mutually irrelevant 
in any context, or related in a clear way so that any update can 
percolate through the system cleanly. In the first case, each module 
will grow until the modularity becomes meaningless, since it cannot be 
split into mutually irrelevant parts. In addition, the classifica- 
tions must be rigid. The other approach, to relate contexts in a way 
which reflects the perspective relativity we have noted, does not 
appear to have been seriously attempted (although some recent work on 
"idea processing" packages come close). The system will need some 
kind of analogue of the Experience aspect of each of its conceptual 
graphs (sentences) and schemas. 
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5.3.2 WISARD -a bottom-up approach 
Searle (1980) gives a scenario, now famous, of a person with no knowl- 
edge of Chinese being locked up in a room with a short story, written 
in Chinese, and a rule book for deriving answers to questions about 
the story by manipulating the characters. The argument is that the 
exercise would not make any difference to his understanding of Chin- 
ese, and that, by analogy, AI systems which contain organised struc- 
tures of information and are thereby capable of answering certain 
types of question appropriately do not ipso facto understand what is 
being represented. 
Aleksander and Burnett comment on Searle's critique: 
"The point is that although language and medicine can be 
organised into structures of information which lend themselves to 
programming techniques, these structures by themselves do not 
result in an understanding of the underlying realities; for the 
abstractions were first achieved by a process of induction, 
deriving general principles from particular instances, and only 
become useful in the real world when one has some experience of 
the actual phenomena they explain. " (Aleksander and Burnett, 
1983, p. 200) 
In general, this type of criticism is levelled at the 'top-down' 
approach to AI which is where most of the research has been directed. 
The emphasis is on preprogramming, rather than on enabling the machine 
to learn from experience. The latter approach, it is argued, requires 
a completely different computer architecture, in the same way that a 
brain is different from a conventional von Neumann digital computer. 
In human terms, the problem is that of understanding the groundwork, 
mentioned in Chapter 3, needed to prepare for a certain perspective. 
In contrast to machines, humans begin with sensations which are pre- 
sumed to be initially quite undifferentiated. Then comes discrim- 
ination, between self and the world, between mother and other people 
and so on. Much later comes language. As Aleksander and Burnett put 
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it: 
"Now the fact of the matter is that we do not take a human baby 
out of the crib and start teaching it to play chess, manipulate 
building blocks or speak English. We accept that before any of 
these things are feasible the child is going to have to 'grow up' 
quite a lot - and the essence of growing up is the gradual and 
progressive gathering of experience... " (Ibid., p. 263) 
It is not that a computer cannot be programmed to behave like a 
learning automaton; indeed, many industrial robots do that already. A 
machine which has a facility for attaching a label to any new state 
(e. g. state 1, state 2, etc. ) and a logical facility for attaching a 
particular configuration of state and input to a particular output 
(e. g. if in state 2 and no input change to state 3), . oft i± can be 
trained to build up a set of these if-then statements as if from 
experience. It can also build up a picture of the world as a 'world 
automaton' in a similar way and thereby construct 'from experience' 
the 'program' followed by the world. That is, if the world is in a 
certain state (i. e. presents a certain input) and the robot does a 
certain thing, then the world will change, or not, to another state. 
But however sophisticated such a system might become, there are still 
certain respects in which it obviously does not learn in the same way 
as a brain does. This is no more evident than in the learning of 
physical skills: 
"Children, even performing animals, can learn to balance a stick 
upright on the end of a finger or a ball on the tip of the nose. 
This is clearly comparable to the job of adjusting the thrusters 
of a rocket during its launch phase in order to stop it toppling 
sideways. Yet the child... masters a 'knack'..., whereas the need 
to keep a rocket at Cape Kennedy in the vertical position 
requires the attention of colossal computer banks in Houston 
constantly calculating and recalculating the complex series of 
equations that govern the vehicle's stability. 
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"The point of this comparison is to suggest that when a child... 
masters a physical skill, what is learned is a pattern rather 
than a set of algorithms. " (Ibid., p. 204) 
They go on to suggest that the pattern recognition mechanism in the 
brain might be more fundamental than the logical mode of thought which 
we use to manipulate symbols and algorithms. It certainly seems that 
we share this mechanism with other creatures who lack the intellectual 
facility. Perhaps, they argue, the preprogrammed approach has been 
disappointing because 
"... it cannot realise its full potential unless it is underpinned 
by a more fundamental, though perhaps less formally 'intelli- 
gent', system operating as a pattern recogniser. " (Ibid., p. 205) 
Igor Aleksander and his colleagues have been working on such a device 
for some years, and the result is known as WISARD, for Wilkie, Stonham 
and Aleksander's Recognition Device. WISARD exceeded expectations by 
being capable of recognising faces (live images, not photographs), and 
could even be trained to discriminate between different expressions on 
the same face. 
Many aspects of WISARD's design reflect what is known about the brain, 
as a network of neurons which either 'fire' or do not, according to 
the pattern of incoming pulses. Thus far, they act as simple logic 
gates, and it is the synapses (points on the incoming nerves) which 
control the 'weight' given to the pulses. Attempts to model this kind 
of arrangement before the advent of the silicon chip were not success- 
ful, but now ordinary Random Access Memory (RAM) provides an ideal 
tool. The neuron can 'learn' by changing its synaptic weights, and 
this is done by certain dominant synapses which, in effect, can also 
tell the neuron that the present pattern is the one to fire on in 
future. This is simple enough to model using RAMs, and the theory 
behind WISARD begins with this. 
The next step was to give the RAM net a capacity for generalisation. 
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To show it a particular pattern of pixels, for example, and tell it to 
fire when it sees this pattern again is a long, laborious process, and 
to teach it to accept even small amounts of noise would mean going 
through all possible near-misses in turn. Instead of this, the WISARD 
researchers found a way of letting the net assemble votes, or probab- 
ilities, in favour of this being the image it is looking for. This 
was done by using more, smaller RAMs, with each RAM being allotted one 
section of the image. 
This turns out to be many orders of magnitude more economical, as well 
as enabling the machine to recognise patterns which it has not been 
specifically taught - i. e. to generalise. The teaching process inv- 
olves showing each RAM the perfect image for its particular section, 
plus all the images which are out by one pixel. Thus in a section 
which consists of 4x4 pixels, the RAM is taught to recognise 17 
images as acceptable. Now, each RAM can cast a vote to say that its 
own section corresponds to the particular image it has been taught. 
The net result over the whole image, at reasonable levels of noise 
which are unlikely to be very evenly distributed, should be a majority 
vote in favour when the taught image is presented. 
The more the image is subdivided, the more it can generalise until, 
when it is subdivided too finely, it gives a positive response to 
nearly all images, resulting in 'saturation'. The engineering prob- 
lem, then, includes tuning the fineness of subdivision to a point 
where maximum discrimination is combined with maximum generalisation. 
The next step was to incorporate a form of feedback, whereby the 
machine sees not only the image but also the number of 'votes' cast in 
favour of its being the taught image. This serves to increase its 
degree of confidence in recognising the image. This is analogous to 
the way we see something we think we recognise, and take a second look 
to confirm or reject it. The difference is that we compare the image 
with a remembered image, whereas the system so far only has a crude 
measure to provide the feedback. 
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The next level of sophistication is to try to give the machine memory 
not just of which image was last seen, but of the actual image itself. 
This can be done by means of the 'data-in' terminals on the RAMs, 
those terminals which, in this arrangement, are used to indicate when 
to learn (i. e. setting the synaptic weight, in the neuron analogy). 
"Instead of simply treating the data-in terminals uniformly, 
putting a1 on all of them and relying on the address terminals 
which 'see' an image to store the 1s in the appropriate places, 
we can connect the data-in terminals to another matrix on which 
an image can be displayed... If the output terminals are 
connected to another matrix which displays an image then, 
providing the terminals are connected to the matrices in an 
identical fashion, the image that goes in through the data-in 
matrix will be reproduced on the output one. " (Ibid., p. 244) 
The state of the system is now a 'taught' image, the one on the data- 
in matrix, rather than merely a number of firings in response to a 
particular image. Thus the machine can learn to identify a 'seen' 
pattern by the image it has been taught to associate with it, and can 
go into that state (i. e. output that image). It can still generalise 
as well as before, as long as a constant taught pattern is maintained 
at the data-in terminals for all the input images that are to count as 
the same thing. In this way the machine can generalise different 
expressions on the same face. 
Feeding back the output (i. e. the 'taught') image and mixing it with 
the input 'seen' image will have the same confidence-building effect 
as the simple fire-count did, but with the added benefit of refining 
the internal image with each successive scan. Now if the 'teach' 
terminals are directly connected to the input image, it will automat- 
ically learn any new image that is presented to it and construct a 
corresponding (though cruder, owing to the smaller matrix) internal 
image, which it can output to show the experimenter which state it is 
in. 
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Long-term prospects mentioned in Aleksander and Burnett's book incl- 
ude: provision for long-term memory, provision for appropriate respon- 
ses rather than simply outputting the internal image; connecting the 
device to a manipulator with a sense of touch so that it can learn 
about the world in three dimensions; and equipping it with the means 
of moving about in the world so that it can focus its attention on 
particular, "significant" areas. These can all be envisaged in terms 
of connections between neural nets of the kind the authors describe. 
WISARD is but one example of a bottom-up approach to AI. It is not 
intended to cut out preprogramming altogether, but it is suggested 
that perhaps the introduction of algorithms and heuristics is more a 
matter of convenience, in getting the machine to fulfil a specific 
function, than of modelling the brain. Preprogramming of a net would 
consist of establishing certain configurations of 'synaptic weights' 
before the system is shown any images. 
5.3.3 Images and PR 
The question that comes to mind here is whether these images can 
provide the machine with its Experience aspect. WISARD is, at bottom, 
still no less a pixel-matcher than Searle in his cell with the Chinese 
script is a character-matcher. 
Nevertheless, the capacity of WISARD to recognise images is closer to 
the Experience aspect of a perspective than anything we have seen 
before in Al. While images are generally representations and, as 
such, come under the Theory aspect, the current explosive work on 
image recognition and creation, including the use of the 'mouse' on 
even relatively cheap home computers already, does indicate that 
images require quite a different approach from language. Benzon 
(1985) gives an excellent short article on how the mouse and its 
associated software can actually help us to think; the point is made 
that while we can all use language with facility, drawing well is a 
much rarer skill. Those of us who are quite unable to draw with a 
pencil can now, with this software, start to record images as easily 
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as we write words. The demarcation between the two hemispheres of the 
brain (see Ornstein (1972), especially chapter 3) is of interest here 
because the right hemisphere is the seat of skills and knacks as well 
as images. 
Images used as representations are generally considered to be illustr- 
ations of accompanying text, rather than (as Benzon suggests) the 
other way round. The image, once seen as intended, takes the viewer 
more directly to the intended perspective than a description in words 
does. The accompanying words serve to label the space of the image. 
If no image is presented, then it is constructed or recalled intern- 
ally. 
A jumble of pixels is not an image in this sense, until there is some 
way, however primitive, to see distinctions in it (assuming that the 
pixels themselves are of no interest). Only then does it become an 
image at all, because only then does it become more than meaningless 
noise. There is a style of picture which at first sight looks like a 
meaningless patchwork in black and white. A relatively famous example 
is "The Hidden Man", reproduced in Abercrombie (1960), p26. The way 
it is explained usually takes the form of pointing out the eyes, chin, 
beard and so on, until suddenly the image is seen as that of a man. 
Once seen as such, it will never look like a meaningless patchwork 
again. Another style of picture is a technique whereby the picture is 
divided into squares which are quite large relative to the details in 
the picture, and the squares are filled with the 'average' colour (or 
shade of grey) of that portion of the picture. The result only makes 
sense when seen from a distance, even when you know what is being 
represented, because, we assume, the resolution at a distance is 
closer to what we are accustomed to. 
This of course does not mean that we need to have seen that picture 
before, but only that we have experience of the relevant distinctions. 
Do we therefore have to give the machine all the distinctions it will 
ever use? Like humans, it will never see what it is not prepared to 
see - unless it can wander among different perspective spaces. 
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A useful strategy might be therefore to work on giving the machine 
meta-perspectives as well as particular distinctions. We could 
envisage it drawing analogies and thereby creating new distinctions 
for itself. We could also envisage that, having settled upon a 
coherent perspective space (by search or matching, perhaps), it would 
not need to match pixels to internal learned patterns to interpret the 
image. 
5.4 Problems in information retrieval 
One area which badly needs a technique for meaning-matching is that of 
information retrieval, for example in the use of libraries. The 
traditional problem is this: given an information store and a query, 
what is the best method of retrieving all and only the material which 
is actually relevant? Specific references are easily enough found in 
an alphabetical catalogue, but if the user is not yet familiar with 
the literature or, alternatively, with the library classification 
system, he might not know where to start looking. The most common 
stumbling-blocks appear when the user has difficulty in specifying 
what he wants (for example at the outset of a research project), and 
when the query, once specified, does not fit easily into the prevail- 
ing system of classification. Problems also occur with the classifi- 
cation system itself, when new material begins to accumulate in one 
area (e. g. technology) creating an imbalance and putting a strain on 
the old classifications. 
Thus there are two closely related problem areas: that of represent- 
ing the documents (e. g. by abstracts, indexing etc) and that of 
representing the query. Two traditional concepts should be mentioned, 
namely recall and precision. Recall is the proportion of relevant 
documents that are retrieved (i. e. a measure of whether the net was 
thrown wide enough to catch all relevant documents), and precision is 
the proportion of retrieved documents that are relevant (i. e. a meas- 
ure of whether it was narrow enough to exclude irrelevant material). 
There has been some discussion about what appears to be an inverse 
relationship between these two quantities, i. e. the hypothesis that to 
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increase recall is to decrease precision and vice versa. This seems 
to put a limit to the performance of IR systems, since a reasonable 
goal would presumably be 100% recall and 100% precision. A very 
technical examination of the 'inverse law' is given in Robertson 
(1975). In particular, the point is made that where the 'law' might 
work for one independent variable, it might not apply where more than 
one variable is taken into account. 
A number of quite recent papers in the fields of information science 
and information retrieval research are concerned with examining the 
basic assumptions and proposing alternatives with their accompanying 
new strategies. Belkin and Robertson (1976) attempt to derive a 
"spectrum of information concepts" from the basic premises a) that 
information science is problem-oriented, and b) that the one notion 
common to all existing concepts of information is that of change of 
structure, whether it be structure of text, of recipient, or even of 
sender. Boulding's (1956) concept of the "image" - the particular 
mental conception each of us has of the world and our place in it at 
any time - is taken as a starting-point. The point is made towards 
the end of the paper that 'we can imagine document retrieval systems 
which make direct use of the idea of the recipient's image'. 
Griffiths and Elsharkawi (1977) put forward the idea that an IR system 
should be interactive, rather than static, reflecting the philosophi- 
cal insight that communication is not just a matter of the sending and 
receiving of data among otherwise isolated individuals, but is a 
process in which the 'recipient' is also actively participating. They 
criticise Belkin and Robertson's breakdown for not taking this 
dynamic, interactive aspect into account. 
Meanwhile Pratt (1977), in a discussion of the various uses of the 
term 'information', points to three distinct areas of meaning of the 
word: first, there is Shannon and Weaver's clearly-defined notion, 
which everyone accepts but recognises its limits; then there are two 
approaches to that aspect of 'information' which is left over. The 
first sees information as a property of a message, dependent only on 
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the pattern of symbols, and hence as something akin to a form of 
energy, whereas the other sees information as a process, that process 
whereby the recipient of the message is informed, i. e. changed 
inwardly. Pratt suggests adoption of the term 'emmorphosis' for the 
latter sense, to avoid needless controversy as to the 'real' meaning 
of information. 
5.4.1 Belkin's 'ASK' 
Belkin (1977) looks at this 'emmorphosis' aspect of IR. He points to 
two traditional assumptions: first, that a more or less formal 'docu- 
mentary language' is an appropriate mechanism for representing the 
meanings of both the documents and the query (or request) in abstract 
terms, and secondly that the so-called 'best match hypothesis' is an 
appropriate basis for an algorithm which orders the documents accord- 
ing to their relevance to the request. The two assumptions are rel- 
ated in that the best match hypothesis assumes that the information 
need is precisely specifiable in the same terms as the documents it is 
trying to match. 
Systems based on these and similar ideas seem to be reaching a 
performance ceiling, and despite various attempts (which Belkin cites) 
to explain and circumvent this persistent low performance, including 
suggestions to change the goal itself or to modify it to allow for a 
browsing facility and attempts to provide 'relevance weighting', there 
has not been marked improvement. 
Therefore what Belkin proposes is to treat IR 
"in the context of a communication system specific to information 
science" (Belkin, 1977 p. 7). 
The system is represented on two levels: the linguistic level and the 
cognitive level. The linguistic level consists of text, generators of 
text, and recipients; the cognitive level consists of states of knowl- 
edge, information (in the sense of informing) and anomalous states of 
knowledge, or ASKs. The problem facing information science is to 
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facilitate effective communication between the (human) generator of a 
document and the user. 
Belkin shifts the emphasis from the formulated request to the informa- 
tion need behind it, which might be no more that a recognition that 
the present state of knowledge is anomalous. Therefore, he suggests, 
it seems reasonable to represent documents in terms appropriate for 
representing anomalous states of knowledge (ASK), rather than vice 
versa. 
This approach immediately points up new problems, because there are 
different types of ASK, and because there might be alternative ways of 
resolving the anomaly. But the approach seems to be on the right 
track if only because the information-as-property approach has reached 
its limits. 
In a design study for an interactive IR system based on the user's 
ASK, Belkin, Oddy and Brooks (1982) begin with the view that, since 
the user is unable to specify what will resolve the anomaly in his 
state of knowledge, it makes more sense to try to discover the ASK 
than to expect the user to ask the appropriate question right away. 
In Part 1 they outline a system which takes a user's problem statement 
(say, 2-3 paragraphs long), converts it to a structural representation 
of the user's ASK by text analysis, and chooses one of several 
retrieval mechanisms according to the type of problem structure (PS). 
In this context, a retrieval mechanism is a strategy for 
resolving the anomalous aspects of a PS. " (Belkin, Oddy and 
Brooks, 1982) 
The abstract (i. e. the text) is printed out for the user to read, 
along with a brief explanation of why that particular text was chosen. 
The user is then asked to comment on this, whereupon the system either 
stops if the user is satisfied, or changes retrieval mechanism, or 
modifies the problem structure. The procedure is repeated until the 
user is satisfied. 
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The basis of the structures derived and used in the system is word 
association networks, and strength of association is based simply on 
lexical separation in the text. In the design study, outlined in Part 
II of the article, the system was tried out on a sample of genuine 
users with queries, and one consistent comment was that if anything 
some concepts were not strongly enough associated by this method, when 
applied both to the abstracts of the document collection and to the 
problem statement. Lexical separation has the obvious advantage that 
it is a simple variable to work with, but the obvious disadvantage 
that the links between concepts are of many different kinds (to some 
of which the idea of 'close association' does not apply anyway), 
whereas lexical separation is strictly a single dimension. 
While the variety of types of link between concepts was not considered 
in the study, it was clearly recognised that there are different types 
of ASK, and that each type might require a different retrieval 
strategy. The division of links into categories of strong, medium and 
weak association, and the possibility of condensing a network by 
amalgamating clusters of nodes, is enough to cope with (say) the 
difference between a well-understood topic which the user wishes to 
read up and a hazy problem still unresolved in the literature. In 
short, there is already a range of different search strategies 
available using only lexical separation on the problem statements and 
the document abstracts. 
The authors conclude that their results do much to justify their 
approach, but that a great deal more work needs to be done in almost 
all aspects of the system, in particular in refinement of the analytic 
procedures and in classification of ASKs, as well as the interactive 
aspect and the retrieval mechanism itself. 
To think of an anomalous state of knowledge as a frame or script with 
gaps waiting to be filled implies that all knowledge is of the 
'multiple-choice' kind, where there is a clear menu of possible 
answers, of which one and only one is correct. The ASKs which give 
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the greatest problems are quite different in character, because the 
space itself needs to be made clear. 
We immediately have a first step at a possible classification of ASKS, 
namely the distinction between those where the space is clearly under- 
stood but the state of affairs there is not (e. g. what was the date of 
the death of Richard III? ) and those where the space still needs to be 
clarified (e. g. what on earth is cybernetics? ). 
For the former kind of query, standard reference works, possibly 
though not necessarily classified roughly according to perspective 
space, would probably suffice. 
Where the space itself is unclear, there are several possible diffic- 
ulties. Perhaps the question looked simple enough (to the user) but 
turned out to be incoherent, ambiguous, or as yet unanswered in the 
literature. Alternatively, the user knows the query is about the 
space (e. g. an unfamiliar subject). 
It is therefore suggested that perhaps a useful strategy for IR sys- 
tems in the future might be to aim at narrowing down to a perspective 
space rather than immediately to a set of documents. Documents can be 
added to the store according to this type of strategy, possibly making 
classification less arbitrary than some people suggest it is at pres- 
ent. 
Classifying documents according to perspective space would be a form- 
idable task. It might be possible, however, to ask experts in various 
fields to classify authors according to what they are interested in, 
so that users with a vaguely specified ASK could be pointed towards 
their writings. At that point, the title of the work will be enough 
to tell the user whether the document is likely to be of use to him. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
We have examined four areas which might benefit from some of the 
considerations put forward in Chapters 1 to 4, but there are many 
others which might have deserved more attention. 
For example, PR can give some general strategies for non-adversarial 
communication, such as education and explanation. To put this another 
way, it provides us with a non-technical and non-psychological way of 
talking about what good teachers already do instinctively. It seems 
more generally recognised now than in the past that teaching is less a 
matter of imparting facts than of motivating the student to enquire 
for himself. Certainly the long term result of education appears to 
be knowledge not of answers but of where to look for answers. 
In abstract subjects such as mathematics and logic, the subject matter 
is explicitly the learning of perspective spaces. Once the student 
has grasped what the teacher has in mind it is often as if it was 
obvious all along. Plato found this a puzzle, and suggested that this 
'recognition' is recall from a previous existence and, indeed, 
reincarnation has been put forward as an explanation for individual 
differences in aptitude. But we have seen that, given sufficient 
groundwork in experience and representation, a new way of looking does 
seem obvious if it is seen at all. 
Gregory (1981) makes the distinction between Potential Intelligence 
and Kinetic Intelligence. Potential Intelligence is a store of solu- 
tions to problems which accumulate, both in the individual and in the 
community, as new solutions are added to the knowledge; Kinetic Intel- 
ligence is the capacity to solve a problem for the first time. In PR 
terms, the store of familiar perspectives and their associated tool- 
kits, if any, would be part of the accumulation of Potential Intelli- 
gence, and Kinetic Intelligence would be the capacity to see things in 
an entirely new way. 
A great deal of the knowledge that we take for granted is easily con- 
fused with consciousness itself. Perhaps the POV in a complex, value- 
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laden perspective space is where consciousness lies, what Nagel calls 
"the subjective character of experience" (Nagel, 1974), but getting to 
a POV - what it is like to be there - is problematic for machines. 
Why this is so is a difficult problem, not least because our imagina- 
tion does not run to what it would be like to be a machine with 
certain types of input. The best we can do is to imagine what it 
would be like to be ourselves restricted to those types of input (see 
Nagel, 1974, p169). We have difficulty stripping down our perspective 
spaces to those of simple (or, as in Nagel's example of bats, funda- 
mentally alien) systems. 
Nevertheless we have found that perspective relativity, as a concep- 
tual exercise, has proved to be useful in clearing some of the ground 
for a number of problems. The principal difference between our view 
and what is generally thought of as 'perspectivism' is that in the 
latter it is assumed that a person builds up one enormous perspective 
space as he goes through life in a particular intellectual climate, 
whereas we have pointed out that what we build up is a multiplicity of 
ways of looking, not all of which are compatible but which do not 
thereby have to contradict one another. 
In the matter of energy and information propagation in particular, we 
find at least four incompatible perspectives on an act of communica- 
tion, each with its own kind of measurement, where the only possible 
relation between them is that of mutual sensitivity which acts 'down' 
as well as 'up' what is generally regarded as a hierarchy of levels. 
This is one of two senses in which perspective relativity is relevant 
to the problem of meanings; it is also directly relevant to meanings 
themselves, in the sense that the perspective space is more or less 
explicitly a component of the message, and it is this component which 
individuates a meaning when the words (or other form of representa- 
tion) are ambiguous. 
PR can offer a way of looking at some philosophical problems. The 
strategy, in general, is to specify (or at least indicate) the persp- 
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ective, then to go and look at the view. In delineating the perspec- 
tive, we can ensure that all of the envisaged possible answers to the 
question do actually correspond to states of affairs in that space. 
At this point we can eliminate nonsensical questions and, even more 
important, we can say why they are nonsense. If there is still 
puzzlement in that area we can keep looking for a perspective in which 
the question does make sense. 
If the question survives the first stage - i. e. it still makes sense 
after the perspective has been sufficiently well delineated - then the 
next step is to go and see. If it proves to be impossible in practice 
(e. g. to find out if there is an afterlife), then perhaps we can only 
choose where to place our faith. If, on the other hand, it is poss- 
ible to look and see, then the philosophical problem becomes a scien- 
tific one, and the perspective space becomes part of a paradigm. 
In perspective terminology, then, philosophy is (in one meta-perspec- 
tive) the attempt to articulate coherent perspectives in which to 
place the traditional puzzlements; looking for answers has no place in 
the endeavour. Philosophical problems are all pseudo-problems, as 
they stand; philosophy becomes instead a valuable catalyst separating 
areas of disquiet into science on the one hand, and religion on the 
other. The most common type of problem is that in which the two or 
three proposed solutions each fall into different spaces, which are 
mutually incompatible. The mind-body problem is a clear example of 
this. Here we see that it seldom makes sense to speak of a philos- 
ophical 'position'. The strategy would be to separate the different 
perspectives implied by the proposed solutions and then, in each of 
the alternative perspectives, to find out whether the problem is a 
scientific one or one to which there is no answer. If the former, 
steps can be taken to look and see. 
Appropriateness of a perspective in a particular situation depends on 
the purpose which is brought to it. Purposes, in the sense of desired 
results, are not built-in to a perspective space in the way that we 
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have said that values can be. For a purpose to be acceptable, though, 
it must be consistent (to an extent which is included in the judgment) 
with values in all the relevant perspective spaces, otherwise there 
might be unforeseen consequences in the purpose's implementation. 
(One is reminded of the moral of practically every fairy story con- 
cerning the granting of wishes. ) The appropriateness judgment there- 
fore ultimately depends on everything that the devil's advocate can 
bring to it and so, in particular, in the matter of truth we arrive at 
Feyerabend's point that the greater the multiplicity of perspective 
spaces - even apparently oddball ones - the closer we are to under- 
standing the world. We may have nowhere to lay our head, but free 
fall may prove to be more comfortable in any case. 
Finally, in ordinary human communication where the greatest multipli- 
city of perspectives is to be found, a number of different strategies 
are suggested, all of which are common sense but do not appear to 
depend on 'human nature' and psychology. There is, first of all, 
Kuhn's suggestion that to read Aristotle sympathetically you have to 
look for (and try to experience) a perspective space in which what he 
says makes good sense. Conversely, a person can be in the right place 
for an experience and never see it because, for one reason or another, 
the relevant distinctions are not available to him. Perhaps this is 
WISARD's problem. Communication is sharing, but perhaps more import- 
antly it is a matter of seeing what is not shared, and filling the 
anomaly with regard to experience or theory according to which of 
those is lacking. 
This has been only a preliminary conceptual study, and much more work 
could be done in specific areas which has not been attempted here. In 
the attempt to say nothing which would not be subject to alteration if 
an alternative perspective were preferred, it is hoped that this 
notion of perspective relativity has been shown to be innocuous and at 
the same time to carry considerable potential. 
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